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To the Reader
Financial disclosure regulation is paramount. In particular after the recent financial crises,
jurisdictions around the globe have revamped the financial disclosure environment with the ob-
jective to re-establish trust in financial markets. Yet, we know surprisingly little about how these
disclosure requirements actually work. Do they help institutional investors to structure their
portfolios? Do ownership disclosure requirements trigger rebalancing decisions by investors?
How does the international diversity of regulations interact with the labor mobility of the pro-
fessionals that have to deal with them?
These are the questions that Sarah Kröchert is exploring in her thesis. Although all ques-
tions address consequences of disclosure, they capture widely different aspects of that theme.
While this can be understood as an indication of how far-reaching the consequences of financial
disclosure regulation are, it is also an impressive indication of Sarah’s widely spread research
interests.
Her findings are fascinating. She documents that institutional investors cater to accounting-
related notions of comparability, indicating that one of the key features of financial reporting
is valued by the investment community. This is relevant as there is an ongoing debate in the
financial accounting community about whether to strengthen the comparability or the individual
informativeness of financial accounting information. In her second study, she leverages her insti-
tutional expertise to address a key question related to ownership disclosures. Using proprietary
data from the Deutsche Bundesbank, she studies whether institutional investors manage their
ownership stakes to stay "below the radar" of mandatory ownership disclosures (they do). Her
setting is neat for two reasons: Since the data collected by Deutsche Bundesbank is independent
from public ownership disclosures, she is capable to look "behind the curtain". In addition, as
she can observe the complete ownership structure, she can also provide some insights on who
is picking up the discarded ownership stakes. In her final study, which is co-authored with Ulf
Brüggemann and myself, we explore the determinants of short-term international labor mobility
in the professional services sector. The direct labor market consequences of financial market
regulation have been largely overlooked by prior work. Yet again, the international regulatory
harmonization can be expected to affect the mobility of the professionals in that field. While our
findings are exploratory in nature, they are consistent with regulatory harmonization positively
affecting the short-term labor mobility of affected employees.
Sarah Kröchert has developed an impressive research program that provides a holistic view
on what disclosure regulation can and cannot achieve. Understanding the depth and inter-
connectedness of regulations is highly relevant to regulators, market participants and academics
alike. The work of Sarah Kröchert contributes to this debate by using fresh data and designs to
answer new questions. I hope that her studies will be widely read and used.
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Introductory Summary
The requirement to disclose information can affect behavior, both of the disclosing agent and
others consuming the disclosure. The disclosing agent often reveals information about his own
actions and thus makes himself susceptible to critical evaluations. Apart from reputational
consequences, he regularly faces monetary incentives to present himself in a particular manner.
Agents consuming the disclosure obtain, directly or indirectly, more information, which they can
incorporate into their decision-making. Jin and Leslie [2003], for instance, provide evidence for
consequences of the public disclosure of restaurant hygiene scores, for the restaurants subject to
disclosure and their guests. Notably, the authors study the introduction of the dislosure regime,
not the underlying hygiene inspections, from which the scores are derived and which are in place
before. Their findings suggest that the mere requirement to disclose incentivizes restaurants to
improve hygiene, serving, in turn, to increase revenues. At the same time, potential guests can
better choose the restaurant that matches their preferences [e.g., Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973].
This thesis comprises three essays on the consequences of mandatory, financial disclosures. In
each essay, the agent of interest assumes a different role; he is primarily disclosing, consuming
disclosures or supporting the preparation of the same.
The agents of interest are sophisticated, knowledgeable and well informed. They have the
necessary expertise to understand financial disclosures and the impact of disclosing certain items.
Despite their expertise, even they are limited in their capabilities of processing information. The
benefits of fully grasping content are frequently offset by the costs of acquiring relevant pieces of
information. In the first and second essay, I focus on one group of sophisticated capital market
participants, institutional investors. Although subsumed by a common term, they are hetero-
geneous entities [e.g., Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009; Edmans, 2014]. Some are forthcoming
about their own activities, others are not; some deal intensively with the activities of third par-
ties, others do not. In the final essay, I concentrate on highly skilled professionals who assist
in the preparation of financial disclosures, employees in the accounting industry. Accounting
is characterized by a comparatively high density of rules and a high degree of standardization
[e.g., Madsen, 2011]. Across countries, these rules can differ and, in this vein, change incentive
patterns in other markets, such as the international labor market.
The essays are all empirical in nature and take methodological approaches aimed at gaining
insight into the questions at hand. They do so by exploiting settings that offer variation in
the constructs of interest along with data sources with a sufficient level of detail. As a result,
settings range from single countries, Germany or the United States (US), to a broad set of
country pairs. They encompass disclosure regulation that varies in the cross section or over
1
time, in part allowing for causal inference strategies. Finally, they entail data of a granularity
rarely found in academic studies.
The first essay, “Ownership Disclosure and Ownership Structure: Investors’ Response to
Lower Reporting Thresholds”, assesses the reaction of disclosing agents to a change in disclosure
requirements. Disclosure instruments are ownership disclosures, timely, non-periodic announce-
ments, through which investors are to reveal their holdings. Rules refer to all investors on
regulated capital markets, but only to certain holdings in that they condition disclosure on
crossing reporting thresholds. Hence, disclosing agents have some discretion as to whether to
disclose at all. Remaining below reporting thresholds does not trigger any disclosure require-
ment. Disclosing agents also have potential incentives to avoid disclosure. Transparency can be
costly, for example, if it involves the revelation of privately generated information [e.g., Fishman
and Hagerty, 1995; Wermers, 2001]. These costs should be especially pronounced for sophis-
ticated investors with holdings close to reporting thresholds. I therefore differentiate between
different types of (institutional) investors and investigate whether they adjust their holdings
around disclosure changes.
The study exploits the German setting for three reasons. First, the German regulator lowered
reporting thresholds, enabling the analysis of rule changes that are plausibly exogenous from
the perspective of the investor. Second, I can work with data on privately reported and publicly
disclosed holdings of all different investor types in the market. The comprehensive data coverage
makes it possible to analyze which investors decrease their holdings, but also which investors
are on the other side of the trades. Third, the German stock market has two segments, the
regulated and unregulated market, of which only one is subject to the ownership disclosure
regime. Consequently, I conduct a difference-in-differences analysis, with the rule changes as
treatment and unaffected holdings as control group.
Findings show that mutual funds and banks, sophisticated investor types with small stakes,
reduce their holdings while non-financial corporations, typical blockholders whose stakes are
public knowledge, increase their holdings. They underline that, in the extreme, changes in own-
ership disclosure can induce changes in ownership structure. By this means, they can influence
other firm outcomes, e.g., stock liquidity as discussed below or corporate governance structures
as discussed in extant work [e.g., Appel, Gormley and Keim, 2016; Edmans, 2014]. Further
analyses of mutual funds, the investor type with the most robust results, show that mutual
funds tend to concentrate their holdings just below the initial reporting threshold, consistent
with disclosure avoidance incentives driving the observed reduction in their holdings. Lastly, I
address liquidity consequences of mutual funds’ response. The reduction in their holdings ap-
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pears to weaken the positive relation between disclosure and stock liquidity that is documented
in prior literature [e.g., Agarwal, Mullally, Tang and Yang, 2015; Christensen, Hail and Leuz,
2016].
The second essay, “Accounting Comparability in Mutual Funds’ Portfolios”, centers on mutual
funds in their role as agents who consume disclosures. Precisely, as agents who process and
evaluate periodic financial statements issued by potential and existing portfolio firms. Mutual
funds, or rather their fund managers, need accounting information to make investment decisions.
In addition, they need accounting information that is comparable and standardized to benchmark
firms against each other. Although they certainly have the expertise to make financial statements
comparable on their own, they increasingly rely on automated data processing for large and
diversified portfolios, implying that they might demand ex ante similar accounting information.
In this study, I examine whether accounting comparability of potential and existing portfolio
firms affects mutual funds’ investment decisions.
I resort to the US market because of the availability of frequent portfolio disclosures of
mutual funds. I measure accounting comparability of firms in line with De Franco, Kothari and
Verdi [2011], but extend the concept in two respects. Next to the return-based model proposed
by De Franco et al., I employ a cash flow-based model. Moreover, I emphasize the investor
perspective. The assessment of comparability requires the definition of a peer group. Since
mutual funds decide about the composition of their portfolios, the most relevant peers, from
their perspective, should be portfolio firms. The comparability proxies thus capture accounting
similarities with portfolio peers. They are defined at the holding level and vary with firms’ own
accounting practices as well as the set of portfolio peers they are compared to.
The analysis at first establishes that accounting comparability is high in mutual fund port-
folios. As benchmark, I use analyst portfolios, constructed from analysts’ coverage decisions.
Analyst portfolios are ambitious benchmarks in that analysts themselves should benefit from
covering firms that are, in accounting terms, more comparable [e.g., De Franco et al., 2011; Neel,
2017]. Yet, findings show that comparability is higher in mutual fund portfolios. Among mutual
funds, comparability is also higher in nonindexer than in indexer portfolios, strengthening the
economic rationale. If similar accounting information facilitates portfolio management, compa-
rability effects should be concentrated in portfolios of nonindexer funds that actively manage
their portfolios. The analysis then turns to the source of the comparability effects and mutual
funds’ investment decisions. I can show that the probability of a firm being included into a
portfolio is increasing in accounting comparability. Besides, I study comparability around the
point in time when the firm is included. Until inclusion into the portfolio, accounting compa-
3
rability increases, but does not change much afterwards. Taken together, the findings suggest
that mutual funds value accounting comparability in selecting investments. The findings do not
suggest that mutual funds induce changes in comparability of their portfolio firms once they are
invested.
The third essay, “Temporary Migration within Multinational Corporations: Evidence from
the Accounting Industry” (co-authored with Ulf Brüggemann and Joachim Gassen), focuses on
agents that support the preparation of financial disclosures. Regulations governing accounting
and tax disclosures are complex in themselves and differ across countries. Auditors and (tax)
consultants assist in setting up the necessary infrastructure in firms. Their expertise originates
from both specialization in local rules and international experience with different institutional
environments. Mobility in an international context may thereby depend on the similarity in
the respective regulatory frameworks. In this study, we provide initial evidence on the relative
importance of these occupation-level determinants for temporary, within-firm migration.
We explore a proprietary dataset of a large accounting firm, informing about all international
assignments of its employees. The data are granular in the sense that they allow to observe
mobility in country pairs. We initially verify that typical, country-level migration determinants
also play a role for the type of mobility in our setting; temporary, within-firm migration of
the highly skilled. We can show that mobility is higher in country pairs with cultural links
and economic ties and country pairs that are geographically closer. In the second step, we
test whether the similarity in accounting and tax regimes in country pairs, the factor specific
to the occupations, is associated with the decision to migrate. We can show that mobility
is increasing in the similarity of rules, in particular for auditors. We hence add to the still
evolving literature on temporary migration of (accounting) professionals [e.g., Beaverstock, 2017;
Bloomfield, Brüggemann, Christensen and Leuz, 2017] by documenting that occupation-level
factors are related to mobility patterns.
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Ownership Disclosure and Ownership Structure:
Investors’ Response to Lower Reporting Thresholds∗
Sarah Kröchert
Humboldt University of Berlin
Abstract
The study investigates which investors adjust their holdings around the introduction of
lower reporting thresholds for ownership disclosures. I work with a dataset that includes
both publicly disclosed and undisclosed holdings. I exploit segment-specific rules in the
stock market that provide variation in disclosure regimes. Mutual funds and, to a lesser
extent, banks decrease while non-financial corporations increase their holdings. I then ex-
amine in greater detail whether the reduction in mutual funds’ holdings is consistent with
the avoidance of reporting thresholds. In the public disclosures, mutual funds concentrate
their holdings just below the initial threshold. They also seem to react gradually over time,
supporting a response to stricter enforcement. Finally, I study liquidity consequences. The
reduction in mutual funds’ holdings appears to weaken the previously documented posi-
tive relation between disclosure and stock liquidity. The findings suggest that changes in
ownership disclosure can induce changes in ownership structure.
∗I am grateful to Deutsche Bundesbank for the provision of the Securities Holdings Statistics; to EQS Group for the
notifications; to Martin Schmidt and Richard Stehle from Humboldt University of Berlin for the list of ISIN changes;
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for historical and current ISIN. I thank Dan Amiram, Martin Bierey, Mary Billings, Ulf Brüggemann, Joachim Gassen,
Alon Kalay, Maximilian Muhn and Peter Pope for their thoughtful feedback. I further thank workshop participants at
Humboldt University, Columbia University, the 2017 EAA Doctoral Colloquium, the 2017 EAA Annual Congress and the
2017 AAA Annual Meeting for helpful comments.
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1 Introduction
There is evidence that investors prefer to avoid the disclosure of their holdings. Under a trans-
parency regime that conditions on reporting thresholds, such a preference can translate into
the accumulation of holdings just below the disclosure threshold. Academic research suggests,
for instance, that transparency regimes for short sales result in investors keeping positions low
and hence avoiding their public disclosure [e.g., Jank, Roling and Smajlbegovic, 2016; Jones,
Reed and Waller, 2016]. Investors themselves regularly emphasize that disclosure is costly and
regulators care about potential reactions to these costs. In discussions about the adequate
level of ownership disclosure, the European Commission acknowledges that "[l]arge institutional
investors [...] have a tendency to remain below the regulatory disclosure threshold in listed
companies" [European Commission, 2008, p. 9]. This study examines a setting in which the
regulator lowers reporting thresholds for ownership disclosures. While the above rationale im-
plies that, in response, investors reduce their holdings, it is incomplete in that it cannot describe
the behavior of all market participants. Widespread selling, even if only by institutional in-
vestors, induces price pressure. In the end, some investors need to take the other side of the
trades and thus add to their holdings. Ex ante, it is not obvious who ends up on which side of
the market. I investigate which investors decrease and which investors increase their positions.
In addition, I study the liquidity consequences of the reaction to the regulatory changes.
Empirical research is relatively silent on the relation between ownership disclosure and own-
ership structure, which is mostly due to the frequent unobservability of investors’ actions. If
they successfully avoid disclosure, there is no public record of their holdings. Even if data are
available, they usually relate to subsets of investors and impede inferences on the overall own-
ership structure [e.g., Aragon, Hertzel and Shi, 2013; Jank et al., 2016]. Yet, understanding the
relation is important because it impacts firm-level outcomes. Ownership structure shapes stock
liquidity or the corporate governance of firms. Studies show that different investors can affect
firm decisions and capital market assessments, but, again, often focus on a particular investor
type [e.g., Appel, Gormley and Keim, 2016; Boone and White, 2015; Edmans, 2014].
I explore the research question in the German setting, since it offers a rare combination
of datasets. The data cover the holdings of (almost) all investors, including investors who
successfully avoid disclosure. Precisely, they encompass privately reported and publicly disclosed
holdings. I use privately reported holdings from the Securities Holdings Statistics (SHS), a
database of Deutsche Bundesbank, the German central bank. Every quarter, German financial
institutions inform the central bank about all holdings in shares deposited with them, separately
for single securities and different investor types. In this dataset, I have holdings only at the level
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of the investor type and not the individual investor. However, I can observe all actions of
investors, disclosed and undisclosed, without reporting bias. It is this feature that distinguishes
my study from prior work relying on assumptions about undisclosed choices [e.g., Agarwal, Gay
and Ling, 2014; Jones et al., 2016] and that makes the data attractive for research in general [e.g.,
Baltzer, Jank and Smajlbegovic, 2015; Jank, 2011; Kick, Onali, Ruprecht and Schaeck, 2014].
In the SHS, I can differentiate between foreign investors and the following domestic investor
types: mutual funds, banks, insurance companies and pension funds, non-financial corporations,
governmental institutions, other financial investors and households. In what follows, I refer
to these data as holdings. I use publicly available holdings from notifications disseminated by
the DGAP, the main distributor in Germany. Notifications are the instrument through which
investors disclose their ownership when they cross a threshold and which is directly affected
by the regulatory changes.1 Notably, they contain information at the level of the individual
investor. In what follows, I refer to these data as notifications.
I expect that investors adjust their holdings in response to the introduction of lower reporting
thresholds because disclosure entails costs. Disclosure can be costly, since it invites free riding
and front running [e.g., Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005; Fishman and Hagerty, 1995]; raises
agency costs [e.g., Edmans, Heinle and Huang, 2016; Prat, 2005]; and imposes direct adminis-
trative costs [e.g., European Commission, 2008, 2012]. As an example, Verbeek and Wang [2013]
show that mimicking mutual funds’ holdings from periodic reports can be profitable, consistent
with free riders extracting rents by exploiting mutual funds’ privately generated information.
In contrast to periodic reports that follow fixed reporting intervals, notifications become pub-
lic a few days after the triggering event, the trade that results in crossing a threshold. Their
timeliness might make disclosure particularly costly. Disclosure can also be beneficial in that
it accelerates the realization of returns [e.g., Frank, Poterba, Shackelford and Shoven, 2004;
Ljungqvist and Qian, 2016]. Anecdotally, incidences of misreporting suggest that, at least for
some investors, costs outweigh benefits. In my setting, the asset manager BlackRock repeatedly
discloses notifications with errors or delay, effectively hiding information on its holdings.2
I argue that investors are heterogeneous and therefore face these costs and benefits to a
different extent. However, a priori, I refrain from ranking them along their (net) costs as such
a ranking is not obvious. For instance, mutual funds’ agency relationship might involve consid-
1As described in Section 2.1, it is the issuer and not the investor who discloses the notification; the investor only
notifies the issuer. Although slightly negligent, I ignore the role of the issuer.




erable disclosure costs. Fund investors closely monitor fund managers and punish undesirable
actions by redeeming shares in a timely manner. Fund managers, in turn, ensure that disclosed
holdings satisfy the current expectations of their investors and not necessarily the optimum
[Prat, 2005]. At the same time, mutual funds’ activities are already quite transparent through
other channels, e.g., periodic portfolio disclosures or daily return reports. Albeit imperfectly,
other market participants can guess which securities the fund manager trades. Alternatively,
non-financial corporations, usually long-term strategic investors, likely prefer not to disclose
their private information. Anecdotally, cases of hidden stake building imply that they regard
the revelation of such information as costly.3 Yet, existing rules typically require them to dis-
close their holdings before thresholds are lowered, again questioning incremental costs. Thus,
I merely argue that costs differ across investors and that this heterogeneity is precisely what
makes holding adjustments possible. Investors with the highest disclosure costs reduce their
holdings below reporting thresholds and can do so only because there are other investors with
lower disclosure costs who accept their shares.
In the holdings analysis, I examine whether investors adjust their holdings upon the intro-
duction of stricter reporting thresholds in 2007, 2009 and 2012. I use investors’ percentage
stakes since thresholds are formulated as percentage of overall voting rights. The identification
strategy makes use of the segmentation of the German stock market. Ownership disclosure rules
apply only to firms listed on the regulated, not the unregulated market. Hence, I conduct a
difference-in-differences analysis, comparing changes in investors’ holdings in firms in the reg-
ulated market (treatment group) with changes in holdings in firms in the unregulated market
(control group). Despite being relatively large, the unregulated market is the explicit segment
choice of smaller and younger firms [Vismara, Paleari and Ritter, 2012]. I undertake two steps to
improve comparability between treatment and control group. First, I drop from the treatment
group the largest firms. Treated firms in the resulting sample are on average still larger than
control firms, but substantially closer in size. This step should further shift the focus to firms for
which holdings around reporting thresholds translate into typical investment amounts of insti-
tutional investors. The German Investment Funds Association (BVI) stresses that mutual funds
might easily exceed thresholds with their holdings in midcaps.4 Second, I work with different
estimation approaches. I mainly rely on firm (and quarter-year) fixed effects. In additional
specifications, I include firm-specific linear time trends and time-varying firm characteristics or
3In Germany, the most prominent example for hidden stake building is the Porsche–Volkswagen case, which
becomes public in 2008. See, e.g.: http://www.economist.com/node/12523898.
4See their comments at: http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/archive/2009/0626/ausschuesse/a07/anhoerungen/033/
Stellungnahmen/04-BVI.pdf.
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restrict the sample to a balanced panel and matched subsets of firms.
Across the different specifications, mutual funds and, to a lesser extent, banks decrease while
non-financial corporations increase their stakes. The result for mutual funds is pronounced for
the disclosure increase in 2007, the strongest event for identification. In 2007, the regulator
reduces the initial reporting threshold from 5% to 3%, in all likelihood prompting investors with
on average small stakes, to which mutual funds belong, to consider adjustments. Theoretically,
mutual funds’ reaction is consistent with agency costs accounting for a sizeable component of
overall disclosure costs. The result for banks is somewhat weaker in that it is less robust across
models and not as clearly related to the disclosure increase in 2007. It supports the existence of
other components of disclosure costs. Like mutual funds, banks are frequently trading investors
with small stakes and hence exposed to free riding and front running. The result for non-
financial corporations reveals who is on the other side of the market with presumably lower
disclosure costs. Non-financial corporations typically trade less regularly and their holdings are
often public knowledge under the previous disclosure regime. I then provide descriptive evidence
that hints at the specific actions investors take around the disclosure increase in 2007. Findings
so far show that some investors decrease their holdings. If the decrease is motivated by the
threat of disclosure, these investors will only reduce and not completely sell off their holdings.
Aggregate statistics are consistent with this rationale. Mutual funds and banks slightly increase
the number of firms they are invested in and the market value of their holdings drops.
The above results suggest that an increase in ownership disclosure can provoke a shift in
ownership structure in the market. The reduction in holdings that I document is large from the
standpoint of the investor type. For mutual funds, the type with the most robust results, stakes
in firms in the regulated market decline relative to stakes in firms in the unregulated market
by 38bp or 17% of their pre-treatment level. In monetary terms, the decline corresponds to
asset sales of around AC2,074m or 1% of total market capitalization. Admittedly, a change in
ownership of 0.38% might not seem large from the standpoint of assessing ownership structure
as a whole. However, I cannot observe holding changes of all mutual funds. Among the investor
types I resort to, foreign investors include foreign mutual funds. Moreover, I eliminate from the
sample the largest and most visible firms, the preferred investment target of mutual funds [e.g.,
Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Ferreira and Matos, 2008]. Thus, my results can well represent
a lower bound.
In the next step, I focus on mutual funds and examine in greater detail whether the avoidance
of reporting thresholds is the most likely explanation for the observed reduction in their holdings.
I can show that mutual funds reduce their holdings gradually over time, indicative of adjustments
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in response to stricter enforcement of ownership disclosure rules. I then turn to the notifications.
The dataset starts with the disclosure increase in 2007, contains stakes of individual investors
and distinguishes between mutual funds and other investors. In it, mutual funds report stakes
more frequently just below 3% and less frequently at zero, relative to other investors. Both
findings strengthen the disclosure avoidance argument: mutual funds appear to reduce their
holdings to be below the initial reporting threshold and do not completely sell them off, which
could also be motivated by, for instance, a change in investment strategy. Besides, mutual funds
disclose a decreasing number of notifications for falling below a threshold over the sample period,
relative to all notifications they submit. This finding is again in line with a delayed response
because of initially weak enforcement. In the early years, there can still be (more) notifications
by funds that intend to avoid disclosure, but adjust holdings not before the regulator displays
sufficient scrutiny.
Finally, I study the liquidity consequences of the reduction in mutual funds’ holdings. In
principle, there are two contradictory effects. An increase in ownership disclosure improves the
public information set. Information asymmetry should decline and liquidity should increase [e.g.,
Agarwal, Mullally, Tang and Yang, 2015; Huddart, Hughes and Levine, 2001; Kyle, 1985]. At
the same time, I find that an increase in ownership disclosure results in mutual funds reducing
their holdings, in part by selling to non-financial corporations. A decline in the number of
frequently trading investors and a rise in the number of blockholders should impair liquidity
[e.g., Demsetz, 1968; Heflin and Shaw, 2000; Rubin, 2007]. I first replicate results from prior
literature and provide evidence for both channels separately. I then address their interaction
and show that the positive impact on liquidity is mitigated or even completely offset for firms
likely most affected by the reduction in mutual funds’ holdings.
The paper contributes to the literature on the consequences of ownership disclosure. Theoret-
ically, extant research analyzes how ownership disclosure rules impact strategies of (potentially)
informed investors [e.g., Fishman and Hagerty, 1995; Huddart et al., 2001; John and Narayanan,
1997]. From a legal perspective, authors discuss how the design of existing regulation shapes the
investor base in practice [e.g., Hu, 2015; Hu and Black, 2006; Schouten, 2010]. Empirically, stud-
ies suggest that investors adjust positions around periodic reporting dates [e.g., Agarwal et al.,
2014; He, Ng and Wang, 2004; Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler and Vishny, 1991] and in response
to increased, not necessarily periodic disclosure requirements [e.g., Agarwal, Vashishtha and
Venkatachalam, 2017; Duong, Huszár and Yamada, 2015; Jank et al., 2016]. They further reveal
that investors do not always revert to holding adjustments; in some settings, non-disclosure is
an option [e.g., Agarwal, Jiang, Tang and Yang, 2013; Aragon et al., 2013]. Common to the
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empirical work is the isolated study of specific subsets of investors. Investors need to find others
that are willing to trade with them, which makes incentive structures in the market interde-
pendent. I attempt to, at least in part, account for these interdependencies by simultaneously
investigating all different investor types.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 characterizes the setting and
formulates expectations. Section 3 describes the identification strategy, sample and data. Section
4 presents the main results for all investor types and additional analyses for mutual funds.
Section 5 reports the results for liquidity consequences and Section 6 concludes.
2 Setting and Expectations
2.1 Institutional Setting
In Germany, firms listed on the regulated market are subject to ownership disclosure rules. I
work with regulatory changes in 2007, 2009 and 2012 that mandate stricter reporting thresholds
for the disclosure of ownership in these firms. All of them are well anticipated, evidenced, for
instance, by early adoptions of the corresponding laws. In addition, all of them comprise various
measures aimed at increasing transparency about ownership structures. In what follows, I focus
on the main elements resulting in lower thresholds.
The instrument to inform about ownership is the notification of major holdings or, in short,
notification. Notifications reveal the identity of the individual or entity that can exert influence
on the issuer via the exercise of voting rights. To capture actual voting power, rules on attribution
obligate not only the holder, but all investors with legal or de facto influence to report holdings
[secs. 22 ff. of the Securities Trading Act (WpHG)].5 Attribution rules are responsible for a
dominance of large entities among reporting investors, such as fund families with many individual
funds, as they usually require the aggregation of individual stakes at the entity level. The
disclosure process involves both the investor, who first notifies the issuer, and the issuer, who
then disseminates the notification. Disclosure occurs within a few days. Disclosed information
encompasses, among other things, identifying information on the investor and issuer, the stake as
percentage of overall voting rights and the date of the trade triggering the disclosure requirement
[secs. 17, 19 of the Securities Trading Notification and Insider List Ordinance (WpAIV) in
the version applicable until 11/26/2015]. During the sample period, disclosure formats are
5To be precise, there are very few exceptions for which rules on attribution do not obligate the holder, but only
other investors to report, e.g., shares provided as security [BaFin, 2013b]. In general, rules on attribution follow
the principle of mutual attribution, i.e., all involved parties have to notify.
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not standardized and vary in practice; Appendix A.2 presents one example for a typical, short
notification.6 Prior research shows that the disclosure of notifications is associated with abnormal
returns, suggesting that the information therein constitutes news for market participants [e.g.,
Mietzner and Schweizer, 2014; Veil, Ruckes, Limbach and Doumet, 2015].
Investors are required to notify whenever their stake, i.e., the number of voting rights they
can exercise over the total number of voting rights, reaches or crosses a reporting threshold.7
In January 2007, the regulator adds to the existing reporting thresholds of 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%
and 75% the new thresholds of 3%, 15%, 20% and 30% [sec. 21 WpHG]. Besides, it prescribes
analogous rules for financial instruments that grant the right to acquire shares with attached
voting rights (e.g., call options with physical settlement) with the exception of the 3% threshold
[sec. 25 WpHG in the version applicable until 3/1/2009]. In conjunction with shorter disclosure
deadlines and broader dissemination principles [secs. 21, 26 WpHG, sec. 3a WpAIV], the
regulatory change hence ensures faster and more granular information about ownership.
Regulatory changes in 2009 and 2012 differ in two respects. First, they are partly motivated
by prominently discussed cases in which investors secretly accumulate large positions with in-
struments outside the scope of existing rules [e.g., European Commission, 2012]. Second, they
are more subtle. Since March 2009, voting rights from shares and other financial instruments
are to be aggregated, practically resulting in stricter reporting thresholds [sec. 25 WpHG in the
version applicable until 11/26/2015]. Since February 2012, financial instruments that merely
facilitate the acquisition of shares (e.g., call options with cash settlement) are likewise subject
to disclosure. Corresponding voting rights are to be aggregated with the other positions, again
tightening thresholds [secs. 25, 25a WpHG in the version applicable until 11/26/2015]. These
later changes represent disclosure increases only for investors who are active in equity and deriva-
tive markets. In Germany, derivative markets are in principal open to all investors and even
the less sophisticated ones, households, access them [DDV, 2010]. For some of the more sophis-
ticated investors, the regulator limits investments in derivatives; constraints are most binding
for insurance companies and pension funds and less so for mutual funds and banks. Eventual
usage of derivatives appears to depend on both investment strategy and regulatory constraints.
6I redact identifying information on investor and issuer according to the publication guidelines of Deutsche
Bundesbank.
7Normally, it is the investor’s trade, i.e., the change in the number of voting rights the investor can exercise,
that triggers the disclosure requirement. Occasionally, it is the change in the issuer’s capital structure, i.e., the
change in the total number of voting rights. I interpret the disclosure as deliberate choice of the investor as raw
data suggest that capital structure changes are not material. For the period 2007–2014, issuers report changes
in the total number of voting rights on average only every other year (data are from the BaFin’s annual reports,
available at: www.bafin.de).
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For instance, although permitted to, just a certain fraction of mutual funds invest in derivatives
[e.g., Natter, Rohleder, Schulte and Wilkens, 2016; Rohleder, Schulte and Wilkens, 2017].8
Over the years, the regulator strengthens efforts to enforce ownership disclosure rules. The
exact timing of these efforts is hard to pin down, but they are likely concentrated around the
first disclosure increase. For example, the BaFin, the enforcement agency, reports a decreasing
number of incorrect and delayed notifications around the implementation of the 2007 changes.9
Figure 1 displays the number of notifications for the sample period, the years 2005–2014, in
absolute terms (gray bars) and per firm listed on the regulated market (blue line). Notifications
refer to all notifications under the prevailing regime; in 2007, they relate to shares, in later
years also to other financial instruments.10 Figure 1 shows that the disclosure increases in 2007
and 2012 are measurable. From 2006 to 2007 (2011 to 2012), notifications per firm rise from
4.1 to 8.8 (7.1 to 9.7), which the BaFin attributes primarily to the introduction of the 3%
threshold and the extension to cash-settled derivatives [BaFin, 2008, 2013a]. The outcome thus
suggests that investors with holdings close enough to reporting thresholds are at least prompted
to (re)consider the costs of ownership disclosure.
The regulatory changes do not take place in isolation. Most importantly, in 2007, the regu-
lator implements an entire bundle of measures from the Transparency Directive (TPD), which
applies in the whole European Union (EU). The TPD aims at establishing higher transparency
by increasing disclosure requirements not only for investors, but also issuers (e.g., extension of
periodic reports, interim reporting) [secs. (1), (2) Directive 2004/104/EC]. An increase in issuer
disclosure is usually associated with a decrease in information asymmetry [e.g., Verrecchia, 2001].
In this vein, it can affect incentives for disclosure avoidance and investment strategies. I argue
that effects from increased issuer disclosure should be of second order and hence less relevant
for investors. However, I cannot directly test my argument. The takeaway for the empirical
analysis is that the effect in 2007 is to some degree a joint effect.
2.2 Expectations
The disclosure of notifications entails costs and benefits, albeit to a different extent for different
investors as investors are heterogeneous [e.g., Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009; He et al., 2004].
8The references describe derivative usage of US mutual funds. Anecdotal evidence suggests similar behavior of
German mutual funds. Since 2004, they are allowed to invest in derivatives and do so increasingly over time.
See, e.g.: www.wiwo.de/archiv/futures-und-optionen-fonds-voller-derivate-seite-2/5543050-2.html.
9The BaFin reports the numbers in its annual reports, available at: www.bafin.de.
10Figure 1 includes notifications from trades in the respective periods and excludes notifications about existing
holdings, which have to be disclosed following the regulatory changes in 2007 (with the exception of the 3%
threshold) and 2012 [sec. 41 (4a), (4d) and (4e) WpHG].
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They vary, among other things, with respect to sophistication, trading patterns, organizational
structure and existing regulatory constraints.
Disclosure costs arise, at first, because of free riding and front running. Investors who buy or
sell stock based on private information give away part of their informational advantage if they
disclose trades after the fact [e.g., Fishman and Hagerty, 1995; Huddart et al., 2001]. Other
market participants can use the disclosures to either anticipate future trades or intervene in
ongoing transactions that are split into smaller trades. If they mimic the trading patterns of the
disclosing investors, they can harm them by intensifying price impact. Besides, front running
generalizes to other motives. If disclosing investors do not trade based on private information
but observable liquidity needs, other market participants can harm them similarly [e.g., Agarwal
et al., 2013; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2005].
The degree to which investors are exposed to free riding and front running partly depends
on the nature of the private information they possess. Institutional investors, as opposed to
households, are generally regarded as informed [e.g., Jank, 2011; Kick et al., 2014]. For institu-
tional investors with diversified, high-turnover portfolios and small stakes, private information
should mainly translate into superior information processing capabilities. Mutual funds, banks
and insurance companies and pension funds fall into this category. They trade frequently and
face regulatory upper limits in terms of stake size. For instance, mutual fund families are not
permitted to have a stake that is larger than 10% in a single issuer. Prior literature supports the
notion that the revelation of their holdings is costly. Frank et al. [2004] and Verbeek and Wang
[2013] show that merely replicating mutual funds’ portfolios from public disclosures is profitable.
Notably, these portfolio disclosures are substantially less timely than notifications. For institu-
tional investors with concentrated, low-turnover portfolios and large stakes, private information
should also refer to information about their own intentions. Non-financial corporations, often
blockholders, trade less frequently and face no regulatory constraints on stake size. Their dis-
closures contain implicit information on future monitoring and, in the extreme, takeover plans.
Prior studies support the rationale that such implicit information is priced. Clifford [2008] and
Brav, Jiang, Partnoy and Thomas [2008] show that issuer announcement returns are higher
around the release of ownership disclosures for active (13D) than for passive (13G) investments
and that returns prevail even if the holdings per se are already public knowledge.
The degree to which investors are exposed to front running depends additionally on the
observability of their liquidity demand. Typical targets for front running are investors in financial
distress, under pressure to liquidate assets. Observability of financial distress is given if investors
regularly report their capital inflows and outflows. All institutional investors follow some form
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of (periodic) reporting and thereby ensure a certain level of transparency about their funds. The
literature points in particular to (open-end) mutual funds [e.g., Coval and Stafford, 2007; Shive
and Yun, 2013]. In Germany, market participants can derive flows into and out of mutual funds
primarily from their portfolio disclosures, which the law requires at a seminannual frequency.
The second component of disclosure costs are agency costs which arise in delegated money
management. The requirement to disclose trades in a timely manner can incentivize agents to
act according to their principal’s current information set and not their own private information
for which returns materialize only with delay. In this vein, they meet the expectations of
the principal, but lower expected payoffs to the same [e.g., Edmans et al., 2016; Prat, 2005].
Although most institutional investors act on behalf of someone else, mutual funds’ organizational
structure makes the agency relationship especially pronounced. Fund investors closely monitor
fund managers and can easily exit. Fund managers, in turn, seem to undertake costly actions to
prevent liquidity outflows, such as window dressing of portfolios or the promotion of short-term
goals towards their portfolio firms [e.g., Agarwal et al., 2014, 2017].
Finally, there are direct costs. Investors themselves repeatedly highlight the administrative
costs associated with lower reporting thresholds.11 For instance, the aggregation of holdings
from different subsidiaries or fund portfolios to comply with attribution rules can necessitate
additional layers of reporting among individual entities. Furthermore, regulators acknowledge
the bureaucratic burden from unharmonized national laws for internationally active investors
[European Commission, 2008, 2012]. Thus, large investors across all categories of institutional
investors might be affected.
Disclosure costs can then be offset by corresponding benefits or become unavoidable due to
existing regulation. Benefits lie in improved monitoring in agency relationships [e.g., Ge and
Zheng, 2006; Holmström, 1999] or quicker return realization in case of other investors mimicking
trades [e.g., Frank et al., 2004; Ge and Zheng, 2006]. The latter represents the upside of free
riding. If investors disclose after fully implementing their strategy or as explicit part of it,
‘copycat’ investors can increase returns. Empirical evidence in this respect is largely confined
to short sellers, sophisticated and lightly regulated investors [Ljungqvist and Qian, 2016].
Existing regulation plays two roles. First, it might result in (almost) no incremental costs
from the regulatory changes. Ownership disclosure rules are in place before thresholds are low-
ered; starting with 5%, investors have to disclose their holdings. Hence, for many non-financial
11As an example, the BVI criticizes direct costs especially with respect to the introduction of the 3% threshold.
See their comments at: http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/archive/2009/0626/ausschuesse/a07/anhoerungen/03-
3/Stellungnahmen/04-BVI.pdf.
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corporations and other blockholders, the regulatory changes imply no new disclosures, their
holdings are already public knowledge. In addition, institutional investors disclose their hold-
ings via other channels, at least in an aggregated fashion. For example, mutual funds, the most
transparent type, disclose portfolio positions seminannually. On a voluntary basis, some provide
information on selected positions more frequently, usually monthly or quarterly (e.g., their ‘top
10 holdings’).12 Notifications differ in their timeliness: the information that a holding crosses
a threshold is to be disclosed within a few days. Still, if investors do not rely on precise tim-
ing, existing transparency requirements can make notifications redundant. Second, regulatory
constraints might prevent investors from acting on their incentives. Insurance companies and
pension funds face strict prudent-man principles, but banks are also under substantial regulatory
scrutiny [e.g., Del Guercio, 1996; Jank, 2011].
The above discussion demonstrates that it is not obvious which investors face the highest
(net) costs upon the introduction of lower reporting thresholds and have the necessary leeway
to act on them. Yet, given the heterogeneity across investors, they are most certainly exposed
to different costs. This heterogeneity is crucial for observing a response at all. If all investors
encountered the same costs and subsequently reduced their holdings, price pressure would, in all
likelihood, make the adjustment prohibitively costly. On the other hand, if investors encounter
different costs, they will respond according to their relative costs of disclosure. Investors will
reduce their holdings below the threshold as long as their incentives, including the associated
price impact, make it worthwile. The remaining investors will take the other side of the trades.13
3 Research Design and Data
3.1 Identification Strategy
I use the regulatory changes in 2007, 2009 and 2012 as treatment events to measure whether
investors adjust their holdings in response to lower reporting thresholds. I estimate effects with
respect to the effective dates of the written rules, which do not come as a surprise. Investors
should not react (long) before, as there are no benefits to anticipatory behavior. A time lag
rather supports the rationale of a strategic response, since it allows for the careful assessment
of costs and benefits. However, investors might react with some delay after the effective dates
awaiting the enforcement of the rules [Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002]. In favor of this notion,
12For an example, see: https://www.allianzglobalinvestors.de/web/b2cdetails?action_id=b2c.FondsDetails.Struk-
tur&l_act_id=b2c.FondsDetails&1180=DE00084 71004.
13The discussion further demonstrates that households should face neither costs nor benefits from disclosure.
Consequently, they are a candidate for taking the other side of the trades.
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enforcement becomes more stringent over time. Further, Christensen, Hail and Leuz [2016]
document a gradual effect of the TPD, the directive that includes the ownership disclosure rules
in 2007, on liquidity.
In the holdings analysis, I use the segmentation of the German stock market for identification.
The regulatory changes affect only holdings in firms listed on the regulated market. Germany has
a relatively large unregulated market, governed by stock exchange rules with considerably lower
transparency requirements. In particular, holdings in firms in the unregulated market are at no
time subject to ownership disclosure rules [Stehle and Schmidt, 2015]. I conduct a difference-in-
differences analysis and measure the impact of lower reporting thresholds on holdings in firms in
the regulated market (treatment group) relative to holdings in firms in the unregulated market
(control group). Firms listed on the unregulated market are on average smaller and younger than
firms listed on the regulated market. Besides, they often have the option to list on both segments
and make a deliberate choice for the market with lower transparency standards [Vismara et al.,
2012]. To address potential differences which might counteract parallel trends, I work with firm
(and quarter-year) fixed effects in almost all specifications. In supplemental tests, I add firm-
specific linear time trends. While the latter allows for differential trends not only of treatment
and control group but individual firms, it is quite demanding. If the impact is of a gradual
nature, a linear trend may well capture part of it. To address segment choice and ultimately
treatment assignment, I match firms from the regulated market to firms from the unregulated
market based on observable, pre-treatment characteristics.
For causal identification, the disclosure increase in 2007 is the strongest and cleanest event.
It is strongest because it introduces the 3% threshold for voting rights from shares. It is cleanest
because it originates from EU legislation that is passed years in advance, in 2004. The later two
disclosure increases are weaker, since they lower thresholds only for investors who invest in both
equity and derivative instruments. Moreover, they raise the issue of reverse causality, since they
are designed around publicly discussed cases of disclosure avoidance.
In the notifications analysis, I have, by definition, firms that are treated and selected. In-
vestors are required to disclose notifications solely for firms listed on the regulated market and
reportable ownership changes do not occur regularly. Instead of exploiting variation across firms,
I make use of variation across investor types, mutual funds and all other investors.
3.2 Sample
I compile a sample of firms listed on German stock exchanges in the years 2005–2014 and around
at least one of the regulatory changes. To do so, I start with the list of all securities contained in
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the SHS database of Deutsche Bundesbank. The SHS keeps records for all securities kept in safe
custody in Germany, regardless of issuer or holder origin [Bade, Flory and Schönberg, 2016]. It
should thus provide the universe of shares listed on the regulated and unregulated market. I then
restrict the sample to equities for which I find information in Thomson Reuters Datastream.14
I drop securities which appear only before March 31, 2007 (Datastream mnemonic: TIME),
the quarter-end of the first treatment event, or only after December 31, 2011 (BDATE), the
quarter-end before the last treatment event. I also drop securities with a lifetime of less than
365 days or names indicating that they are not common equity (NAME) [Ince and Porter, 2006].
Lastly, I limit the dataset to one security per firm. I keep only major securities, i.e., the most
liquid security for a firm with several securities (MAJOR), and primary listings, i.e., the main
listing of the major security for a cross-listed firm (ISINID). The resulting sample consists of
1,844 unique firms.
For the holdings analysis, I partition the sample into treatment and control group. I assign a
firm to the treatment group if (i) it is listed on the regulated market for at least eight consecutive
quarters according to the register maintained by the European Securities and Markets Authority
(ESMA) or (ii) it is included in the CDAX in the years 1999–2013; the CDAX is a German stock
market index comprising firms in the regulated market.15 I assign treatment at the firm level,
since the CDAX source does not offer time-variant information and the ESMA register does
not start before the second quarter of 2007, after the first disclosure increase. I consider the
time-invariant treatment definition sufficient, since switching between markets is generally a rare
event.16 I obtain a treatment (control) group with 867 (977) firms.
Requiring holdings data for the main model results in a final sample of 1,549 unique firms
with 814 (735) firms in the treatment (control) group. Table 1 displays the number of firms
in the last quarter of each sample year, for the whole sample (column 1) and separately for
treatment (column 2) and control group (column 3). The table further specifies the percentage
of firms listed on the regulated market that I include in the treatment group (column 4). Its
14I use ISIN to link the SHS with Datastream. While the SHS contains historical ISIN, Datastream relies on
current ISIN. I use several sources to link historical and current ISIN: (i) snapshots of the Datastream universe
for the years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2016; (ii) a list of ISIN changes on the regulated market in
Frankfurt for the years 2005–2014, provided by Martin Schmidt and Richard Stehle from Humboldt University
of Berlin; and (iii) a translation file for historical and current ISIN of CDAX firms for the years 1999–2013,
provided by Erik Theissen, Esad Smajlbegovic and Thomas Johann from the University of Mannheim. After
matching the holdings from the SHS to Datastream, I work with the Datastream code (Datastream mnemonic:
DSCD) as security identifier.
15For details on the ESMA register, see: www.registers.esma.europa.eu. For details on the CDAX source, see
Footnote 14.
16I rerun all analyses with a modified, time-variant treatment definition. For all quarters starting in or after
2007q2, I classify a firm-quarter as treated if it is listed in the ESMA register. For all quarters preceding
2007q2, I use the firm’s treatment status in 2007q2. Results are overall similar.
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increase over the years suggests better data coverage while its decrease in the end reflects sample
selection criteria; I exclude firms with first-time appearance after 2011. In both treatment and
control group, numbers first increase and then decrease. However, changes are more pronounced
for the control group, in line with structural breaks in the unregulated market. The introduction
of new subsegments in 2005 and 2008, the Entry Standard and the First Quotation Board, leads
to more listing options; the closing of the First Quotation Board in 2012 reduces them again.
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Holdings
I use holdings from the SHS of Deutsche Bundesbank, the German central bank. Since 2005,
Deutsche Bundesbank collects quarterly information on security holdings from all banks and
investment companies in Germany (reporting institutions).17 The reporting institutions are
required to inform about their own holdings as well as their customers’ holdings, i.e., holdings of
individuals and entities that have securities deposits with them. For each equity security, they
provide information on the number of shares held at quarter-end. To prevent double entries, they
are to include only securities which they keep in safe custody for end consumers. To facilitate
further analysis, they are to split up end consumers into investor types. By construction, security
holders in the SHS are subject to ownership disclosure rules, but they are not necessarily the only
ones. The SHS does not cover individuals or entities that are subject to disclosure requirements
via rules on attribution [Amann, Baltzer and Schrape, 2012; Bade et al., 2016].
I work with the following investor types. I first define foreign investors (foreign) based
on (own) holdings of foreign banks and foreign central securities depositories. Since foreign
financial institutions are not required to report to Deutsche Bundesbank, I cannot determine
the ultimate holder. Prior studies treat them as predominantly institutional investors [Baltzer
et al., 2015; Deutsche Bundesbank, 2015]. Among domestic institutional investors, I distinguish
between mutual funds (funds), banks (banks), insurance companies and pension funds (ins),
non-financial corporations (corp), governmental institutions (gov) and other financial investors
(other).18 Two categories deserve further comment. Mutual funds include hedge funds. I label
the category mutual funds because hedge funds account for a tiny percentage of total funds; on
average 0.007% for the years 2007–2012.19 Other financial investors encompass heterogeneous
17Deutsche Bundesbank uses the data for regulatory and research purposes. Researchers can apply for access
and work with the data on-site.
18Strictly speaking, domestic investors include some foreign investors, but their holdings are negligible. For
instance, domestic mutual funds have an average stake of 1.262% whereas foreign mutual funds have an average
stake of 0.019% in the main sample with 38,330 observations.
19The numbers of funds are from the BaFin’s annual reports, available at: www.bafin.de.
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entities, such as investment companies with their proprietary holdings or bank-type institutions
pursuing risky business. I group them together to form a residual category, not because I expect
them to behave alike. Lastly, I define domestic households (hh) in accordance with the SHS.20
In the analysis, I measure the effect on the percentage stake as it determines whether a
reporting threshold is crossed. I compute stakes at quarter-end, from the last quarter of 2005,
the first available quarter, until the last quarter of 2014. The stake of investor type ? in firm i and
quarter t, stake_?it, corresponds to the number of shares held by investor type ? divided by the
number of shares outstanding as provided by Datastream (NOSH) and multiplied by 100. I use
shares outstanding from Datastream because the SHS does not record foreign holdings for which
shares are kept in custody outside of Germany. I also make use of these foreign holdings to refine
the sample. In Germany, foreign investors have a clear preference for the largest, index-listed
firms [Deutsche Bundesbank, 2014]. At the same time, these firms lack comparable firms in the
control group. I hence exclude them by truncating the difference between shares outstanding
and total shares reported in the SHS (as percentage of shares outstanding) at the 95th percentile.
Lastly, I clean up the data. I truncate the percentage difference between shares outstanding and
total SHS shares at the 5th percentile to remove negative cases which are obvious errors. I assign
the remaining difference to the foreign investors already classified as such. I truncate stakes by
type and quarter at the 1st and 99th percentile to remove more subtle inconsistencies at the level
of the investor type. The final sample contains only firm-quarters with nonmissing stake_?it
for all investor types.21
3.3.2 Notifications
I obtain notifications for the period January 20, 2007, to November 30, 2012, from the DGAP,
the main service provider for the dissemination of regulated information in Germany. The DGAP
distributes a substantial portion of all notifications; the average over the sample years amounts
to 62%.22 Firms in the dataset tend to be larger firms; their average market value exceeds the
average market value in the treatment group of the holdings sample. According to informal
statements of the DGAP, the client structure remains stable over time.
20The SHS classifies security holders according to the European System of Accounts (ESA). I use the following
ESA 2010 codes for the investor types. foreign: 1225, 1228; funds: 1230, 1240; banks: 1221, 1222, 1223,
1224; ins: 1280, 1290; corp: 1100, 1270; gov: 1311, 1312, 1313, 1314; other: 1251, 1261, 1262; and hh: 1400,
1500.
21To reduce discretion in data cleaning, I rerun all models with a different version of stake_?it, the raw stakes
truncated at the 1st and 99th percentile across all types and the whole sample period. Results are very similar.
22The number constitutes a lower bound. I derive it based on the total number of notifications collected by
the DGAP and the total number of notifications reported by the BaFin. However, the DGAP and the BaFin
define notifications differently. Precisely, one notification of the DGAP often contains several notifications as
understood by the BaFin.
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The notifications comprise machine-readable, largely unstructured text. The regulator does
not prescribe a uniform reporting format which results in some variety in practice; Appendix
A.2 presents one example. I use regular expression matching to extract the following items from
each notification: issuer ISIN, disclosure and trade date, stake, reporting threshold(s) crossed as
well as investor type. For the investor type, I distinguish between mutual funds (mf) and other
investors. In particular, I search for name matches with the member list of the BVI, the German
Investment Funds Association.23 Hence, I focus on German mutual funds to be consistent with
the holdings analysis. At the same time, BVI members are often internationally active, putting
more emphasis on the investor type per se. The member list contains 101 different names.
The notifications sample for the 3% threshold matches with 33 names, of which a small number
clearly dominates (percentage among matches in parentheses): BlackRock (34%), Allianz Global
Investors (15%), Universal-Investment (9%), Deka (6%) and Union Investment (5%). Findings
are thus driven by a small number of fund families.
In the analysis, I work with the data in two formats. I first examine the subset of notifi-
cations for falling below or exceeding the 3% threshold. From 28,270 raw notifications, I drop
notifications because they are duplicates due to translations or rules on attribution; they have
missing information on the variables of interest; or they relate to other sections of the WpHG.
From the 9,082 remaining notifications, 2,596 (2,066) indicate falling below (exceeding) 3% for
375 firms. I then return to the notifications for all reporting thresholds and aggregate them at
the firm-quarter level. I investigate the share of notifications for falling below a threshold in
mutual funds’ notifications in a given firm-quarter; the number of firms declines to 204 as not
all firms have notifications submitted by mutual funds. In addition, I investigate mutual funds’
share in overall notifications in a given firm-quarter; the number of firms rises to 535.
4 Results
4.1 Descriptives
Table 2 displays summary statistics.24 Panel A shows the distributions of stakes, stake_?it,
for the whole sample (line 1) and separately for treatment (t, line 2) and control group (c, line
3). The columns on the left (right) inform about (the top decile of) equal-weighted percentage
stakes and the middle columns about value-weighted stakes, stake_?it weighted by market
23I collect the names from the member list in the BVI yearbook 2016 (www.bvi.de) and the website of the BVI
(www.bvi.de).
24I limit summary statistics to mean and standard deviation to conform to the publication guidelines of Deutsche
Bundesbank.
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value. The sample for value-weighted stakes is slightly smaller, since market value, mvit, is not
always available. The low number of observations for stake_govit in the top decile of the control
group reflects a low number of non-zero holdings of governmental institutions in the unregulated
market.
Percentage stakes demonstrate particularities of the German capital market. Foreign in-
vestors, non-financial corporations and households dominate overall ownership; stake_foreignit,
stake_corpit and stake_hhit together account for more than 90% with roughly equal propor-
tions. Non-financial corporations’ large average holdings represent family holdings and cross-
holdings that originate from the traditionally insider-oriented German system [e.g., Baltzer et al.,
2015; Franks and Mayer, 2001]. Percentage stakes also illustrate distinct ownership patterns in
treatment and control group, which are in part attributable to the investment decision per se.
Investors with generally small holdings (funds, banks, ins and gov) have more stakes equal to
zero in the unregulated than the regulated market.
Consistent with prior literature, the comparison of equal-weighted with value-weighted stakes
depicts a preference of institutional investors for large firms [e.g., Dahlquist and Robertsson,
2001; Ferreira and Matos, 2008]. Due to my sample selection criteria, values differ to some extent
from other studies based on the SHS [e.g., Baltzer et al., 2015; Deutsche Bundesbank, 2014]. I
eliminate the preferred investment target of mutual funds, banks and insurance companies and
pension funds: large and index-listed firms. At the same time, this approach yields treated and
control firms that are closer in size. In Panel B, the average market value, mvi(t−1), amounts to
348m AC (35m AC) in the treated (control) sample.
Finally, average stakes in the top decile of the stake distributions reveal whether reporting
thresholds can translate into binding constraints for the different investor types. Among the
investors with small holdings, mutual funds and banks reach values well beyond 3%, the newly
introduced threshold in 2007; stake_fundsit (stake_banksit) has a mean of almost 10% (5%) in
the top decile of the treatment group, suggesting that, also at the individual level, some investors
encounter more extensive disclosure requirements. Insurance companies and pension funds and
governmental institutions seem to be less affected; stake_insit (stake_govit) has a mean of
around 2% (0.2%) in the top decile of the treatment group. Means refer to the whole sample
period and therefore include potentially adjusted post-treatment values. In addition, maxima
for stake_?it in the treatment group clearly exceed 10% for every investor type (untabulated).
Still, the low values for insurance companies and pension funds and governmental institutions
have implications for the subsequent analysis. If I find evidence consistent with an adjustment
of holdings, only very few observations can be responsible for it.
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Panel B of Table 2 contains firm characteristics, which are informative about the type of
firm that selects into the (un)regulated market. Firms in the regulated market have higher share
prices, upi(t−1) has a mean of AC26.557 (AC17.842) in the treated (control) sample; they have a
larger analyst following, anait amounts on average to 3.317 (0.237) analysts; they are older,
ageit has a mean of 57.251 (23.938) quarters; and they pay more dividends, dyi(t−1) indicates
that dividends amount on average to 1.2% (0.5%) of the share price. Around 83% of treated
firms are listed in the CDAX, a stock market index (cdaxi). Control firms cannot, by definition,
be listed in the CDAX. I provide precise definitions of the variables in Appendix A.1.
4.2 Main Analysis
To assess the impact of stricter reporting thresholds on investors’ holdings, I estimate the fol-
lowing model (main model):
stake_?it =β1post7t × treati + β2post9t × treati + β3post12t × treati + βkFEt + βlFEi + εit
where stake_?it is the percentage stake in firm i and quarter t of foreign investors (foreign), mu-
tual funds (funds), banks (banks), insurance companies and pension funds (ins), non-financial
corporations (corp), governmental institutions (gov), other financial investors (other) or house-
holds (hh). post7t (9) [12] is an indicator variable equal to one if quarter t is larger than 2006q4
(2008q4) [2011q4]. treati is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is part of the treatment
group, i.e., listed on the regulated market. FEt and FEi denote quarter-year and firm fixed
effects and subsume the main effects of the post indicators and treati. Standard errors are
two-way clustered by firm and quarter-year to control for both cross-sectional and time-series
dependence [Gow, Ormazabal and Taylor, 2010; Petersen, 2009].25 The coefficients of interest,
β1, β2 and β3, capture differential changes in holdings in the treatment group relative to the
control group upon the introduction of lower reporting thresholds.
Table 3 shows the results. Mutual funds, banks, insurance companies and pension funds
and households reduce their holdings, albeit at different points in time. Mutual funds are
the sole investor type with a statistically significant estimate for 2007, the cleanest event for
identification. The coefficient indicates a decline in stakes of 38bp or 17% of their pre-treatment
level, translating into asset sales of AC2,074m or 1% of total market capitalization.26 Given
25As an alternative, I cluster only by firm. Standard errors vary somewhat across specifications, but two-way
clustering seems to be the overall more conservative option.
26The mean of stake_fundsit in the sample of treated firms in the pre-treatment period is 2.268; the estimate
for 2007 (β1) is -0.378; and -0.378/2.268 corresponds to a decline of 17%. I multiply the percentage reduction
(17%) with the total market value of mututal funds’ holdings in treated firms to obtain the monetary value
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that the estimate is likely driven by a subset of mutual funds, those that belong to the large
fund families, it is economically significant. Moreover, it should constitute a lower bound. In
the data, I cannot identify holdings of foreign mutual funds and I do not consider holdings in
mutual funds’ preferred investment target, the largest, index-listed firms. Mutual funds continue
to reduce their holdings in 2009; the coefficient indicates an incremental decline of 29bp. They do
not seem to respond to the disclosure increase in 2012; the coefficient is not different from zero.
Banks and insurance companies and pension funds reduce their holdings, but the reduction is
less clearly linked to the introduction of lower reporting thresholds. Despite altogether negative
estimates, only the coefficient(s) for 2009 (and 2012) is (are) statistically significant (in the case
of insurance companies and pension funds). As discussed in the previous section, the result for
insurance companies and pension funds probably stems from very few observations. Anticipating
the results in Table 4, it is also not robust across specifications. Lastly, households reduce their
holdings. The finding is limited to the disclosure increase in 2012 and, as discussed below, not
robust.
On the other side of the market, non-financial corporations increase their holdings. Estimates
are positive throughout and statistically significant for the later two disclosure increases. Esti-
mates for the remaining investor types are not different from zero. Thus, results are consistent
with a response to the introduction of lower reporting thresholds. While mutual funds and banks
decrease, non-financial corporations increase their holdings. Coefficients for mutual funds and
banks do not differ, supporting similar adjustments. However, they differ from the coefficients
for non-financial corporations, strengthening the observed, opposite patterns in responses.27
I then vary sample and regression model in a number of ways. I first repeat the estimation
of the main model with a balanced panel to account for the changing sample composition. For a
firm to be in the sample, I require complete quarterly observations for the years 2005–2008. I do
not extend the requirement until the end of the sample period to have a reasonable number of
control firms for estimation. The resulting sample contains 375 (75) treated (control) firms and
15,117 firm-quarters. By construction, the number of quarterly observations declines towards
the end of the sample period.
Second, I add firm-specific linear time trends to the main model to allow for differential
trends of individual firms. For a firm to be in the sample, I require observations for the third
(AC2,074m). For the total market value of holdings, I use the average of the quarterly values in the pre-treatment
period.
27Precisely, the β2 and β3 coefficients of mutual funds and banks differ from the β2 and β3 coefficients of non-
financial corporations at the 5% significance level.
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and fourth quarter of 2006, the quarters preceding the first disclosure increase. The resulting
sample encompasses 588 (175) treated (control) firms and 23,722 firm-quarters.
Third, I relax the fixed effects structure and include time-varying control variables for in-
vestment preferences of investors [e.g., Baltzer et al., 2015; Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001;
Ferreira and Matos, 2008]. The set of control variables, CONT , comprises size [ln(mv)i(t−1)],
share price [ln(up)i(t−1)], analyst following [ln(ana)it], age [ln(age)it], dividend yield [dyi(t−1)]
and index membership [cdaxi]. Lagged variables allow for time to respond. I account for indus-
try (and quarter-year) fixed effects instead of firm fixed effects. I add the main effect for the
treatment group, treati, as it is not redundant in this specification. I lose some observations due
to missing information on the control variables. The sample contains 798 (714) treated (control)
firms and 35,499 firm-quarters.
Fourth, I estimate the main model on subsets of matched firms to address the market segment
choice. I start with the balanced panel from above and model whether the firm chooses a listing
on the regulated market. I rely on accounting and not capital-market variables as predictors,
since the latter are partly the outcome of the segment choice. I use the natural logarithm of
total assets, return on assets and sales growth, each as average over the pre-treatment period,
the years 2005–2006. I apply propensity score matching (PSM) with replacement and obtain a
matched sample with 289 (34) treated (control) firms and 18,368 firm-quarters.28 In addition, I
match firms with the coarsened exact matching (CEM) method [Iacus, King and Porro, 2012].
CEM sorts the predictors into strata and produces exact matches based on the strata. The
resulting sample encompasses 137 (35) treated (control) firms and 5,821 firm-quarters. Control
observations enter with continuous weights to take into account the size of the strata.29
Table 4 shows the results. Overall, mutual funds and banks decrease their holdings. The
finding for banks is weaker in that it is less pronounced around the disclosure increase in 2007
and more sensitive to model specification. Non-financial corporations increase their holdings,
not necessarily around the disclosure increase in 2007, but seemingly in response to the reduc-
tion in holdings of mutual funds and banks. Restricting the sample to a balanced panel leads to
statistically significant estimates for all three investor types in 2007. The coefficient for mutual
28Specifically, I use one-to-one, nearest neighbor matching and set the caliper to 0.2 × the standard deviation of
the propensity score from the logit model (0.031). I verify that differences in the predictors between treated
and control firms are not statistically significant after matching.
29Under both matching methods, I weight and thus reuse control observations. As an alternative, I repeat
the matching, but require that control observations enter only once. The resulting sample for PSM (CEM)
contains 76 (34) unique firms, with the same number of treated and control firms, and 2,572 (1,156) firm-
quarters. Compared to the estimates in Table 4, results are similar for mutual funds, mixed for banks and
weaker for non-financial corporations.
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funds in 2007 is comparable in magnitude to the main model; the coefficients for 2009 and 2012
indicate that incremental adjustments in the later years reverse. Introducing firm-specific linear
time trends supports the reduction in holdings of mutual funds and hints at a reaction of insur-
ance companies and pension funds. Null results for the other investors come as no surprise as
the specification is quite demanding. The pre-treatment period is relatively short and investors
might react gradually. Accounting for investment preferences provides further evidence for own-
ership changes of mutual funds and non-financial corporations and illustrates inconsistency for
households; coefficient signs change across specifications. Restricting the sample to matched
subsets of firms yields estimates roughly in line with the previous models, but larger in magni-
tude. In untabulated analyses, I conduct remaining robustness tests. I drop non-German firms
and penny stocks and repeat the estimation of the main model. I obtain results very similar to
Table 3.
So far, I can show that some investors decrease and others increase their holdings, but I
cannot show which actions investors take. In principle, the decrease can result from either
the complete sale of the investment or the mere reduction in percentage points. My argument
predicts the latter: investors reduce their holdings below the new reporting threshold to avoid
disclosure. In Table 5, I provide aggregate statistics to give some insight into the specific actions
around the disclosure increase in 2007. For each investor type, it depicts the number of firms in
which the investor type is invested, i.e, the number of non-zero investments, in absolute terms
and as percentage of all firms in the market; and the market value of the investments, in absolute
terms and as percentage of total market capitalization. It contains information separately on
the regulated (treatment group, t) and unregulated market (control group, c) as well as the five
quarters preceding (pre-period, PRE) and the eight quarters succeeding the disclosure increase
in 2007 (post-period, POST ). The table displays averages of the quarterly values.
Table 5 indicates that, in the regulated market, mutual funds and banks slightly increase the
number of firms they are invested in while the market value of their holdings declines. If they sold
off completely, the number of non-zero investments should drop. Instead, non-zero investments
rise. Mutual funds and banks seem to have less money, but more holdings in the regulated market
after the disclosure increase, suggesting on average smaller stakes. Furthermore, percentages of
overall firms and total market capitalization are roughly the same in both periods, supporting
the notion that it is stricter disclosure rules and not revisions in investment strategies that
induces the adjustment of holdings.
This interpretation is only one of several. Alternatively, it could be changes in the number
of investors that explain the larger number of non-zero investments. At least for mutual funds,
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this does not seem likely. Their number is, if at all, decreasing over the years 2005 until 2008.30
Moreover, it could be (in part certainly is) stock price changes in the context of the financial
crisis that explain the decline in the market value of holdings. German mutual funds experience
sizeable outflows during the financial crisis [Deutsche Bundesbank, 2013]. Yet, this does not
rule out disclosure avoidance behavior. Some investors, in particular non-financial corporations,
increase the market value of their holdings, despite a market-wide declining trend in stock prices.
Hence, I acknowledge that the evidence is purely descriptive, but I consider it in line with a
mere reduction and not the complete sale of holdings.
Table 5 is informative in other respects. First, it demonstrates that investors with generally
small holdings (funds, banks, ins and gov) are invested in just a fraction of the market and
a meaningfully smaller fraction in the unregulated market. For instance, mutual funds have
holdings in 55% (21%) of all firms in the (un)regulated market in the pre-treatment period.
Regression results thus hinge on relatively few (control) observations. Second, trends across
time resemble each other in the regulated and unregulated market, which alleviates concerns
regarding the suitability of the unregulated market as control.31
Taken together, the results of the analyses are consistent with different adjustment patterns
of investors in response to different costs of disclosure. In the extreme, they imply that the
introduction of lower reporting thresholds can provoke a shift in ownership structure. The
findings suggest that mutual funds and banks are on the sell side of the market. Both are
sophisticated investors with small stakes and subject to free riding and front running. Banks’
more muted reaction supports binding regulatory constraints. Mutual funds’ more pronounced
reaction supports the idea that the threat of liquidity outflows is strong. Notably, mutual funds’
investment behavior is already fairly transparent. It appears to be the particular disclosure
instrument and its timeliness that trigger their response. The findings also suggest that non-
financial corporations are on the buy side of the market. They usually have stakes above existing
reporting thresholds and trade less frequently. Their reaction seems to be less of a response to
the disclosure increases, but more to the disclosure avoidance strategies of others. Finally, the
analysis highlights the importance of heterogeneity among investors. Heterogeneity is what
makes the adjustment of holdings possible: if some investors want to sell, others need to buy.
30To be precise, the number of mutual funds amounts to 6,303 in 2005; 5,884 in 2006; 5,995 in 2007; and 6,031
in 2008. Numbers are from the BaFin’s annual reports, available at: www.bafin.de. They refer to all mutual
funds and do not differentiate between fund categories, such as equity or fixed income funds.
31For example, substitution into the unregulated market could be an alternative story. If investors intend to avoid
disclosure, they can shift investments from the regulated into the unregulated market. Under this scenario,
holdings in the unregulated market would be affected by the regulatory changes and thus no suitable controls.
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At the same time, it often conceals the adjustment of holdings: if different investors are grouped
together, their reactions can cancel each other out. The lack of any finding for foreign investors
might result precisely from such offsetting.
4.3 Mutual Funds
The remaining sections focus on mutual funds. So far, I can link their behavior most robustly
to the introduction of lower reporting thresholds. In the following, I use additional test designs
and data sources to further link this behavior, the reduction in holdings, to the motivation to
avoid disclosure.
I first assess when mutual funds reduce their holdings in response to the introduction of
the 3% threshold in 2007. In the difference-in-differences analysis, I measure the effect with
respect to the effective date of the new threshold. Yet, enforcement becomes stronger over time,
which should result in a gradual adjustment of holdings. Even if mutual funds intend to avoid
disclosure, they likely wait to observe the outcome of regulatory oversight. Figure 2 depicts
the average quarterly level of mutual funds’ holdings, stake_fundsit, in the period 2005–2008,
separately for treatment and control group. Figure 2a shows averages of the raw stakes for a
balanced panel. In the post-treatment period, stakes follow a declining trend in the treatment
group while they remain at roughly the same level in the control group. Although this pattern
is consistent with a gradual impact over time, it seems to start already in the pre-treatment
period. In Figure 2b, I apply the synthetic control method [Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller,
2015; Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003]. That is, I report averages for stakes in treated firms
and synthetic controls. For each treated firm, I construct a synthetic control, i.e., a weighted
combination of control firms. I obtain the weights by identifying the combination of stakes in
control firms that most closely tracks the treated firm’s stake in the pre-treatment period.32 By
construction, stakes in treated and synthetic control observations follow a parallel trend in the
pre-treatment period. In contrast to Figure 2a, stakes in treated firms do not decrease before
2007. They rather start declining and deviating from stakes in synthetic controls when the 3%
threshold becomes effective and do so increasingly over the subsequent quarters.
I then explore the notifications data, the subset of publicly observable holdings with informa-
tion at the level of the individual investor. I start with the distribution of reported stakes around
the 3% threshold. The preceding results are in line with mutual funds reducing their holdings
32Specifically, I first restrict the sample to a balanced panel and the treatment group to firms with stakes less
than or equal to the maximum stake in the control group in the same quarter. I then match each treated firm
to a combination of control firms whose combined stake most closely resembles the treated firm’s stake in the
pre-treatment period.
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below the initial reporting threshold and this in part after its introduction. Thus, there should
be corresponding notifications and more of them for mutual funds than for other investors. Fig-
ure 3 displays the distribution of stakes after crossing the 3% threshold, separately for falling
below and exceeding the threshold as well as mutual funds and other investors. Figure 3a and
Figure 3c illustrate that mutual funds more frequently report stakes just below the threshold.
For them, more than 40% of all stakes fall into the interval next to the threshold while, for other
investors, it is around 25%. Similarly, other investors more frequently completely sell off their
holdings. For them, almost 30% of all stakes fall into the interval around zero while, for mutual
funds, it is less than 10%. Hence, notifications support the disclosure avoidance rationale: com-
pared to other investors, mutual funds accumulate stakes just below the threshold. Figure 3b
and Figure 3d show the distribution of stakes after exceeding 3% and demonstrate that, again,
mutual funds tend to report stakes closer to the threshold. The difference is less pronounced,
but the motivation is also less obvious. It might be the incentive to minimize the information
content in the notification. If investors disclose stakes around the threshold, they do not convey
much information apart from the threshold that is crossed and has to be disclosed in any case.
Panel A of Table 6 translates the above into a regression framework. The dependent variable
is the reported stake, stakej , from notification j. The independent variables comprise indicator
variables for mutual funds, mfj , and the disclosure increases in 2009 and 2012; post9t (12) is
equal to one if trading day t is after February 28, 2009 (January 31, 2012). Note that I use
the exact dates and not only the quarters in which the rules become effective. Of main interest
is the coefficient for mfj . If mutual funds report stakes closer to 3%, it will be positive for
falling below (columns 1 and 2) and negative for exceeding the threshold (columns 3 and 4).
I interact mfj with the post indicators to test for changing behavior across time. I present
models with two different fixed effects structures, only firm fixed effects (columns 1 and 3) and
fixed effects for firm, quarter-year, month and weekday (columns 2 and 4). Standard errors are
two-way clustered by firm and quarter-year.33 Results strengthen the implications of Figure 3.
Mutual funds report stakes closer to 3% and the difference is especially large for falling below the
threshold. The coefficient of mfj equals 0.538 in column 2 and -0.137 in column 4; all coefficients
are statistically significant at the 1% level. Coefficients of the interaction terms are not different
from zero, indicating no changing behavior over time conditional on reporting stakes below or
above 3%. I relax this restriction in the following.
If mutual funds reduce their holdings below the threshold in particular around its introduc-
33Clustering only by firm changes inferences in column 3; the coefficient of mjj is statistically significant at the
5% instead of the 1% level.
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tion, they will disclose relatively more notifications for falling below in the earlier years. The
notion is consistent with an adjustment of holdings to avoid ownership disclosure and, at the
same time, a delayed response awaiting the enforcement of the rules. I test it in columns 1
and 2 in Panel B of Table 6. The dependent variable is the share of notifications for falling
below a threshold in mutual funds’ notifications in a given firm-quarter, share_mf_belowit.
Over all years, mutual funds submit notifications for falling below and exceeding in roughly
equal proportions; the average of share_mf_belowit amounts to 0.485. To gain insight into
the distribution across time, I divide the sample period into subperiods based on the regulatory
changes. I use the post indicators for the disclosure increases in 2009 and 2012 and define them
again on quarters; post9t (12) is equal to one if quarter t is larger than 2008q4 (2011q4). I
include industry fixed effects in both specifications and the set of control variables CONT in
column 2; specifically, I control for size [ln(mv)i(t−1)], share price [ln(up)i(t−1)], analyst follow-
ing [ln(ana)it], age [ln(age)it], dividend yield [dyi(t−1)] and index membership [cdaxi]. Standard
errors are two-way clustered by firm and quarter-year.34 In line with the disclosure avoidance
rationale, results show that mutual funds disclose relatively less notifications for falling below
in the later subperiods. For instance, the coefficient of post9t equals -0.089 in column 2, which
corresponds to a decline of almost 20% of the dependent variable at its mean.
Finally, I test whether mutual funds’ share in overall notifications changes with the disclosure
increases in 2009 and 2012. An increase (a decrease) suggests that mutual funds are more (less)
affected by the later two regulatory changes, which represent stricter rules only for investors
who are active in both equity and derivative markets. In Section 2.1, I argue that mutual
funds should, in principle, face more stringent disclosure requirements, since they have the
necessary leeway to invest in derivatives (and do so). In this section, I examine whether they
exploit the leeway in a manner that leads to more disclosure, compared to all other investors.
I report the results in columns 3 and 4 in Panel B of Table 6. The regression models mirror
the specifications in columns 1 and 2 except for the dependent variable which is the number
of notifications submitted by mutual funds over the total number of notifications disclosed in
a given firm-quarter, share_mfit. Over all years, mutual funds submit around one tenth of
notifications; the average of share_mfit amounts to 0.118. Upon the introduction of stricter
reporting thresholds, they appear to be disproportionately affected. The results indicate that
their share in overall notifications increases significantly over time.
34Clustering only by firm results in non-significant coefficients of post12t.
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5 Liquidity Effects
In this section, I study liquidity consequences of the disclosure increases. I investigate whether
the reduction in mutual funds’ holdings mitigates the positive relation between disclosure and
stock liquidity documented in prior literature. Christensen et al. [2016] show that the imple-
mentation of the TPD leads to an increase in liquidity in the EU. They assess the effect, among
other things, by comparing firms in the regulated and unregulated market. Agarwal et al.
[2015] find that mandatory, more frequent mutual fund disclosures lead to higher liquidity. Both
studies argue that more extensive disclosure reduces information asymmetry among market par-
ticipants and thus increases liquidity. In this vein, both studies shift the focus from disclosing
to non-disclosing investors. In Section 4, I concentrate on disclosing investors and their holding
adjustments in response to disclosure increases. The results indicate that mutual funds reduce
while non-financial corporations add to their holdings. These changes in ownership, however,
can have negative effects on liquidity. A smaller fraction of mutual fund investors can lower
liquidity because it implies a smaller fraction of investors who frequently trade and, thereby,
keep trading costs low [e.g., Demsetz, 1968; Rubin, 2007]. A larger fraction of non-financial
corporations can lower liquidity because it implies a larger fraction of informed blockholders
[e.g., Heflin and Shaw, 2000; Rubin, 2007].
Empirically, I first provide evidence for the above arguments on a standalone basis in my
setting. I start with the ownership structure channel and test whether mutual fund ownership
is positively associated with liquidity. I use the notifications for crossing the 3% threshold to
identify changes in ownership. I examine whether the change in bid-ask spreads, my proxy for
liquidity, differs for changes in mutual fund ownership relative to changes in other investors’ own-
ership. I use other investors as benchmark to abstract from disclosure effects, i.e., confounders
primarily driven by the disclosure of notifications and not the underlying changes in ownership.
If there is a positive relation between mutual fund ownership and liquidity, the change in bid-
ask spreads will be more positive (negative) for decreases (increases) in mutual fund ownership.
Panel A of Table 7 displays the results, in column 1 (2) for the sample based on notifications
for falling below (exceeding) the threshold, i.e., ownership decreases (increases). The dependent
variable is the change of the bid-ask spread from the pre-trade to the post-disclosure period,
∆ln(spread)it; spreads are averages of daily values over three months. The independent vari-
ables encompass the indicator variable for mutual funds, mfj , the variable of interest, as well as
control variables from prior literature, size [∆ln(mv)it], turnover [∆ln(to)it] and return variabil-
ity [∆ln(sd_ret)it] [e.g., Christensen et al., 2016; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000]. Control variables
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enter in changes, derived in a similar fashion as the change of the bid-ask spread.35 I include in-
dustry fixed effects and cluster standard errors by firm. Results suggest a somewhat asymmetric
relation between mutual fund ownership and liquidity. Bid-ask spreads increase relatively more
if mutual fund ownership decreases, but they do not change differentially if it increases.
I return to the holdings data to have comprehensive information on mutual fund ownership
that does not condition on crossing a reporting threshold. The sample includes firm-quarters
for the regulated and unregulated market and excludes penny stocks.36 Following a similar
rationale as above, I test whether bid-ask spreads, ln(spread)it, are negatively associated with
changes in mutual fund ownership, ∆stake_fundsit. I account for size [ln(mv)i(t−4)], turnover
[ln(to)i(t−4)] and return variability [ln(sd_ret)i(t−4)] as well as firm and quarter-year fixed ef-
fects.37 I cluster standard errors by firm and quarter-year. Column 1 in Panel B of Table 7
depicts the results. Spreads are negatively related to changes in mutual fund ownership and the
relation is statistically significant at the 1% level. In column 2, I repeat the estimation with a
combined ownership category of sophisticated, frequently trading investors (combined); mutual
funds, banks and insurance companies and pension funds. The coefficient of ∆stake_combinedit
is smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant, suggesting that mutual funds are par-
ticularly important as liquidity providers.
In the next step, I address the information asymmetry channel. I analyze liquidity around
the introduction of stricter ownership disclosure rules, essentially following the research design
of Christensen et al. [2016]. I estimate liquidity responses for firms in the regulated market, the
treatment group, relative to firms in the unregulated market, the control group. I include firm-
quarters from the holdings analysis with available data for estimation in the sample. Column 1
of Table 8 displays the results. The dependent variable is the bid-ask spread, ln(spread)it. The
variables measuring the effect of interest comprise the interactions of the indicator variable for
the treatment group, treati, with the post indicators; post7t (9) [12] is equal to one if quarter t
35For spreads, size and turnover, I compute averages of daily values for the 63 trading days before the trading date
of the notification and the 63 trading days after the disclosure date of the notification. For return variability, I
compute the standard deviation of daily returns over the same periods. I require a minimum of 33 observations
in each period. For all variables, I use the natural logarithm of one plus the variable and calculate the change
as the difference between post-disclosure and pre-trade value.
36I define a stock as penny stock if its unadjusted price is less than the 5th percentile of the price distribution
[Schmidt, von Arx, Schrimpf, Wagner and Ziegler, 2017]. Using the more common cutoff of AC1 leads to a loss
of observations especially in the unregulated market and likely does not address particularities of the German
setting; even among the largest, index-listed firms, prices below AC1 are observable [Stehle and Schmidt, 2015].
However, my penny stock definition results in some outliers driving the distributions of the (liquidity) proxies.
For instance, the mean of spreadit equals 6.2% (Panel B of Table 2).
37I define variables on calendar quarters and proceed similarly as above. Specifically, spread and turnover are
quarterly averages of the daily values. Return variability is the quarterly standard deviation of daily returns.
I require at least 33 (10) observations (for turnover). Size is the market value at the end of the quarter. I lag
each control variable four quarters and use the natural logarithm of one plus the variable.
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is larger than 2006q4 (2008q4) [2011q4]. I control for size [ln(mv)i(t−4)], turnover [ln(to)i(t−4)]
and return variability [ln(sd_ret)i(t−4)], together subsumed by CONT (see Footnote 37 for
the construction of the variables). I account for firm and quarter-year fixed effects and cluster
standard errors by firm and quarter-year. Results support a positive relation between disclosure
and liquidity. The introduction of stricter reporting thresholds in 2007 and 2009 is associated
with lower bid-ask spreads. The further tightening of the disclosure regime in 2012 does not
have an incremental impact.
In the final step, I investigate how the ownership structure and information asymmetry
channel interact. So far, the evidence is in line with the existence of each in isolation. Since
I observe a reduction in mutual funds’ holdings around the disclosure increases, I now assess
whether they counteract each other when considered jointly. To do so, I extend the model in
column 1 of Table 8. Precisely, I add interactions with an indicator variable for high mutual fund
ownership in the pre-treatment period, highi. I use pre-treatment values to provide for some
degree of exogeneity in the proxy. I single out firms with a high level of mutual fund ownership
because I expect them to experience the largest reduction. The variable highi is equal to one if
stake_fundsit is larger than the median in the last quarter of 2006, where the median is defined
separately for treatment and control group to take into account generally different ownership
levels. I work with two samples: a small sample in which each firm has an observation for
the last quarter of 2006 and a broad sample in which I set highi equal to zero if the firm
has no observation. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 8 report the results for the broad and small
sample, respectively. Across the disclosure increases in 2007 and 2009 and both samples, there
is evidence for an overall offsetting effect. While the treatment effect for firms with low mutual
fund ownership is more negative, it is close to zero for firms with high mutual fund ownership.
For instance, in column 3, the coefficients of post7t × treati and post7t × treati × highi are
-0.032 and 0.024, respectively. Thus, results are consistent with the reduction in mutual funds’
holdings having a negative impact on liquidity and weakening the positive impact through the
information asymmetry channel. Lastly, I repeat the estimation for the combined stake of mutual
funds, banks and insurance companies and pension funds, combined, and report the results in
columns 4 and 5 of Table 8. Again, the finding for mutual funds does not generalize.
6 Conclusion
In this study, I investigate which investors adjust their holdings around the introduction of
lower reporting thresholds for ownership disclosures. I conduct a comprehensive assessment by
considering all different investor types in the market in their potential roles of sellers, holders and
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buyers of stock. I can do so because I have a dataset of privately reported holdings, encompassing
both publicly disclosed and undisclosed investments. For identification, I use three regulatory
changes effectively lowering reporting thresholds. I exploit that they affect only holdings in firms
in the regulated and not the unregulated market. Results of the difference-in-differences analysis
show that mutual funds and, to a lesser extent, banks decrease while non-financial corporations
increase their holdings. Results of descriptive analyses support the notion that mutual funds
and banks merely reduce their holdings in size and do not completely sell them off, consistent
with the avoidance of reporting thresholds.
In supplemental analyses, I turn to the subset of publicly observable holdings from the
disclosure instrument that is the subject of the regulatory changes, notifications, and the investor
type with the most robust findings, mutual funds. Results again suggest that mutual funds
reduce their holdings to avoid reporting thresholds. Relative to all other investors, they more
frequently disclose stakes just below the initial reporting threshold. In addition, such activities
seem to be concentrated around the first disclosure increase, consistent with a gradual response
to stricter enforcement. Relative to all notifications of mutual funds, notifications for falling
below a threshold occur less frequently in the later years.
Finally, I reconcile my findings with the extant literature on liquidity effects [e.g., Christensen
et al., 2016; Rubin, 2007]. In line with previous work, I illustrate that liquidity is, in general,
positively associated with both mutual fund ownership and ownership disclosure. I then show
that these two channels almost completely offset each other for firms that are likely most affected
by the reduction in mutual funds’ holdings.
Taken together, the paper emphasizes that ownership disclosure rules can impact investor
behavior and thereby ownership structures. Like prior studies, it stresses the importance of
investor heterogeneity [e.g., Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009; He et al., 2004]. Besides, it under-
lines that investors’ incentives do not arise in isolation, but depend on the investor composition
in the market. My findings inform about the ranking of disclosure costs among investors. Even
if all investors perceive disclosure as costly ex ante, the market mechanism will ensure that only
investors with the relatively highest disclosure costs reduce their holdings. Investor heterogeneity
hence makes holding adjustments feasible in that it provides for trading partners. Future re-
search faces ample opportunities to explore this diversity further. Settings differ, internationally





stake_?it The number of shares held by investor type ? divided by the total number
of ordinary shares outstanding (NOSH multiplied by 1,000) multiplied
by 100.
? is one of the following: foreign investors (foreign), mutual funds
(funds), banks (banks), insurance companies and pension funds (ins),
non-financial corporations (corp), governmental institutions (gov), other
financial investors (other) or households (hh).
post7t (9) [12] Indicator variable equal to one if quarter t is larger than 2006q4 (2008q4)
[2011q4].
If the unit of observation is the notification: post9t (12) is an indicator
variable equal to one if trading day t is after February 28, 2009 (January
31, 2012).
treati Indicator variable equal to one if firm i is part of the treatment group,
i.e., listed on the regulated market.
mvit [ln(mv)it] [Natural logarithm of one plus the] market value in millions (MV).
upit [ln(up)it] [Natural logarithm of one plus the] unadjusted closing price (UP).
anait [ln(ana)it] [Natural logarithm of one plus the] number of analysts following the firm.
ageit [ln(age)it] [Natural logarithm of one plus] quarter t less the quarter from which
Datastream holds information about the firm (BDATE).
dyit Dividend yield (DY), i.e., dividends per share as percentage of the share
price, ranging from 0 to 1.
cdaxi Indicator variable equal to one if firm i is a member of the index CDAX.
spreadit
[ln(spread)it]
[Natural logarithm of one plus the] quarterly mean of the daily bid-ask
spread. The daily bid-ask spread is based on the daily closing bid (PB)
and ask (PA) prices adjusted for capital actions: = (PA−PB)(PA+PB)/2 .
ln(to)it Natural logarithm of one plus the quarterly mean of daily share turnover.
Daily share turnover is daily unadjusted volume (UVO) over total shares
outstanding (NOSH) multiplied by 100.
ln(sd_ret)it Natural logarithm of one plus the quarterly standard deviation of daily
returns. Daily returns are based on the total return index (RI).
highi Indicator variable equal to one if stake_?i(2006q4) is above the median in
2006q4.
stakej Stake disclosed in notification j.
Continued on next page
36
Continued from previous page
Variable Description
mfj Indicator variable equal to one if notification j is submitted by a mutual
fund.
share_mf_belowit The number of notifications for falling below submitted by mutual funds
over the total number of notifications submitted by mutual funds.
share_mfit The number of notifications submitted by mutual funds over the total
number of notifications disclosed.
Notes: i denotes firm, j notification and t quarter (trading day if the unit of observation is the notification). If applicable,
the Datastream or Worldscope mnemonic is displayed in parentheses.
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A.2 Example of a Notification
38
References
Abadie, A., Diamond, A. and Hainmueller, J. [2015], ‘Comparative politics and the synthetic
control method’, American Journal of Political Science 59(2), 495–510.
Abadie, A. and Gardeazabal, J. [2003], ‘The economic costs of conflict: A case study of the
Basque Country’, The American Economic Review 93(1), 113–132.
Agarwal, V., Gay, G. D. and Ling, L. [2014], ‘Window dressing in mutual funds’, Review of
Financial Studies 27(11), 3133–3170.
Agarwal, V., Jiang, W., Tang, Y. and Yang, B. [2013], ‘Uncovering hedge fund skill from the
portfolio holdings they hide’, The Journal of Finance 68(2), 739–783.
Agarwal, V., Mullally, K. A., Tang, Y. and Yang, B. [2015], ‘Mandatory portfolio disclosure,
stock liquidity, and mutual fund performance’, The Journal of Finance 70(6), 2733–2776.
Agarwal, V., Vashishtha, R. and Venkatachalam, M. [2017], ‘Mutual fund transparency
and corporate myopia’, Working Paper. Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2728969.
Amann, M., Baltzer, M. and Schrape, M. [2012], ‘Microdatabase: Securities holdings statistics
– a flexible multi-dimensional approach for providing user-targeted securities investment
data’, Deutsche Bundesbank: Technical Documentation. Available at https://www.bundes-
bank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Bundesbank/Research_Centre/microdatabase_securi-
ties_holdings_statistics.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.
Appel, I. R., Gormley, T. A. and Keim, D. B. [2016], ‘Passive investors, not passive owners’,
Journal of Financial Economics 121(1), 111–141.
Aragon, G. O., Hertzel, M. and Shi, Z. [2013], ‘Why do hedge funds avoid disclosure? Evidence
from confidential 13F filings’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48(05), 1499–
1518.
Bade, M., Flory, J. and Schönberg, T. [2016], ‘SHS-Base, data report 2016-02 – metadata version
1-1’, Deutsche Bundesbank Research Data and Service Centre: Data Report. Available at
https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/EN/Downloads/Bundesbank/Research_Centre/re-
search_data_micro_data_shsb_data_report.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.
BaFin [2008], Annual Report 2007, Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Bonn and
Frankfurt am Main.
BaFin [2013a], Annual Report 2012, Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, Bonn and
Frankfurt am Main.
BaFin [2013b], Emittentenleitfaden, 4 edn, Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht,
Bonn and Frankfurt am Main.
Baltzer, M., Jank, S. and Smajlbegovic, E. [2015], ‘Who trades on momentum?’, Working Paper.
Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2517462.
39
Bhattacharya, U. and Daouk, H. [2002], ‘The world price of insider trading’, The Journal of
Finance 57(1), 75–108.
Boone, A. L. and White, J. T. [2015], ‘The effect of institutional ownership on firm transparency
and information production’, Journal of Financial Economics 117(3), 508–533.
Brav, A., Jiang, W., Partnoy, F. and Thomas, R. [2008], ‘Hedge fund activism, corporate gov-
ernance, and firm performance’, The Journal of Finance 63(4), 1729–1775.
Brunnermeier, M. K. and Pedersen, L. H. [2005], ‘Predatory trading’, The Journal of Finance
60(4), 1825–1863.
Christensen, H. B., Hail, L. and Leuz, C. [2016], ‘Capital-market effects of securities reg-
ulation: Prior conditions, implementation, and enforcement’, Review of Financial Studies
29(11), 2885–2924.
Clifford, C. P. [2008], ‘Value creation or destruction? Hedge funds as shareholder activists’,
Journal of Corporate Finance 14(4), 323–336.
Coval, J. and Stafford, E. [2007], ‘Asset fire sales (and purchases) in equity markets’, Journal of
Financial Economics 86(2), 479–512.
Cronqvist, H. and Fahlenbrach, R. [2009], ‘Large shareholders and corporate policies’, The
Review of Financial Studies 22(10), 3941–3976.
Dahlquist, M. and Robertsson, G. [2001], ‘Direct foreign ownership, institutional investors, and
firm characteristics’, Journal of Financial Economics 59(3), 413–440.
DDV [2010], Annual Report 2009, Deutscher Derivate Verband, Frankfurt am Main and Berlin.
Del Guercio, D. [1996], ‘The distorting effect of the prudent-man laws on institutional equity
investments’, Journal of Financial Economics 40(1), 31–62.
Demsetz, H. [1968], ‘The cost of transacting’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 82(1), 33–53.
Deutsche Bundesbank [2013], ‘Current developments in the mutual funds market: Demand,
structural changes and investor behaviour’, Monthly Report January.
Deutsche Bundesbank [2014], ‘Ownership structure in the German equity market: General trends
and changes in the financial crisis’, Monthly Report September.
Deutsche Bundesbank [2015], ‘Securities holdings statistics for analysing holdings of securities
in Germany and Europe: Methodology and results’, Monthly Report March.
Duong, T. X., Huszár, Z. R. and Yamada, T. [2015], ‘The costs and benefits of short sale
disclosure’, Journal of Banking & Finance 53, 124–139.
Edmans, A. [2014], ‘Blockholders and corporate governance’, Annual Review of Financial Eco-
nomics 6, 23–50.
40
Edmans, A., Heinle, M. S. and Huang, C. [2016], ‘The real costs of financial efficiency when
some information is soft’, Review of Finance 20(6), 2151–2182.
European Commission [2008], Report on more stringent national measures concerning Directive
2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information
about issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, Commission Staff
Working Document, Brussels.
European Commission [2012], Report from the Commission: Impact assessment, Commission
Staff Working Paper, Brussels.
Ferreira, M. A. and Matos, P. [2008], ‘The colors of investors’ money: The role of institutional
investors around the world’, Journal of Financial Economics 88(3), 499–533.
Fishman, M. J. and Hagerty, K. M. [1995], ‘The mandatory disclosure of trades and market
liquidity’, Review of Financial Studies 8(3), 637–676.
Frank, M. M., Poterba, J. M., Shackelford, D. A. and Shoven, J. B. [2004], ‘Copycat funds:
Information disclosure regulation and the returns to active management in the mutual fund
industry’, The Journal of Law & Economics 47(2), 515–541.
Franks, J. and Mayer, C. [2001], ‘Ownership and control of German corporations’, Review of
Financial Studies 14(4), 943–977.
Ge, W. and Zheng, L. [2006], ‘The frequency of mutual fund portfolio disclosure’, Working Paper.
Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=557186.
Gow, I. D., Ormazabal, G. and Taylor, D. J. [2010], ‘Correcting for cross-sectional and time-series
dependence in accounting research’, The Accounting Review 85(2), 483–512.
He, J., Ng, L. and Wang, Q. [2004], ‘Quarterly trading patterns of financial institutions’, The
Journal of Business 77(3), 493–509.
Heflin, F. and Shaw, K. W. [2000], ‘Blockholder ownership and market liquidity’, The Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 35(4), 621–633.
Holmström, B. [1999], ‘Managerial incentive problems: A dynamic perspective’, The Review of
Economic Studies 66(1), 169–182.
Hu, H. T. C. [2015], ‘Financial innovation and governance mechanisms: The evolution of decou-
pling and transparency’, Business Lawyer 70(2), 347–405.
Hu, H. T. C. and Black, B. [2006], ‘The new vote buying: Empty voting and hidden (morphable)
ownership’, Southern California Law Review 79(4), 811–908.
Huddart, S., Hughes, J. S. and Levine, C. B. [2001], ‘Public disclosure and dissimulation of
insider trades’, Econometrica 69(3), 665–681.
Iacus, S. M., King, G. and Porro, G. [2012], ‘Causal inference without balance checking: Coars-
ened exact matching’, Political Analysis 20(1), 1–24.
41
Ince, O. S. and Porter, R. B. [2006], ‘Individual equity return data from Thomson Datastream:
Handle with care!’, Journal of Financial Research 29(4), 463–479.
Jank, S. [2011], ‘Are there disadvantaged clienteles in mutual funds?’, CFR Working Paper
Series 11-02. Available at https://ideas.repec.org/p/zbw/cfrwps/1102.html.
Jank, S., Roling, C. and Smajlbegovic, E. [2016], ‘Flying under the radar: The effects of short-
sale disclosure rules on investor behavior and stock prices’, Working Paper. Available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2783762.
John, K. and Narayanan, R. [1997], ‘Market manipulation and the role of insider trading regu-
lations’, The Journal of Business 70(2), 217–247.
Jones, C. M., Reed, A. V. and Waller, W. [2016], ‘Revealing shorts: An examination of large
short position disclosures’, Review of Financial Studies 29(12), 3278–3320.
Kick, T., Onali, E., Ruprecht, B. and Schaeck, K. [2014], ‘Wealth shocks, credit-supply shocks,
and asset allocation’, European Central Bank Working Paper Series No. 1662. Available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2408449.
Kyle, A. S. [1985], ‘Continuous auctions and insider trading’, Econometrica 53(6), 1315–1335.
Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., Thaler, R. and Vishny, R. [1991], ‘Window dressing by pension fund
managers’, The American Economic Review 81(2), 227–231.
Leuz, C. and Verrecchia, R. E. [2000], ‘The economic consequences of increased disclosure’,
Journal of Accounting Research 38, 91–124.
Ljungqvist, A. and Qian, W. [2016], ‘How constraining are limits to arbitrage?’, Review of
Financial Studies 29(8), 1975–2028.
Mietzner, M. and Schweizer, D. [2014], ‘Hedge funds versus private equity funds as shareholder
activists in Germany – differences in value creation’, Journal of Economics and Finance
38(2), 181–208.
Natter, M., Rohleder, M., Schulte, D. and Wilkens, M. [2016], ‘The benefits of option use by
mutual funds’, Journal of Financial Intermediation 26, 142–168.
Petersen, M. A. [2009], ‘Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing
approaches’, The Review of Financial Studies 22(1), 435–480.
Prat, A. [2005], ‘The wrong kind of transparency’, The American Economic Review 95(3), 862–
877.
Rohleder, M., Schulte, D. and Wilkens, M. [2017], ‘Management of flow risk in mutual funds’,
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 48(1), 31–56.
Rubin, A. [2007], ‘Ownership level, ownership concentration and liquidity’, Journal of Financial
Markets 10(3), 219–248.
42
Schmidt, P. S., von Arx, U., Schrimpf, A., Wagner, A. F. and Ziegler, A. [2017], ‘On the
construction of common size, value and momentum factors in international stock markets:
A guide with applications’, Working Paper. Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1738315.
Schouten, M. C. [2010], ‘The case for mandatory ownership disclosure’, Stanford Journal of Law,
Business & Finance 15, 127–182.
Shive, S. and Yun, H. [2013], ‘Are mutual funds sitting ducks?’, Journal of Financial Economics
107(1), 220–237.
Stehle, R. and Schmidt, M. H. [2015], ‘Return on German stocks 1954 to 2013’, Credit and
Capital Markets 48(3), 427–476.
Veil, R., Ruckes, M., Limbach, P. and Doumet, M. [2015], ‘Today’s or yesterday’s news?’,
Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 44(5), 709–753.
Verbeek, M. and Wang, Y. [2013], ‘Better than the original? The relative success of copycat
funds’, Journal of Banking & Finance 37(9), 3454–3471.
Verrecchia, R. E. [2001], ‘Essays on disclosure’, Journal of Accounting and Economics 32(1–
3), 97–180.
Vismara, S., Paleari, S. and Ritter, J. R. [2012], ‘Europe’s second markets for small companies’,
European Financial Management 18(3), 352–388.
43
Figures







































2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
year
notifications (abs.) secs. 21, 25, 25a WpHG
notifications (rel.) secs. 21, 25, 25a WpHG
 
Notes: The figure displays the number of notifications for secs. 21, 25 and 25a WpHG per year, in absolute
numbers (gray bars) and per firm (blue line). It shows all notifications disclosed in the German market and
reported by the BaFin. The number of firms corresponds to the number of firms listed on the regulated
market. Source: annual reports of the BaFin, available at: www.bafin.de.
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Notes: The figure displays the quarterly mean of mutual funds’ stakes, stake_fundit, for the period 2005q4–2008q4. Figure 2a shows the mean of the raw stakes for a balanced panel. The
number of treated (control) firms is equal to 375 (75) in each quarter. Figure 2b shows the mean of (raw) stakes for treated firms and synthetic controls. Stakes for synthetic controls are
weighted combinations of stakes in control firms. I construct them by matching each treated firm to a combination of control firms whose combined stake most closely tracks the stake in
the treated firm in the pre-treatment period. To ensure comparability, I limit the treatment group to firms with stakes less than or equal to the maximum stake in the control group in the
same quarter. I further restrict the sample to a balanced panel. The number of treated firms and synthetic controls is equal to 322 in each quarter. I use 75 control firms for the synthetic
controls. Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC), Securities Holdings Statistics (SHS-Base) 2005–2008, own calculations.
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Notes: The figure displays the distribution of reported stakes around the 3% threshold, separately for falling below and
exceeding the threshold as well as mutual funds and other investors. The number of observations is equal to 364 in Figure




Table 1: Firms across Quarters
Holdings
Treated Firms in
% of Firms in the
Quarter All Treatment Control Regulated Market
2005q4 701 581 120 63
2006q4 868 647 221 63
2007q4 990 659 331 63
2008q4 1,100 677 423 66
2009q4 1,140 670 470 71
2010q4 1,184 663 521 73
2011q4 1,202 654 548 76
2012q4 1,144 632 512 79
2013q4 1,104 619 485 80
2014q4 814 505 309 71
All years 1,549 814 735
Notes: The table shows the number of firms in the last quarter of each sample year in the
holdings sample, for the whole sample (column 1) and separately for treatment (column 2)
and control group (column 3). It further shows the percentage of firms listed on the regulated
market that I include in the treatment group (column 4). The total number of firms listed on
the regulated market is published in the BaFin’s annual reports, available at: www.bafin.de.
The last row (All years) depicts the number of unique firms over the entire sample period.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC), Securities Holdings Statistics (SHS-Base)
2005–2014, own calculations.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Holdings
Value-weighted 10th Decile
Variable N Mean SD N Mean N Mean
stake_foreignit 38,330 30.904 30.236 37,470 42.652 3,833 92.629
t 23,363 27.303 25.758 22,890 42.142 2,336 83.059
c 14,967 36.526 35.408 14,580 50.510 1,496 96.620
stake_fundsit 38,330 1.281 2.805 37,470 4.452 3,823 8.637
t 23,363 1.810 3.235 22,890 4.667 2,336 9.954
c 14,967 0.456 1.644 14,580 1.145 1,496 4.369
stake_banksit 38,330 0.549 1.835 37,470 0.934 3,833 4.309
t 23,363 0.674 2.009 22,890 0.973 2,336 4.943
c 14,967 0.352 1.502 14,580 0.343 1,496 3.091
stake_insit 38,330 0.159 0.901 37,470 0.385 3,833 1.549
t 23,363 0.215 1.029 22,890 0.395 2,336 2.027
c 14,967 0.072 0.643 14,580 0.242 1,496 0.722
stake_corpit 38,330 29.644 31.521 37,470 31.091 3,832 92.677
t 23,363 31.069 31.035 22,890 31.213 2,336 91.819
c 14,967 27.419 32.141 14,580 29.208 1,496 93.969
stake_govit 38,330 0.017 0.233 37,470 0.042 3,832 0.172
t 23,363 0.023 0.287 22,890 0.044 2,330 0.228
c 14,967 0.008 0.101 14,580 0.009 724 0.167
stake_otherit 38,330 3.416 8.493 37,470 5.293 3,833 22.735
t 23,363 3.382 7.608 22,890 5.444 2,336 20.766
c 14,967 3.468 9.714 14,580 2.968 1,495 25.826
stake_hhit 38,330 34.030 27.953 37,470 15.150 3,833 85.847
t 23,363 35.523 27.752 22,890 15.123 2,336 85.918
c 14,967 31.698 28.107 14,580 15.575 1,496 85.664
Notes: The table displays summary statistics for the whole sample (line 1) and separately for treatment (t, line
2) and control group (c, line 3). The columns on the left (right) contain statistics for (the top decile of) equal-
weighted percentage stakes and the middle columns contains value-weighted stakes, i.e., stake_?it weighted by
market value, mvit. i and t denote firm and quarter-year, respectively. stake_?it is the number of shares held
by investor type ? divided by the number of shares outstanding, multiplied by 100. ? is one of the following:
foreign investors (foreign), mutual funds (funds), banks (banks), insurance companies and pension funds (ins),
non-financial corporations (corp), governmental institutions (gov), other financial investors (other) or households
(hh). Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC), Securities Holdings Statistics (SHS-Base) 2005–2014,
own calculations.
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Panel B: Firm Characteristics
Variable N Mean SD Variable N Mean SD
post7t 38,330 0.900 0.300 post9t 38,330 0.690 0.462
t 23,363 0.871 0.336 t 23,363 0.643 0.479
c 14,967 0.945 0.228 c 14,967 0.763 0.425
post12t 38,330 0.327 0.469 treati 38,330 0.610 0.488
t 23,363 0.304 0.460 t 23,363 1.000 0.000
c 14,967 0.362 0.481 c 14,967 0.000 0.000
mvi(t−1) 35,499 231.361 894.180 upi(t−1) 35,499 23.308 77.668
t 22,265 348.356 1,089.411 t 22,265 26.557 80.816
c 13,234 34.529 293.764 c 13,234 17.842 71.734
ln(mv)i(t−1) 35,499 2.944 2.132 ln(up)i(t−1) 35,499 1.702 1.465
anait 35,499 2.169 5.742 ageit 35,499 44.832 34.694
t 22,265 3.317 6.962 t 22,265 57.251 34.450
c 13,234 0.237 0.969 c 13,234 23.938 23.153
ln(ana)it 35,499 0.515 0.903 ln(age)it 35,499 3.473 0.945
dyi(t−1) 35,499 0.009 0.019 cdaxi 35,499 0.520 0.500
t 22,265 0.012 0.020 t 22,265 0.828 0.377
c 13,234 0.005 0.016 c 13,234 0.000 0.000
spreadit 20,324 0.062 0.095
t 16,144 0.052 0.079
c 4,180 0.100 0.134
ln(spread)it 20,324 0.057 0.077
Notes: The table displays summary statistics for the whole sample (line 1) and separately for treatment (t,
line 2) and control group (c, line 3). i and t denote firm and quarter-year, respectively. post7t (9) [12] is
an indicator variable equal to one if quarter t is larger than 2006q4 (2008q4) [2011q4]. treati is an indicator
variable equal to one if firm i is part of the treatment group, i.e., listed on the regulated market. mvit
[ln(mv)it] is the [natural logarithm of one plus the] market value. upit [ln(up)it] is the [natural logarithm of
one plus the] unadjusted closing price. anait [ln(ana)it] is the [natural logarithm of one plus the] number of
analysts following the firm. ageit [ln(age)it] is the [natural logarithm of one plus] firm age in quarters. dyit
is dividends as percentage of the share price. cdaxi is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is a member
of the index CDAX. spreadit [ln(spread)it] is the [natural logarithm of one plus the] quarterly mean of the
daily bid-ask spread.
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Table 3: Main Model
Holdings
stake_?it
foreign funds banks ins corp gov other hh
post7t × treati −1.401 −0.378∗∗ −0.100 −0.030 1.381 −0.011 0.267 0.273
(1.392) (0.146) (0.132) (0.069) (1.194) (0.012) (0.348) (0.916)
post9t × treati −0.954 −0.286∗ −0.209∗∗ −0.082∗∗ 2.214∗∗ −0.006 −0.052 −0.626
(0.978) (0.144) (0.096) (0.032) (1.048) (0.006) (0.377) (0.854)
post12t × treati −0.828 0.097 −0.022 −0.072∗∗ 2.436∗∗ −0.004 0.385 −1.991∗∗
(0.888) (0.101) (0.062) (0.028) (0.917) (0.005) (0.385) (0.831)
Quarter-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
adj. R2 0.806 0.671 0.496 0.557 0.796 0.556 0.528 0.825
adj. R2 within 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.002
N 38,330 38,330 38,330 38,330 38,330 38,330 38,330 38,330
Notes: The table displays estimates for the main difference-in-differences analysis. i and t denote firm and quarter-
year, respectively. stake_?it is the number of shares held by investor type ? divided by the number of shares
outstanding, multiplied by 100. ? is one of the following: foreign investors (foreign), mutual funds (funds), banks
(banks), insurance companies and pension funds (ins), non-financial corporations (corp), governmental institutions
(gov), other financial investors (other) or households (hh). post7t (9) [12] is an indicator variable equal to one if
quarter t is larger than 2006q4 (2008q4) [2011q4]. treati is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is part of the
treatment group, i.e., listed on the regulated market. Standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and quarter-year
and denoted below the coefficients in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level,
respectively. Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC), Securities Holdings Statistics (SHS-Base) 2005–2014,
own calculations.
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Table 4: Main Model Variations
Holdings
stake_?it
foreign funds banks ins corp gov other hh
(1) Balanced Panel
post7t × treati −1.410 −0.351∗∗∗−0.394∗∗∗−0.018 2.623∗∗−0.001 0.050 −0.499
(1.265) (0.060) (0.127) (0.073) (1.204) (0.004) (0.504) (0.829)
post9t × treati 0.207 −0.406∗ −0.226 −0.075 0.108 0.003 0.137 0.252
(0.959) (0.214) (0.228) (0.049) (1.380) (0.006) (0.834) (1.543)
post12t × treati 0.549 0.421∗∗∗ 0.083 −0.046 2.070 −0.011∗ 0.390 −3.456∗
(1.296) (0.153) (0.077) (0.040) (1.704) (0.006) (0.647) (1.706)
Quarter-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
adj. R2 0.795 0.652 0.520 0.588 0.839 0.662 0.471 0.863
adj. R2 within 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003
N = 15,117; 375 (75) treated (control) firms
(2) Linear Time Trend
post7t × treati −0.110 −0.319∗∗ −0.067 −0.012 1.284 0.002 0.098 −0.876
(1.409) (0.148) (0.146) (0.056) (1.552) (0.004) (0.402) (1.052)
post9t × treati 0.507 −0.274∗ −0.244 −0.068∗ −1.186 0.003 −0.141 1.403
(1.043) (0.146) (0.159) (0.037) (1.185) (0.005) (0.663) (1.131)
post12t × treati 0.520 0.076 0.134 −0.007 −0.421 −0.002 0.232 −0.531
(1.181) (0.167) (0.121) (0.024) (1.201) (0.003) (0.356) (0.862)
Firm fixed effects × trend yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
adj. R2 0.853 0.790 0.677 0.792 0.894 0.942 0.651 0.924
adj. R2 within 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
N = 23,722; 588 (175) treated (control) firms
(3) Control Variables
post7t × treati −2.390 −0.291∗ −0.051 −0.017 0.087 0.005 −0.127 2.783∗∗
(1.760) (0.152) (0.137) (0.070) (1.466) (0.011) (0.407) (1.133)
post9t × treati −8.363∗∗∗ −0.178 −0.099 −0.052∗∗ 4.281∗∗∗ 0.003 0.303 4.105∗∗∗
(1.668) (0.133) (0.083) (0.025) (1.304) (0.005) (0.425) (1.075)
post12t × treati −1.097 0.188∗ −0.070 −0.032 1.124 −0.009 −0.343 0.239
(1.320) (0.099) (0.068) (0.031) (1.214) (0.007) (0.397) (1.227)
CONT and treati yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Quarter-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
adj. R2 0.146 0.387 0.030 0.028 0.163 0.023 0.031 0.245
adj. R2 within 0.123 0.350 0.020 0.015 0.125 0.006 0.019 0.211
N = 35,499; 798 (714) treated (control) firms
51
stake_?it
foreign funds banks ins corp gov other hh
(4) Matched Firms: PSM with Replacement
post7t × treati −4.978∗ −0.770∗∗ 0.246 −0.051 3.804∗∗∗−0.001 −0.766 2.517∗
(2.510) (0.316) (0.529) (0.087) (1.128) (0.001) (0.739) (1.273)
post9t × treati 2.073 −0.692 −1.305∗ −0.128 2.206 0.005 1.596 −3.754
(2.094) (0.496) (0.670) (0.078) (3.512) (0.006) (1.083) (3.171)
post12t × treati 0.864 0.406 0.087 −0.005 3.234 −0.017∗∗ 0.232 −4.801
(2.299) (0.283) (0.339) (0.037) (3.791) (0.008) (0.776) (3.000)
Quarter-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
adj. R2 0.796 0.682 0.718 0.660 0.812 0.673 0.431 0.814
adj. R2 within 0.006 0.021 0.036 0.005 0.012 0.003 0.007 0.019
N = 18,368; 289 (34) treated (control) firms
(5) Matched Firms: CEM with Weights
post7t × treati 1.410 −0.574∗∗∗−0.465∗ −0.117 0.762 0.002 0.328 −1.348
(1.428) (0.143) (0.235) (0.129) (2.065) (0.002) (0.550) (1.774)
post9t × treati 4.507∗ −0.370 −1.984 −0.137 −5.135 0.005 2.109 1.004
(2.435) (0.240) (1.546) (0.109) (3.087) (0.010) (1.716) (3.421)
post12t × treati 0.481 0.684∗∗ −0.246 −0.010 −0.011 −0.015∗ 0.325 −1.209
(1.536) (0.305) (0.150) (0.036) (3.211) (0.009) (0.751) (2.774)
Quarter-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
adj. R2 0.801 0.582 0.608 0.599 0.810 0.608 0.374 0.828
adj. R2 within 0.008 0.007 0.061 0.008 0.004 0.001 0.009 0.000
N = 5,821; 137 (35) treated (control) firms
Notes: The table displays regression estimates for variations of the main model: (1) a sample restricted to firms that
have complete quarterly observations for the period 2005q4–2008q4; (2) the main model extended with firm-specific
linear time trends; (3) a simplified model with only industry and quarter-year fixed effects, but extended with a
set of control variables, CONT ; (4) a sample of firms from propensity score matching (PSM); and (5) a sample of
firms from coarsened exact matching (CEM). Before matching, samples are restricted to firms that have complete
quarterly observations for the period 2005q4–2008q4. i and t denote firm and quarter-year, respectively. stake_?it
is the number of shares held by investor type ? divided by the number of shares outstanding, multiplied by 100. ? is
one of the following: foreign investors (foreign), mutual funds (funds), banks (banks), insurance companies and
pension funds (ins), non-financial corporations (corp), governmental institutions (gov), other financial investors
(other) or households (hh). post7t (9) [12] is an indicator variable equal to one if quarter t is larger than 2006q4
(2008q4) [2011q4]. treati is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is part of the treatment group, i.e., listed
on the regulated market. CONT includes the following control variables: the natural logarithm of one plus the
market value, ln(mv)i(t−1); the natural logarithm of one plus the unadjusted closing price, ln(up)i(t−1); the
natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following the firm, ln(ana)it; the natural logarithm of one
plus firm age in quarters, ln(age)it; dividends as percentage of the share price, dyi(t−1); and an indicator variable
equal to one if firm i is a member of the index CDAX, cdaxi. Standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and
quarter-year and denoted below the coefficients in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05
and 0.01 level, respectively. Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC), Securities Holdings Statistics
(SHS-Base) 2005–2014, own calculations.
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foreign funds banks ins corp gov other hh
abs. (%) abs. (%) abs. (%) abs. (%) abs. (%) abs. (%) abs. (%) abs. (%) N
PRE
t 599 (99) 330 (55) 493 (82) 321 (53) 604 (100) 158 (26) 576 (95) 604 (100) 5
108,550 (44) 12,396 (5) 2,877 (1) 1,935 (1) 73,308 (30) 55 (0) 9,623 (4) 36,244 (15) 5
c 156 (95) 35 (21) 69 (43) 27 (17) 165 (100) 15 (9) 144 (87) 165 (100) 5
4,410 (40) 400 (4) 85 (1) 134 (1) 2,781 (29) 4 (0) 229 (2) 2,352 (24) 5
POST
t 660 (99) 368 (55) 516 (78) 332 (50) 663 (100) 177 (27) 636 (96) 663 (100) 8
106,091 (44) 10,289 (4) 2,495 (1) 1,235 (1) 73,996 (31) 26 (0) 10,862 (5) 33,430 (14) 8
c 330 (97) 66 (20) 135 (39) 45 (14) 332 (98) 17 (5) 266 (80) 336 99 8
5,583 (38) 184 (1) 67 (0) 43 (0) 5,534 (40) 1 (0) 421 (3) 2,406 (17) 8
Notes: The table displays the number of firms with non-zero holdings and the market value of the holdings, separately for treatment (t) and control group (c), pre-period
(PRE) and post-period (POST) as well as investor type ?. ? is one of the following: foreign investors (foreign), mutual funds (funds), banks (banks), insurance
companies and pension funds (ins), non-financial corporations (corp), governmental institutions (gov), other financial investors (other) or households (hh). The table
provides the number of firms with non-zero holdings and the market value of holdings in absolute terms (abs.) and as percentage (% ) of overall firms and of total
market capitalization, respectively. The pre-period (post-period) includes 2005q4–2006q4 (2007q1–2008q4). All numbers are averages of the quarterly values; N depicts
the number of quarters entering the calculation. Overall, there are 3,022 (824) observations in the treatment (control) group in the pre-period and 5,308 (2,718) in the
post-period. Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC), Securities Holdings Statistics (SHS-Base) 2005–2014, own calculations.
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Table 6: Analysis of Notifications
Notifications





(0.070) (0.074) (0.035) (0.037)
post9t ×mfj −0.028 −0.040 0.077 0.082
(0.092) (0.097) (0.094) (0.081)
post12t ×mfj −0.027 −0.011 −0.055 −0.029
(0.155) (0.110) (0.123) (0.105)
Main effects post? yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Quarter-year fixed effects no yes no yes
Month fixed effects no yes no yes
Weekday fixed effects no yes no yes
adj. R2 0.290 0.302 0.199 0.203
adj. R2 within 0.029 0.028 0.005 0.006
N 2,596 2,596 2,066 2,066
Notes: The table displays estimates for the regression of the disclosed stake,
stakej . The sample is restricted to notifications for falling below (exceeding) the
3% threshold in columns 1 and 2 (columns 3 and 4). j and t denote notification
and trading day, respectively. mfj is an indicator variable equal to one if
notification j is submitted by a mutual fund. post9t (12) is an indicator variable
equal to one if trading day t is after February 28, 2009 (January 31, 2012).
Standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and quarter-year and denoted
below the coefficients in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the
0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. Source: notifications distributed by the
DGAP 2007–2012, own calculations.
Panel B: Mutual Funds’ Shares in Notifications over Time
share_mf_belowit share_mfit
post9t −0.085∗∗ −0.089∗∗ 0.040∗∗ 0.038∗∗
(0.036) (0.039) (0.016) (0.016)
post12t −0.058∗∗ −0.051∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.020)
CONT no yes no yes
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes
adj. R2 0.025 0.041 0.050 0.100
adj. R2 within 0.015 0.039 0.019 0.073
N 719 719 3,569 3,569
Notes: The table displays estimates for the regression of mutual funds’ shares in notifica-
tions. i and t denote firm and quarter-year, respectively. share_mf_belowit is the share
of notifications for falling below a threshold in mutual funds’ notifications. share_mfit is
mutual funds’ share in overall notifications. post9t (12) is an indicator variable equal to one
if quarter t is larger than 2008q4 (2011q4). CONT includes the following control variables:
the natural logarithm of one plus the market value, ln(mv)i(t−1); the natural logarithm
of one plus the unadjusted closing price, ln(up)i(t−1); the natural logarithm of one plus
the number of analysts following the firm, ln(ana)it; the natural logarithm of one plus
firm age in quarters, ln(age)it; dividends as percentage of the share price, dyi(t−1); and an
indicator variable equal to one if firm i is a member of the index CDAX, cdaxi. Standard
errors are two-way clustered by firm and quarter-year and denoted below the coefficients in
parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
Source: notifications distributed by the DGAP 2007–2012, own calculations.
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Industry fixed effects yes yes
adj. R2 0.128 0.104
adj. R2 within 0.115 0.105
N 2,225 1,833
Notes: The table displays estimates for the regression of the change in bid-ask
spreads. The sample is restricted to notifications for falling below (exceeding)
the 3% threshold in column 1 (column 2). i, j and t denote firm, notification
and post-disclosure period, respectively. ln(spread)it is the three-month mean
of daily bid-ask spreads. mfj is an indicator variable equal to one if notification
j is submitted by a mutual fund. ln(mv)it is the natural logarithm of one plus
the market value. ln(to)it is the natural logarithm of one plus the three-month
mean of daily share turnover. ln(sd_ret)it is the natural logarithm of one
plus the three-month standard deviation of daily returns. ∆ is the difference
between the three months post-disclosure and the three months pre-trade.
Standard errors are clustered by firm and denoted below the coefficients in
parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level,













Quarter-year fixed effects yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes
adj. R2 0.691 0.691
adj. R2 within 0.112 0.112
N 17,482 17,482
Notes: The table displays estimates for the regression of the bid-ask spread
on changes in stakes of mutual funds (column 1) as well as mutual funds,
banks and insurance companies and pension funds [combined] (column 2). i
and t denote firm and quarter-year, respectively. stake_?it is the number of
shares held by investor type ? divided by the number of shares outstanding,
multiplied by 100. ? is mutual funds (funds) in column 1 and the combined
category (combined) in column 2. ∆ is the difference between quarter t and
quarter (t− 1). ln(mv)i(t−4) is the natural logarithm of one plus the market
value. ln(to)i(t−4) is the natural logarithm of one plus the quarterly mean
of daily share turnover. ln(sd_ret)i(t−4) is the natural logarithm of one plus
the quarterly standard deviation of daily returns. Standard errors are two-
way clustered by firm and quarter-year and denoted below the coefficients in
parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level,
respectively. Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC), Securities
Holdings Statistics (SHS-Base) 2005–2014, own calculations.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
post7t × treati −0.020∗∗−0.028∗∗−0.032∗∗∗−0.029∗∗−0.034∗∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
post7t × treati × highi 0.021∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.013 0.018
(0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014)
post9t × treati −0.017∗∗−0.017∗∗−0.037∗ −0.015∗∗−0.043∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.019) (0.007) (0.024)
post9t × treati × highi 0.023∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.005 0.033
(0.009) (0.019) (0.013) (0.026)
post12t × treati 0.007 0.006 0.020 0.006 0.020
(0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006) (0.024)
post12t × treati × highi 0.003 −0.011 0.009 −0.005
(0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.024)
CONT yes yes yes yes yes
Remaining interactions yes yes yes yes
Quarter-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
adj. R2 0.688 0.691 0.678 0.691 0.679
adj. R2 within 0.115 0.122 0.172 0.122 0.173
N 20,324 20,324 13,334 20,324 13,334
Notes: The table displays estimates for the regression of the bid-ask spread on disclosure
and ownership proxies. i and t denote firm and quarter-year, respectively. ln(spread)it
is the natural logarithm of one plus the quarterly mean of daily bid-ask spreads. post7t
(9) [12] is an indicator variable equal to one if quarter t is larger than 2006q4 (2008q4)
[2011q4]. treati is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is part of the treatment
group, i.e., listed on the regulated market. highi is an indicator variable equal to one
if stake_?i(2006q4) is above the median in 2006q4, where ? is funds (funds, banks
and ins [combined]) in columns 2 and 3 (4 and 5). The sample is restricted to firms
with an observation for 2006q4 in columns 3 and 5. CONT includes the following con-
trol variables: the natural logarithm of one plus the market value, ln(mv)i(t−4); the
natural logarithm of one plus the quarterly mean of daily share turnover, ln(to)i(t−4);
and the natural logarithm of one plus the quarterly standard deviation of daily returns,
ln(sd_ret)i(t−4). Standard errors are two-way clustered by firm and quarter-year and
denoted below the coefficients in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the
0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively. Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC),
Securities Holdings Statistics (SHS-Base) 2005–2014, own calculations.
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Abstract
The study examines whether accounting comparability matters for mutual funds’ portfolio
decisions. I measure accounting comparability at the holding level by assessing similarities
with portfolio peers, explicitly adopting an investor perspective. Methodologically, I follow
De Franco, Kothari and Verdi [2011], extended with a cash flow-based model. I first show
that comparability is high and varies predictably with the type of mutual funds. For the
same firm, comparability is higher in mutual fund than in analyst portfolios, which I derive
from analysts’ coverage decisions. Likewise, it is higher in portfolios of active funds. I
then provide evidence consistent with comparability arising from the selection of already
comparable firms. For the same portfolio, a firm is more likely to be included if it is
more comparable to portfolio peers. For the firm that is included, comparability increases
until and around inclusion, but not subsequently. The findings are in line with accounting
comparability reducing portfolio management costs.
∗I am grateful to Janja Brendel, Ulf Brüggemann, Tom Fischer, Joachim Gassen, Maximilian Muhn and Harm Schütt for
their helpful feedback. I thank workshop participants at Humboldt University as well as the 2015 EAA Annual Congress,




BlackRock, the largest asset manager worldwide and the provider of a wide range of mutual
funds, regularly emphasizes the usefulness of comparable accounting information. When engag-
ing in discussions with standard setters, it promotes accounting standards that enhance both
clarity and comparability of financial statements. It underlines that its internal analysts, in
their role as users of accounting information, spend a substantial amount of time scrutinizing
the financial statements of existing and potential portfolio firms. Their main task lies in the
adjustment of individual positions to eliminate effects from idiosyncratic choices and, thus, to
make them more comparable.38 However, BlackRock’s business model does not primarily rely
on manual adjustments, but a combination of human judgement and automated data processing.
Many of its mutual funds have large and diversified portfolios and manage risks based on the
technology platform Aladdin.39 As of late, BlackRock officially cuts back on staff specialized
in traditional forms of stock picking and expands on computerized alternatives, shifting money
to its ‘quants’. The rationale, in the words of the head of active equities, is that BlackRock
"can more efficiently deliver alpha at a better cost with automated processes".40 Handing over
analysis tasks from humans to machines requires input that is already comparable if the output
is to be of an equivalent quality. One source for this input are financial statements. One impli-
cation from this input is that the firms BlackRock evaluates and eventually invests in are more
comparable in accounting terms. In this study, I investigate whether accounting comparability
affects investment decisions of mutual funds in general, not only BlackRock.
Academic research suggests that mutual funds value accounting comparability. The underly-
ing notion is that similar accounting information reduces information processing costs. Mutual
funds frequently decide which firms to hold in their portfolios and need standardized informa-
tion for sound decision-making [e.g., Covrig, DeFond and Hung, 2007; DeFond, Hu, Hung and
Li, 2011]. Yet, this literature focuses on comparability benefits in international settings with
apparent differences in accounting and auditing standards as well as enforcement structures. I
38BlackRock details its views on comparability and analyst activities, for example, when responding to
standard setters’ proposals through comment letters. See, e.g.: http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/-
SectionPage&cid=1218220137090, http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1218220137090 or
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/SectionPage&cid=1218220137090. BlackRock is not the only institu-
tional investor who argues along these lines. For instance, see: http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/Section-
Page&cid=1218220137090, for the position of T. Rowe Price on the accounting for financial instruments.
39The use of Aladdin is not restricted to BlackRock. The asset manager distributes its technology to competitors
and this to an extent that some discuss the potential for systemic risk arising from too uniform approaches to
analysis, see, e.g.: https://www.economist.com or https://www.ft.com.
40The quote is from Mark Wiseman, BlackRock’s global head of active equities, and included in Bloomberg’s
report about the cutbacks in the stock-picking department, available at: https://www.bloomberg.com.
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concentrate on one country, the United States (US), with a single set of accounting standards,
US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). In addition, I examine a country with
extensive, well-developed standards for preparers and auditors and an enforcement system that
strives for proper implementation of rules and monitoring of compliance [e.g., Dye and Sunder,
2001; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016]. In this setting, investors are familiar with prevailing accounting
practices and encounter relatively transparent firms so that comparability does not have to be
a key concern. Hence, I first study whether portfolios of mutual funds display high levels of
accounting comparability and find that they do.
I then turn to the relevance of accounting comparability for making investment decisions.
Extant research provides evidence for a selection channel, i.e., investors pick firms whose account-
ing is aligned with their preferences before investment, and an influence channel, i.e., investors
attach less importance to the accounting in the initial investment stage and encourage the appli-
cation of certain practices thereafter [e.g., Bradshaw, Bushee and Miller, 2004; Fang, Maffett and
Zhang, 2015]. While, in reality, it likely is a combination of both, one channel might dominate.
My findings are consistent with the selection and inconsistent with the influence channel.
I measure accounting comparability following De Franco, Kothari and Verdi [2011]. De Franco
et al. propose an output-based construct that centers on how stock returns, the proxy for eco-
nomic events, map into earnings, the proxy for financial statements. Since the informativeness
of returns can depend on factors that are associated with mutual funds’ portfolio decisions, I
employ an additional model. Precisely, I use the mapping of cash flows, the alternative proxy
for economic events, into accruals [Cascino and Gassen, 2015]. Two firms have comparable ac-
counting systems if they produce similar financial statement outcomes for the same economic
event. Central to the concept is the set of peers against which comparability is assessed. The
accounting system of a firm, in itself, cannot be comparable. It can only be comparable to the
accounting systems of other firms. Prior studies largely resort to industry peers [e.g., Brochet,
Jagolinzer and Riedl, 2013; De Franco et al., 2011]. I choose portfolio peers as my argument
rests on an investor perspective. I expect mutual funds to act on comparability because similar
financial statement information allows for a thorough evaluation of potential and existing port-
folio firms. Since I can only observe existing portfolio firms, I identify similarities with their
accounting systems. The resulting proxies are return-based and cash flow-based comparability
at the level of the holding. They vary across portfolios, i.e., the same firm has different com-
parability values for different sets of portfolio peers; they vary across firms, i.e., different firms
have different comparability values due to different accounting systems; and they vary within
firms, i.e., the same firm experiences changes in its accounting system over time.
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I analyze portfolios of US mutual funds, which make up a significant portion of worldwide
institutional investment. For example, US domestic equity funds manage 20% of global assets
invested in open-end funds at the end of 2016 [ICI, 2017]. Fund managers have the discretion to
decide about the inclusion of firms into their portfolios and therefore face potential costs from low
comparability of financial statements. I do not consider entire portfolios, but limit observations
to the holdings that should be most important to the fund manager. I measure importance with
the portfolio weight of the holding, i.e., the percentage of the market value of the portfolio it
represents [Fich, Harford and Tran, 2015]. I keep only holdings with a portfolio weight of at least
0.5%. I further limit portfolio firms to the largest, most visible firms to mitigate the influence of
mechanical drivers of the comparability proxies (e.g., size or liquidity) that can simultaneously
impact portfolio decisions. In the analyses, I work with different samples. I begin with the
broadest possible sample and gradually reduce observations to the subset for which accounting
comparability should matter most, holdings of actively managed funds. At various stages, I
match observations to lower variation in factors I am not interested in. For the same firm, I
match holdings from similar portfolios. For the same portfolio, I match holdings from similar
firms. I apply the coarsened exact matching (CEM) algorithm that allows to control the degree
of (im)balance in matched samples [Iacus, King and Porro, 2012].
To assess whether accounting comparability is high in mutual funds’ portfolios, I need a
benchmark. I use analysts’ coverage decisions, a straightforward, but also ambitious choice.
The comparability literature illustrates that analyst outcomes are associated with accounting
comparability and explains the findings with lower information processing costs [e.g., De Franco
et al., 2011; Neel, 2017], which closely resembles the explanation put forward for mutual funds.
I create analyst portfolios from the firms analysts cover and corresponding return-based and
cash flow-based comparability at the holding level. Raw differences in comparability are stark.
Yet, analyst portfolios differ from mutual fund portfolios in several respects. I account for
economic, mechanical drivers of comparability as well as investment preferences of mutual funds
and expertise of analysts with a broad range of control variables at the firm and portfolio
level. Moreover, I test for differences in comparability in tightly matched samples, comprising,
for a single firm, holdings from both analyst and mutual fund portfolios. Results show that
comparability in mutual fund portfolios is higher and that differences are large. In the matched
samples, the difference in return-based (cash flow-based) comparability translates into 9% (8%)
of average comparability in mutual fund portfolios.
To corroborate the above, I exploit cross-sectional variation in mutual funds. Actively man-
aged, nonindexer funds need information to decide about buying, selling or holding stocks.
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Within the group of nonindexer funds, stock pickers need even more granular information, in
part certainly accounting data, to distinguish undervalued or overvalued stocks. Consequently,
the documented comparability effects should originate from their portfolios. I adopt the concept
of the active share of Cremers and Petajisto [2009] to proxy for stock picking and use the rough
division into (non)indexers to proxy for the existence of investment discretion. I test for dif-
ferences in comparability along the extent of stock picking and refine the sample by matching,
for a single firm, holdings from nonindexer to indexer portfolios. Results show that, overall,
comparability is increasing in the extent of stock picking.
So far, findings are in line with a preference for accounting comparability, of mutual funds
in general and active funds in particular. This is not to say that the primary concern of mutual
funds is the similarity of financial statements. Nevertheless, apart from mutual funds or buy-side
analysts, also other intermediaries, such as sell-side analysts and rating agencies, are known to
frequently correct reported numbers [e.g., Gu and Chen, 2004; Kim, Kraft and Ryan, 2013].
Furthermore, institutional investors appear to make investment decisions conditional on the
accounting information environment [e.g., Bowen, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 2014; Bushee
and Noe, 2000]. Thus, comparable accounting information might be a secondary, but still
necessary requirement to get an understanding of firms.
To examine whether accounting comparability impacts the selection of portfolio firms and,
in this vein, mutual funds’ investment behavior, I focus on inclusions into portfolios. That is,
I study the point in time when mutual funds build up positions in firms. I match each firm
that is included to another firm that is neither included nor an existing member of the portfolio.
By construction, the matched firm pair shares certain firm characteristics, but only one firm
is added to the portfolio. I can show that the probability of inclusion is modestly increasing
in accounting comparability, with the same set of portfolio peers. Specifically, a one-standard-
deviation increase in return-based (cash flow-based) comparability leads to an increase in the
probability of inclusion of 2% (3%). I can further show that the information environment of
firms moderates the relation. The impact of accounting comparability is lower for firms with high
bid-ask spreads or high return volatility. The finding is consistent with mutual funds valuing
comparable accounting information for standardized, automated analyses. Low bid-ask spreads
and low return volatility, indicative of stable and predictable operations, alleviate the need for
manual adjustments.
To address the relative importance of the selection and influence channel, I track changes in
accounting comparability over time, around the inclusion into portfolios. I restrict the sample
to newly included holdings that remain in the portfolio for at least four years. I require such
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a long holding period mainly because of the measurement of the comparability proxies. At
the same time, it should favor the incidence of (in)direct communication and influence activities
[McCahery, Sautner and Starks, 2016]. I assess comparability before, around and after inclusion,
with the same portfolio. Results reinforce the above findings. Within holdings, comparability
clearly increases before inclusion, supporting the selection channel. However, it does not change
(much) afterwards, questioning the relevance of the influence channel in my setting.
Hence, the evidence suggests that BlackRock’s funds are not an exception. Active mutual
funds, on average, seem to value accounting comparability and this by the time they start
pursuing investments. These investors regularly rely on automated data processing for which
they need comparable information from the financial statements. Even if they apply adjustments,
they need information that can be easily standardized, with minimal human involvement [Kim
et al., 2013]. Their methods provide a rationale for the findings and, in particular, for the
selection channel.
The study comes with the caveat that the comparability proxies might not fully grasp the
concept of accounting comparability. They are, by definition, confined to summary metrics of the
financial statements [De Franco et al., 2011]. In addition, descriptives illustrate that especially
the return-based proxy is subject to economic fluctuations. Nonetheless, descriptives equally
reveal that (raw values of) return-based and cash flow-based comparability do not behave alike.
Although results are overall weaker for cash flow-based comparability, both proxies yield similar
conclusions.
The paper contributes to the literature on institutional investors and accounting compa-
rability. Research frequently works with different accounting regimes and changes therein to
operationalize (dis)similarity of financial statements. Bradshaw et al. [2004] consider specific
accounting method choices and Yu and Wahid [2014] determine accounting distance in country
pairs based on differences in local accounting rules. At a more aggregate level, studies employ
the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) [e.g., Covrig et al.,
2007; DeFond et al., 2011; Florou and Pope, 2012]. Other work shifts the focus to accounting
outcomes, such as summary measures of the financial statements or disclosure formats [e.g.,
Fang et al., 2015; Jung, 2013]. While all of these studies take into account a rich variety of
firm and investor characteristics to fill the conceptual notion of accounting comparability, none
incorporates characteristics of other portfolio firms. My study attempts to do exactly this by es-
timating comparability within mutual funds’ portfolios. Portfolio holdings are informative about
investors’ preferences. Certainly, my approach has limitations in that I only observe preferences
as revealed through actual choices, i.e., I observe the outcome of the investment process and not
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the single stages of analysis. Still, it refines the investor perspective.
Besides, the paper relates to the literature on peer selection. Extant work discusses difficulties
in and proposes solutions for identifying industry peers [e.g., Bhojraj, Lee and Oler, 2003; Hoberg
and Phillips, 2016] and peers for valuation purposes [e.g., Bhojraj and Lee, 2002; Young and
Zeng, 2015]. My findings imply that portfolios of mutual funds, or even institutional investors
in general, might be another reference point since these investors select firms in a manner that
results in higher accounting comparability. Along similar lines, Ramnath [2002] derives an
industry classification from common analyst coverage.
The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the measurement of accounting compa-
rability and Section 3 the data. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Measurement of Accounting Comparability
According to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), "for information to be compa-
rable, like things must look alike and different things must look different" [FASB, 2010, QC23].
De Franco et al. [2011] translate this statement into a measurable construct by assessing the
similarity of accounting functions across firms. I closely follow them in the estimation of firm-
pair comparability, but differ in the choice of the peer group for the subsequent aggregation into
holding-level comparability.
The estimation starts at the firm level. The accounting function, the empirical model for the
firm-specific accounting system, maps stock returns, a proxy for economic events, into earnings,
a proxy for financial statements. With stock returns, I do not only capture economic events, but
also variation in the informativeness of returns about these events. I face a problem for inference
if the factors driving this variation simultaneously affect portfolio composition. One candidate
is stock liquidity that is associated with both informativeness of returns and mutual funds’
holdings [e.g., Falkenstein, 1996; Gassen, Skaife and Veenman, 2016]. To mitigate the influence
of these factors, I resort to an additional model for the firm-specific accounting system that
maps cash flows, an alternative proxy for economic events, into accruals [Cascino and Gassen,
2015]. I obtain the return-based and cash flow-based accounting functions from estimating the
following equations:
earningsit = α0,i + α1,ireturnit + εit
accrualsit = β0,i + β1,icfoit + εit
where i and t denote firm and quarter-year, respectively. earningsit is income before extraordi-
nary items scaled by lagged market value of equity. returnit is quarterly stock return. accrualsit
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is the difference between income before extraordinary items and operating cash flow scaled by
lagged total assets. cfoit is operating cash flow scaled by lagged total assets. I estimate the
equations for each firm i and quarter t over the 16 previous quarters; I relax the number of
quarters to 14 if data are unavailable. The estimated coefficients α̂0,i and α̂1,i (β̂0,i and β̂1,i)
proxy for the return-based (cash flow-based) accounting function.41
To determine the similarity between the accounting functions of firm i and j, I derive average
absolute forecast errors in the firm pair. For the return-based model, I use the coefficients α̂0,i and
α̂1,i and returnit to predict firm i’s earnings from its own accounting system, E(earnings)iit; and
I use the coefficients α̂0,j and α̂1,j and returnit to predict firm i’s earnings from the accounting
system of firm j, E(earnings)ijt. I repeat the procedure for each one of the 16 quarters. For
the cash flow-based model, I proceed accordingly to arrive at E(accruals)iit and E(accruals)ijt.















Lower forecast errors, i.e., higher values of compacctijt and compcfijt, correspond to higher
firm-pair accounting comparability. Conceptually, they indicate that both firms depict the same
set of underlying events in a similar fashion in their financial statements. The nature of the
events is not of interest, they can be idiosyncratic or market-wide. However, the measures
incorporate only events experienced by one firm (in the above case, firm i), meaning that they
are firm-specific.
I then turn to the holding level. To do so, I first have to define the relevant peer group, i.e.,
which firms j to consider for firm i. De Franco et al. [2011] work with industry peers. I choose
portfolio peers since my argument rests on an investor perspective. I expect mutual funds to have
stakes in firms whose accounting information is similar. To pick up the investor choice, I compute
firm-pair comparability for each firm i with all firms j in portfolio k. Next, I rank all firm-pair
values for firm i and take the mean of the highest ten, resulting in holding-level comparability
proxies for the return-based and cash flow-based model: compacctikt and compcfikt. I focus on
ten peers as I require at least eleven firms for every portfolio that is included in the sample.
41Although my sample period varies, estimates of the return-based accounting function are very close to De Franco
et al. [2011]. De Franco et al. obtain a mean of 0.00 (0.02) with a standard deviation of 0.04 (0.08) for α0,i
(α1,i) in a sample of 71,295 firm-years for the period 1981–2009. I obtain a mean of 0.00 (0.02) with a standard
deviation of 0.03 (0.07) for α0,i (α1,i) in a sample of 172,956 firm-quarters for the period 2001–2015.
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Relying on ten peers therefore maximizes information content while ensuring an identical number
of peers for each firm.42 The proxies are increasing in comparability and reflect average forecast
errors with the most comparable portfolio peers; I multiply the values by 100 so that forecast
errors are expressed as percentages.
At a single point in time, the comparability proxies, compacctikt and compcfikt, vary across
portfolios because portfolios differ in their sets of peers; and across firms because firms differ
in their accounting functions. The same firm generally has different comparability values if it
is part of different portfolios and thus exposed to different peers. Over time, the proxies vary
further within firms because accounting functions change. Due to the long estimation period,
accounting functions are however sticky. In the analyses, I exploit all of these layers of variation
to understand whether accounting comparability is one factor determining the composition of
mutual funds’ portfolios.
Finally, a remark on my choice of output-based comparability proxies. The literature offers
alternative, input-based approaches, exploring accounting method choices [e.g., Bradshaw et al.,
2004; Bradshaw, Miller and Serafeim, 2009]. I regard them as less appropriate in my setting.
Firms in my study compile their financial statements in accordance with a single set of accounting
standards, US GAAP, which contains few explicit accounting options. Yet, firms face numerous
implicit options when asked to exercise judgement and to specify assumptions, which are hard to
grasp individually. By concentrating on summary measures of the financial statements (earnings
and accruals), I intend to capture discretionary choices.
3 Data
I examine quarterly data from the first quarter of 2001 to the third quarter of 2015. In this vein,
the sample period is long enough to yield, to a certain extent, generalizable results. At the same
time, it consists of more recent years with substantial advances in automated data processing,
which my argument emphasizes.
I begin by identifying firms for which I can estimate accounting comparability. I gather
information from the CRSP/Compustat Merged Database. In accordance with De Franco et al.
[2011], I keep only firms with fiscal year-end in March, June, September or December and drop
firms whose names indicate that they are holding companies, American Depository Receipts
or limited partnerships (e.g., to avoid comparing financial statements within groups). I also
42Selecting the ten firms with the highest firm-pair comparability values introduces a mechanical relation with
portfolio size. The larger the number of firms in the portfolio, the higher holding-level comparability. I account
for the number of peers in the analyses, e.g., by matching on it.
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keep only firms with an average stock price above $5 and average market capitalization above
$100 million. I do so to avoid measuring associations that are driven by differences in firm
fundamentals, affecting the comparability proxies as well as mutual funds’ portfolio choices.
Pre-selecting in this fashion ensures that firms are, in general, more similar. I drop all firm-
quarters with missing data on earnings and returns (accruals and cash flows) in the preceding
14 quarters for the estimation of return-based (cash flow-based) comparability. Lastly, I require
available information on control variables and membership in portfolios with at least ten peers.
Panel A of Table 1 depicts summary statistics of firm characteristics for the resulting universe
of firm-quarters. The number of observations differs for control variables of cash flow-based
comparability (acc_volatilityit and cfo_volatilityit) as data coverage is lower. In total, there
are 3,162 unique firms that are part of at least one mutual fund portfolio in at least one quarter.
Firms are among the most liquid and largest in the market. For example, the average bid-ask
spread is equal to 0.3% (spreadit) and average market capitalization amounts to $6,396 million
(untabulated; Table 1 contains instead the natural logarithm of market capitalization, ln(mv)it).
I then define portfolios of mutual funds. I collect quarterly holdings from the Thomson
Reuters S12 file. Thomson Reuters gathers most of its information from statutory filings, quar-
terly reports on Form N-CSR(S) and N-Q since 2004 and semiannual reports on Form N-30D
before. Prior to 2004, mutual funds regularly provide voluntary portfolio disclosures [e.g., Agar-
wal, Mullally, Tang and Yang, 2015], leading to relatively comprehensive quarterly coverage. I
work with the portfolios as available in the database.43 In merging fund holdings with firm infor-
mation, I use the calendar quarter of the holdings report date. Report dates do not necessarily
coincide with the end of the calendar quarter as statutory filing deadlines refer to fiscal periods
and mutual funds have varying fiscal year-ends. However, there is some overlap. In each sample
year, mutual funds report more than 60% of all holdings for calendar quarter-ends. Besides, I do
not regard time overlap as crucial since the comparability measure per se is rather sticky. I next
restrict portfolios to holdings that are likely most important to the mutual fund. In a sense,
this is another aspect of adopting an investor perspective. I expect that fund managers assess
accounting comparability relative to portfolio firms. I further expect that ‘important’ portfolio
firms receive a larger (than proportional) weight in the assessment. I measure importance to the
fund manager with the portfolio weight of the holding, i.e., the fraction of the overall market
value of the portfolio that the holding represents [Fich et al., 2015]. I drop all holding-quarters
with a portfolio weight below 0.5%. Note that this restriction, by construction, produces com-
43I repeat all analyses with holdings from only mandatory portfolio disclosures by dropping observations for the
years 2001 until 2004. Results are similar.
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parability values that are lower than or equal to the values for entire portfolios. Accounting
comparability corresponds to the mean of the ten highest-ranked firm-pair comparability values.
Enlarging the set of peers can only alter the mean if firm-pair comparability values are higher
with the newly included peers.
I clean up the sample and characterize mutual funds in greater detail with information
from the CRSP Mutual Fund Database, linked to Thomson Reuters via Mutual Fund Links
(MFLINKS). In doing so, I follow previous studies [e.g., Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; Wermers,
2000]. I drop all mutual funds with investment objectives that indicate that they are not
primarily invested in US equities.44 Similarly, I eliminate mutual funds that invest on average
less than 50% of their funds into common stock over the whole sample period and require that
the market value of the holdings selected above equals 25% or more of total net assets at a
single point in time. CRSP reports total net assets separately for different share classes. I
employ the value-weighted average and do not differentiate between share classes. Finally, I
limit the country of origin of mutual funds to the US. To describe the mutual fund type, I
distinguish, among others, between indexers and nonindexers. I classify index funds based on
the variable index_fund_flag and name matches with terms related to indexing strategies [e.g.,
Lines, 2016; Ma, Tang and Gómez, 2016].45 Panel B of Table 1 depicts summary statistics of
fund characteristics for the universe of fund-quarters. A fund-quarter only enters if the portfolio
consists of at least eleven firms after applying the filters from above; the variable peerskt informs
about the number of peers for each firm in the portfolio. In total, there are 4,219 unique mutual
fund portfolios for which holding-level comparability is available in at least one quarter. 14.8%
of fund-quarters are classified as indexer (indexerkt).
I use information on analyst coverage from IBES and on index constituents of the S&P 500
from Compustat.
In the subsequent sections, I analyze different samples. I start off with the broadest possible
set of observations and successively reduce sample size, in part due to a lack of data, but mostly to
focus on the question at hand. Sample firms, funds and holdings can differ across specifications.
The unit of observation is the holding, i.e., the firm-portfolio combination, in a given quarter.
44Specifically, I start with the CRSP objective code and keep funds with domestic equity cap-based, style, mixed
or missing objectives. Among the ones with missing information, I keep funds that, according to Thomson
Reuters, have an investment objective of aggressive growth, growth, growth and income, balanced or missing.
Whenever I use investment objectives in the analyses, I confine mutual funds to the subset for which I have
complete information from CRSP.
45In particular, I check for matches with the following terms: Index, Ind, Idx, Indx, Mkt, Market, Composite,
S&P, SP, Russell, Nasdaq, DJ, Dow, Jones, Wilshire, NYSE, iShares, SPDR, HOLDRs, ETF, Exchange-Traded
Fund, PowerShares, StreetTRACKS, 100, 400, 500, 600, 1000, 1500, 2000, 3000, 5000.
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4 Results
4.1 Mutual Funds vs. Analysts
Extant research suggests that institutional investors value comparable accounting information
because it can reduce information processing costs [e.g., Bradshaw et al., 2004; Fang et al.,
2015]. That is, in managing large portfolios, investors benefit from standardized, clearly defined
items in financial statements. However, these studies usually investigate international settings
in which the application of different accounting standards and the divergence of local account-
ing practices hamper accounting comparability in a straightforward manner. I examine the US
setting in which the application of a uniform set of accounting standards and more harmonized
accounting practices likely result in similar financial statements in general. In addition, domes-
tic institutional investors can regularly resort to alternative information sources, such as local
market experts or firm management [e.g., Covrig et al., 2007; DeFond et al., 2011]. Hence, I
first assess whether financial statement comparability still matters.
Precisely, I study whether mutual funds display a preference for accounting comparability
through their portfolio choices. I contrast comparability in mutual fund portfolios with com-
parability in analyst portfolios, which are an obvious, but also quite demanding benchmark.
The literature discusses potential comparability benefits for analysts and provides supportive
evidence [e.g., De Franco et al., 2011; Horton, Serafeim and Serafeim, 2013; Neel, 2017]. The
rationale for analysts resembles the rationale for mutual funds to a great extent. Both should
experience lower information processing costs from more similar accounting information. Thus,
analyst portfolios are an ambitious benchmark in that they may already be tailored towards
firms with comparable accounting.
I create analyst portfolios from analysts’ coverage decisions. In each quarter, I identify all
firms for which a specific analyst issues a forecast and assign them to this analyst’s portfolio.
For each firm in the analyst portfolio, i.e., the analyst holding, I derive return-based and cash
flow-based comparability. The steps are identical to mutual fund portfolios, the only difference
is the set of peers. Again, the same firm can be part of several analyst portfolios in which it has
different comparability values depending on its peers.
Panel A of Table 2 displays summary statistics of accounting comparability, separately for
return-based (compacctikt) and cash flow-based comparability (compcfikt) as well as mutual
fund (mutual funds) and analyst portfolios (analysts). Samples correspond to the first set of
samples of the analysis described below. The number of observations shows that mutual fund
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holdings exceed analyst holdings. compacctikt (compcfikt) has 1,136,150 (1,119,375) observa-
tions for mutual funds and 251,758 (210,844) observations for analysts. Summary statistics
demonstrate that comparability is higher in mutual fund than in analyst portfolios. compacctikt
(compcfikt) has a mean of -0.557 (-0.592) for mutual funds and of -1.234 (-1.015) for analysts.
Differences in medians are slightly smaller, but still substantial. The large discrepancies imply
that it is, in all likelihood, more than just mutual funds’ selection of portfolio firms that drives
comparability. Figure 1 gives some insight into potential drivers. Figure 1a (1b) depicts the
quarterly mean of compacctikt (compcfikt), separately for mutual funds and analyst portfolios.
The figure illustrates that the comparability proxies are subject to economic fluctuations, the
dot-com bubble in the early years and the financial crisis later on. Recall that I construct the
proxies from data of the preceding four years so that economic downturns have a lagged and
sticky impact.
Descriptives also underline that return-based and cash flow-based comparability proxies cap-
ture distinct aspects of the mapping of economic events into financial statements. The correlation
between compacctikt and compcfikt is positive, but modest. Panel A of Table 2 contains the
Pearson (Spearman) correlation, 0.417 (0.414), for the subset of observations with available com-
parability values from the two models, without differentiating mutual fund or analyst holdings.46
Moreover, the impact of economic fluctuations appears to be more pronounced for return-based
than for cash flow-based comparability. While compacctikt in Figure 1a varies considerably over
time, compcfikt in Figure 1b seems smoother and almost suggests an increasing trend over the
sample period.
To contrast comparability in mutual fund and analyst portfolios after accounting for economic
drivers and model-specific factors, I estimate the model:
comp?ikt =β1mfkt + β2ln(peers)kt + β3ln(mv)it + β4btmit + β5roait + β6 ?
1 _volatilityit
+ β7 ?
2 _volatilityit + β8ear_predictabilityit + β9volumeit
+ β10spreadit + βCONTkt + βFEi + βFEt + εikt
where comp?ikt is either compacctikt or compcfikt. mfkt, the variable of interest, is an indicator
variable equal to one if the portfolio is a mutual fund portfolio. The remaining variables control
for the economic, mechanical drivers of comparability [De Franco et al., 2011]. I rely on the
same variables to incorporate preferences of mutual funds and analysts. My interest does not
46The overlap between the samples for compacctikt and compcfikt is small since the underlying samples are
random draws. Matching all observations yields a similar Pearson correlation coefficient (0.402) and a smaller
Spearman correlation coefficient (0.289) (N = 4,132,224).
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lie in measuring comparability effects that come from pursuing certain investment strategies or
being an expert in a particular type of firm. For instance, mutual funds tend to invest in larger
firms [e.g., Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers, 1997; Falkenstein, 1996]. At the same time,
firm size is positively associated with the comparability proxies.
ln(peers)kt is the natural logarithm of the number of portfolio peers. Although I average
over an identical number of peers for each firm (ten), the overall number of peers in the portfolio
influences comparability values. The more peers, the more options for high firm-pair comparabil-
ity. In my dataset, the number of peers is strongly associated with comparability. Disregarding
other factors, ln(peers)kt has a statistically significant Pearson (Spearman) correlation of 0.229
(0.417) with compacctikt and of 0.387 (0.489) with compcfikt (untabulated).
At the firm level, I account for firm size, ln(mv)it, the natural logarithm of the market
value of equity; book-to-market, btmit, the ratio of the book to market value of equity; return
on assets, roait, income before extraordinary items over lagged total assets; a proxy for earn-
ings predictability, ear_predictabilityit, which is the adjusted R2 from a regression of quarterly
earnings on lagged quarterly earnings over up to 16 quarters, a period that is identical to the
estimation period of comparability; trading volume, volumeit, the quarterly mean of daily share
turnover; and bid-ask spreads, spreadit, the quarterly mean of daily bid-ask spreads. I further
include proxies for the volatility of the summary measures from which I compute comparability.
In specifications with return-based comparability, ?1_volatilityit stands for earnings volatility,
ear_volatilityit, the standard deviation of quarterly earnings scaled by lagged total assets over
up to 16 quarters; and ?2_volatilityit represents return volatility, ret_volatilityit, the standard
deviation of monthly returns over up to 48 months. In specifications with cash flow-based com-
parability, ?1_volatilityit and ?2_volatilityit stand for accrual volatility, acc_volatilityit, and
cash flow volatility, cfo_volatilityit, the standard deviation of quarterly accruals and quarterly
operating cash flow over up to 16 quarters, respectively.
At the portfolio level, I also control for the mean of each of the firm characteristics listed
above, subsumed by CONTkt. I proceed in this fashion to incorporate overall investment prefer-
ences of mutual funds or fields of specialization of analysts. Finally, I use firm and quarter-year
fixed effects, FEi and FEt. Standard errors are two-way clustered by portfolio and quarter-year
[Gow, Ormazabal and Taylor, 2010; Petersen, 2009]. Appendix A.1 lists the variable definitions.
I carefully construct the samples for the analysis. The idea is to exploit the variation across
portfolios. That is, I intend to assess differences in comparability between mutual fund and
analyst portfolios, ideally for the same firm. Before adjustments, samples are large. There are
4,822,229 (4,220,438) observations for compacctikt (compcfikt). I work with subsets of observa-
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tions, at first the random sample. In particular, I randomly select at most ten holdings from
each portfolio in each quarter. To ensure that I measure the variation in peers at the firm level, I
require that firms appear in at least one mutual fund and one analyst portfolio in each quarter.47
In addition, I match holdings of the same firm from mutual fund to analyst portfolios,
in the matched sample. Mutual fund and analyst portfolios differ in part to a high degree.
Notably, mutual fund portfolios have on average more peers. The mean of ln(peers)kt equals
3.681 (3.590) in mutual fund and 2.551 (2.540) in analyst portfolios for compacctikt (compcfikt);
the mean of the raw number of peers equals 44 (40) in mutual fund and 13 (13) in analyst
portfolios (untabulated). Therefore, I match holdings to be able to assess differences between
portfolios that are similar apart from belonging to mutual funds or analysts. I apply the CEM
algorithm [Iacus et al., 2012]. CEM sorts observations into strata which are formed from the
predictors, the variables the researcher matches on, and produces exact matches based on these
strata. CEM’s advantage is that the researcher can, ex ante, fix the allowed range for the
predictors. I match on the raw number of peers as well as portfolio means of size, book-to-
market and bid-ask spreads (size, accrual and cash flow volatility) for compacctikt (compcfikt). I
choose the portfolio characteristics in line with their (mechanical) relation with the comparability
proxies. compacctikt responds noticeably to capital market factors whereas compcfikt is more
affected by fluctuations in the underlying fundamentals. I resort to CEM’s binning algorithm
for the portfolio means and explicitly set intervals for the number of peers so that the maximum
difference for matched observations cannot be greater than ten. Following this approach, I
obtain samples in which each firm is in at least one mutual fund and one analyst portfolio in
each quarter. I do not restrict the number of matches, but use all, with corresponding weights
in the regression analysis. The resulting matched samples are small: there are 10,925 (12,693)
observations for compacctikt (compcfikt), emphasizing that differences in the random sample may
be stark. Since I match on portfolio characteristics, I only include controls for firm characteristics
in the regression model. Appendix A.2.1 explains the matching method graphically and shows
balance before and after matching.
Table 4 depicts the results. The coefficient of the variable of interest, mfkt, is positive
throughout, but statistically weaker for cash flow-based comparability. It amounts to 0.163
(0.013) for compacctikt (compcfikt) in the random sample and to 0.083 (0.067) in the matched
47I consider this approach the cleanest. Nevertheless, it does not hurt the research design (much) to leave
all holdings and firms in the sample since I examine within-firm variation. Results for the samples with all
observations are similar and stronger. Specifically, the coefficient of mfkt equals 0.205 (0.043) for compacctikt
(compcfikt). For both comparability proxies, the coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
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sample. Aside from the coefficient for compcfikt in the random sample, estimates are statistically
significant and differences in comparability seem economically meaningful. For example, in the
matched sample, the difference translates into 9% (8%) of compacctikt (compcfikt), evaluated
at the mean for mutual fund portfolios.
The majority of the coefficients of the control variables is significant and displays the pre-
dicted sign. For instance, the estimate of ln(peers)kt is large, illustrating the positive, mechan-
ical relation between the number of portfolio peers and comparability. The estimates of the
volatility variables, ear_volatilityikt and ret_volatilityikt for return-based comparability and
acc_volatilityikt and cfo_volatilityikt for cash flow-based comparability, have a likewise large,
but mostly negative impact. More frequent changes in the fundamentals hamper the estimation
of the firm-specific accounting system in that the coefficients of the accounting function can only
in part reflect the association between the summary measures. Accounting comparability may
well be lower, consistent with the negative estimates. The control variables, furthermore, hint
at some of the differences in the two comparability models. compacctikt is negatively related
to spreadit, the average bid-ask spread, which is often interpreted as information asymmetry or
illiquidity. I derive the proxy from returns, subject to changes in liquidity and likely responsible
for the estimate [e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1986, 1989]. compcfikt, on the other hand, reveals
similar patterns in the random sample, but weaker relations in the matched sample, which are
not completely explained by the matching variables.
Taken together, the analysis shows that accounting comparability is higher in mutual fund
than in analyst portfolios. In itself, the analyst benchmark is an ambitious one since analysts
face similar incentives as mutual funds to compose their portfolios of firms with comparable
accounting. In practice, the analyst benchmark suffers from shortcomings in the empirical
implementation since analyst portfolios exhibit characteristics distinct from mutual fund port-
folios. However, even after limiting the analysis to portfolios that share relevant characteristics,
accounting comparability remains higher in portfolios of mutual funds. In the next sections, I
focus on mutual fund portfolios and the role of comparability therein.
4.2 Mutual Fund Types
The accounting literature argues that different types of institutional investors make use of ac-
counting information to a different extent [e.g., Bushee and Noe, 2000; D’Souza, Ramesh and
Shen, 2010]. Among mutual funds, researchers regularly separate actively managed from index
funds [e.g., Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki, 2005; Florou and Pope, 2012]. While the former
have investment discretion and hence face the need to gather information about potential portfo-
lio firms, the latter merely replicate the composition of an index. Among actively managed funds,
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researchers further make a distinction between between stock pickers and those that primarily
bet on factors [e.g., Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; Fama, 1972]. Although the implementation
of both investment approaches requires information about firms, it should be the stock picker
who has a detailed interest in financial statements. Notably, it should be the stock picker who
has an interest in the comparability of accounting information of existing and potential portfolio
firms. Thus, in this section, I investigate whether accounting comparability varies predictably
with the type of mutual funds. In doing so, I exploit the classification into nonindexers and
indexers along with the degree of stock picking or stock selection.
I classify mutual funds into nonindexers and indexers with the indicator variable indexerkt,
which is equal to one if the fund is an indexing investor. I measure the degree of stock picking
following the notion of the active share, proposed by Cremers and Petajisto [2009]. Mutual
funds normally have a benchmark index against which their performance is assessed. Cremers
and Petajisto introduce a metric that captures the share of the portfolio that deviates from the
benchmark index. The larger this share, the ‘active share’, the more active the mutual fund
with respect to stock picking. I work with a simplified version by solely studying the share of
firms that is not in the index, i.e., I count the overall number of firms in a given portfolio and
define the variable activekt as the fraction of firms that is not included in the index.48 I obtain
the fraction by going back to the raw portfolios without imposing any restriction on portfolio
weights. Besides, I do not work with the actual benchmarks, but the S&P 500 for all mutual
funds. Prior studies similarly concentrate on deviations from the S&P 500 and show that it
is a common benchmark with index weights that frequently extend to other indexes [Lines,
2016; Wermers, 2003]. I calculate the share of firms that are not included in the S&P 500 each
quarter so that the variable activekt is a time-varying construct that is increasing in the extent
of stock picking. Panel B of Table 1 demonstrates that all mutual funds have some portfolio
firms that are not in the S&P 500; the minimum of activekt over all fund-quarters amounts to
22%. Moreover, the typical portfolio firm is not a member of the index; the mean (median) of
activekt amounts to 89% (94%).
Table 3 presents correlations of activekt with other fund characteristics and return-based
(Panel A) as well as cash flow-based accounting comparability (Panel B) for holding-quarters;
Pearson (Spearman) correlations in the lower (upper) triangle. Descriptives refer to the random
samples which I describe below. activekt is negatively correlated with indexerkt. The Pearson
48Cremers and Petajisto [2009] are more accurate in that they do not only use the appearance of the firm, but
the difference in index and portfolio weights. I implicitly assume that index weights are equal across index
members and that, once a firm is in both the index and the portfolio, index and portfolio weights are the same.
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(Spearman) correlation is -0.410 (-0.170) in the compacctikt sample and -0.411 (-0.172) in the
compcfikt sample. On the one hand, this validates the stock-picking measure. By definition,
indexers should have more portfolio firms that are index members and consequently a lower value
of activekt. On the other hand, the magnitude of the correlations underlines that the stock-
picking concept is more refined than the partition into nonindexers and indexers. Despite being
actively managed, nonindexers have a benchmark against which their investors evaluate their
performance and can follow the benchmark composition, also yielding low values of activekt.
As another validation check, activekt is negatively correlated with portfolio size, ln(tna)kt, the
natural logarithm of total net assets, and ln(peers)kt, as earlier defined. Active funds with stock-
picking skills are usually smaller [e.g., Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; Kacpercyzk, Nieuwerburgh
and Veldkamp, 2014]. Lastly, activekt is negatively correlated with accounting comparability.
The Pearson (Spearman) correlation is -0.063 (-0.232) for compacctikt and -0.097 (-0.216) for
compcfikt. Albeit inconsistent with my expectation, the negative association might be the
consequence of other fund characteristics. More active funds are smaller and smaller funds
have lower comparability, due to, for instance, a smaller number of peers. Summary statistics
of the comparability proxies in Panel B of Table 2, reported separately for nonindexers and
indexers, support the negative association. Mean and median of return-based and cash flow-
based comparability are lower for nonindexers than for indexers.
To examine the association after accounting for other fund characteristics, I estimate the
model:
comp?ikt =β1activekt + β2ln(tna)kt + β3ln(peers)kt
+ βCONTit + βCONTkt + βFEIO + βFEi + βFEt + εikt
where comp?ikt is either compacctikt or compcfikt. The variable of interest is activekt. Con-
trols for other fund characteristics are ln(tna)kt, ln(peers)kt and fixed effects for investment
objectives, FEIO. Data requirements for these variables result in the loss of some mutual funds
that are part of the analysis in the previous section. I continue to control for firm characteris-
tics, CONTit, portfolio means of firm characteristics, CONTkt, and firm and quarter-year fixed
effects, FEi and FEt, as explained in Section 4.1. I cluster standard errors by portfolio and
quarter-year.
I construct the samples for the analysis in a corresponding manner to Section 4.1. I still aim
for measuring the variation in the comparability proxies that is driven by changing peer firms
and to somewhat control for variation within and across firms. This time, I assess differences
between stock pickers and other mutual funds. In the regression model, the emphasis lies on the
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continuous variable activekt. In the sample design, it shifts to the indicator variable indexerkt.
For each firm and quarter, I choose one observation from a nonindexer and one observation
from an indexer portfolio. Initially, there are 4,707,398 (4,287,165) observations for compacctikt
(compcfikt). I first randomly select at most ten holdings from each portfolio in each quarter
and require that firms appear in at least one nonindexer and one indexer portfolio (random
sample).49 I then match holdings of the same firm from nonindexer to indexer portfolios (matched
sample). The idea is to constrast accounting comparability in portfolios that are roughly the
same apart from the degree of active stock picking. I match, with the CEM algorithm, on
the same variables as before: number of peers and portfolio means of size, book-to-market and
bid-ask spreads (number of peers and portfolio means of size, accrual and cash flow volatility)
for compacctikt (compcfikt). I specify that the maximum difference in the number of peers
for matched observations is not to be greater than ten. Compared to the previous section,
there is more overlap in characteristics. Matched samples are larger, with 542,950 (502,510)
observations for compacctikt (compcfikt). Since I match on them, I exclude the number of peers
and the portfolio means of firm characteristics in the regression model. Appendix A.2.2 provides
further details.
Table 5 depicts the results. The coefficient of the variable of interest, activekt, is posi-
tive in three out of four specifications and again weaker for cash flow-based comparability. It
equals 0.055 (-0.008) for compacctikt (compcfikt) in the random sample and 0.071 (0.032) in the
matched sample. Except for the coefficient for compcfikt in the random sample, estimates are
statistically significant and suggest an economically mildly significant relation. For example, in
the matched sample, a one-standard-deviation increase in activekt leads to an increase of 5%
(2%) of compacctikt (compcfikt), evaluated at its mean. Coefficients of the control variables
mostly have the predicted sign. ln(tna)kt loads negatively only for compacctikt in the random
sample, but might be subsumed by the other variables. ln(peers)kt, if included, loads positively.
In sum, the findings show that, within mutual fund portfolios, accounting comparability
varies with the type of mutual funds. In particular, comparability is higher in portfolios of
funds that seem to be stock pickers and thus represent the subset for which similar accounting
information should matter most. In the following sections, I restrict mutual funds to nonindexing
investors, i.e., I drop all mutual funds that are classified as indexing investor in at least one
quarter.
49Again, I rerun the regression model on the samples with all observations and obtain similar results. Specifically,
the coefficient of activekt equals 0.032 (-0.007) for compacctikt (compcfikt) and is statistically significant at the
0.01 level for compacctikt.
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4.3 Portfolio Selection
So far, I present evidence consistent with high levels of accounting comparability in portfolios of
mutual funds. Implicitly, I assume that these levels arise because mutual funds act on compara-
bility. Prior literature indicates that, in some settings, accounting information can affect investor
behavior. Properties of the accounting information environment are associated with holdings
of institutional investors [e.g., Bowen et al., 2014; Bushee and Noe, 2000]. Similarities in the
accounting information environment are related to investments by mutual funds [e.g., DeFond
et al., 2011; Yu and Wahid, 2014]. The underlying rationale in these studies pertains to portfolio
selection. Investors select firms whose accounting coincides with their preferences and expertise.
Yet, prior literature also demonstrates that a variety of firm and stock characteristics can ex-
plain mutual funds’ holdings [e.g., Chen, Jegadeesh and Wermers, 2000; Falkenstein, 1996]. In
what follows, I directly test whether mutual funds attach weight to accounting comparability in
making portfolio decisions, in addition to other firm and stock attributes.
I start with compiling the sample. I concentrate on the quarter in which mutual funds
newly include firms into their portfolios. I define firms as newly included if they are not part of
the portfolio in the preceding eight quarters. To avoid misclassifications due to the minimum
portfolio weight, I determine inclusion status in the raw portfolios. To stick to the important
portion of portfolios, I continue to keep only holdings whose portfolio weight is equal to or exceeds
0.5% (in the quarter of inclusion). I then need firms that are not newly included to be able to
gauge the impact of accounting comparability on portfolio selection. This analysis, therefore,
exploits the variation across firms, i.e., differences in comparability on account of differences in
firm-specific accounting systems. To reduce variation in factors aside from comparability, I match
firms. Precisely, for each firm and each inclusion, I select another firm, a potential candidate
for inclusion, that closely resembles the newly included firm and is neither newly included nor
an existing member of the (raw) portfolio. I apply the CEM algorithm and match on size,
book-to-market, bid-ask spread, earnings and return volatility (size, book-to-market, bid-ask
spread, accrual and cash flow volatility) for compacctikt (compcfikt). I choose the predictors to
incorporate investment preferences of mutual funds (size, book-to-market and spread) as well
as mechanical drivers of comparability that should be less informative about the mapping of
economic events into financial statements (the volatility variables). In matching, I select exactly
one potential candidate for each newly included firm; in the case of several possible matches,
the algorithm randomly picks one. Appendix A.2.3 provides further details on the matching.
Resulting samples still contain holdings, i.e., firms can be simultaneously included in different
portfolios. For each inclusion, there are two observations (holding-quarters), the newly included
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and the potential candidate firm, assigned to the same portfolio and the same quarter. Since I
need two previous years to establish inclusion, the sample period begins in the first quarter of
2003. The sample for compacctikt (compcfikt) comprises 632,046 (578,942) observations.
For the potential candidate firm, I measure accounting comparability as if the mutual fund
included the firm. That is, I use the same portfolio peers for the potential candidate as for the
newly included firm. By this means, I hold portfolios constant and can focus on differences in
the two firms.
Panel C of Table 2 displays summary statistics of accounting comparability, separately for
newly included (inclusion) and potential candidate holdings. Raw differences are in line with
a positive association between comparability and portfolio inclusion, but they are not large.
compacctikt (compcfikt) has a mean of -0.507 (-0.533) for newly included and of -0.556 (-0.561)
for potential candidate holdings. Medians are even closer.
In the analysis, I take into account alternative determinants of portfolio selection and esti-
mate the model:
inclusionikt =β1comp ?ikt +β2ln(peers)kt + β3ln(mv)it + β4btmit + β5retq1it + β6rety1it
+ β7ret_sdit + β8volumeit + β9spreadit + βFEIO + βFEi + βFEt + εikt
where inclusionikt is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is newly included. By construc-
tion, inclusionikt is equal to one for one half of the sample. The variabel of interest, comp?ikt, is
either compacctikt or compcfikt. The remaining variables proxy for investment preferences and
characteristics of mutual funds [e.g., Falkenstein, 1996; Ke and Petroni, 2004; Shive and Yun,
2013]. I control for the number of peers in the portfolio, ln(peers)kt; firm size, ln(mv)it; book-to-
market, btmit; two factors for momentum trading, retq1it and rety1it, the buy-and-hold return
from quarter (t− 4) to quarter (t− 1) and from quarter (t− 1) to quarter t, respectively; return
volatility, ret_sdit, the quarterly standard deviation of daily returns; trading volume, volumeit;
and bid-ask spreads, spreadit.50 I use fixed effects for investment objectives of mutual funds,
firms and quarters, FEIO, FEi and FEt. I cluster standard errors by firm and quarter-year.51
Appendix A.1 lists the variable definitions.
Column 1 and 4 in Table 6 depict the results. The coefficients of the comparability variables
are positive and statistically significant. The estimate of compacctikt (compcfikt) equals 0.020
50The list of control variables is not exhaustive. I extend the above set of controls with, for example, index
membership, analyst following, return on assets, dividend yield, leverage ratio, earnings-to-price ratio and sales
growth [e.g., Bushee and Noe, 2000; Florou and Pope, 2012]. Results are very similar.
51Alternatively, I cluster standard errors by portfolio and quarter-year. Results are very similar.
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(0.058). Economically, the impact is modest. A one-standard-deviation increase in compacctikt
(compcfikt) corresponds to an increase in the probability of inclusion of around 2% (3%). Thus,
accounting comparability does seem to play a role in investment decisions, even if only a sec-
ondary one.
Coefficients of the control variables largely display predicted signs. Note that I already match
on some of them, which likely weakens their associations. For instance, results are consistent
with mutual funds trading on return momentum, retq1it and rety1it load positively; and with
mutual funds selecting more liquid and frequently traded stocks, volumeit is also positive.
Moreover, I make use of cross-sectional variation in firms. I expect that mutual funds value
accounting comparability especially if firms have stable and predictable information environ-
ments. My argument rests in part on the increasing usage of automated data processing tech-
niques. Reliance on standardized computer routines makes information necessary that is equally
standardized. Hence, in selecting portfolio firms, mutual funds might pay particular attention
to comparability when firms are not subject to idiosyncratic shocks or other disruptive events.
Along these lines, D’Souza et al. [2010] show that dissemination speed of financial statement
information from Compustat is positively related to trading volume and negatively related to
idiosyncratic risk. In their interpretation, dissemination speed is the outcome of institutional
demand for (standardized) accounting information and trading volume and idiosyncratic risk
characterize this demand.
I use bid-ask spreads and return volatility, each measured over the same time period as
accounting comparability, to split up observations. Specifically, I create the indicator variable
SPREADit, which is equal to one if the mean of monthly bid-ask spreads is above the median;
and the indicator variable RETit, which is equal to one if the standard deviation of monthly
returns is above the median. Firms with high bid-ask spreads or high return volatility should
experience more unexpected events and should have less predictable information environments.
To test for a differential impact of accounting comparability on portfolio selection for these
firms, I interact compacctikt and compcfikt in the above equation with SPREADit and RETit.
Columns 2–3 and 5–6 in Table 6 depict the results. Coefficients of the interaction terms are
negative in three out of four specifications. SPREADit weakens the impact of return-based
comparability, but has no effect for cash flow-based comparability. RETit weakens the impact
of both comparability proxies.
To sum up, high levels of accounting comparability can arise through the channel of portfolio
selection. Findings are more pronounced for firms with more predictable and less uncertain
information environments, offering insight into possible forms of analysis that are based on
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similar financial statements.
4.4 Selection vs. Influence
The previous section provides evidence in line with mutual funds selecting firms conditional on
the comparability of their accounting with other portfolio firms. In addition to the selection
of ex ante comparable firms, mutual funds can also influence accounting outcomes ex post,
after including firms in their portfolio. Influence, in this context, does not always need to take
the form of direct communication. Mutual funds can express their preferences through various
channels, such as portfolio choices or public disclosures. Extant research supports both channels,
suggesting that it regularly is a combination. Institutional investors in general and mutual funds
in particular seem to respond to firms’ disclosures and, at the same time, to induce changes in
disclosure patterns [e.g., Boone and White, 2015; Fang et al., 2015; Yu and Wahid, 2014]. In the
final analysis, I examine how accounting comparability evolves throughout the holding period to
understand whether mutual funds encourage portfolio firms to align their accounting practices
with their preferences.
I test the relative importance of the selection against the influence channel by studying
accounting comparability around the inclusion of firms into portfolios. I begin with constructing
the samples and focus on firms that are included. The idea is to mainly exploit within-firm
variation, i.e., changes in comparability that are driven by changes in the firm-specific accounting
system over time. As in Section 4.3, I define newly included firms as firms that are not part of
the portfolio in the preceding eight quarters and collect the information from the raw portfolios
of nonindexer funds. In constrast to Section 4.3, I track firms through the holding period and
relax the requirement on portfolio weights. Investors often build up positions successively so
that stocks can enter the portfolio before the portfolio weight reaches 0.5%. Likewise, investors
can reduce positions successively so that stocks remain in the portfolio after the portfolio weight
falls below 0.5%. I only require that the portfolio weight is larger than or equal to 0.5% in at
least one quarter in the period after inclusion.
In the next step, I restrict samples to observations with a holding period of 16 quarters or
more. I intend to assess the possibility of mutual funds inducing changes in the firm-specific
accounting system of their portfolio firms. Therefore, I need estimates of the accounting system
that are derived exclusively from the period during which the mutual fund has a stake in the
firm. In any given quarter, these estimates, α̂0,i and α̂1,i (β̂0,i and β̂1,i) for the return-based
(cash flow-based) accounting function (see Section 2), depend on the prior 16 quarters. The
restriction thus ensures that there is at least one quarter in which the estimates originate from
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accounting practices carried out in their entirety during the holding period, quarter 16. Until
quarter 16, the weight of these accounting practices continuously increases. If mutual funds
resort to the influence channel, accounting comparability will increase similarly. I balance the
samples around inclusion, i.e., for each holding, there are 24 quarters with 8 (16) quarters pre
(post) to inclusion. Due to the overall sample period, inclusions into portfolios occur between
the first quarter of 2003 and the fourth quarter of 2011. The resulting sample for compacctikt
(compcfikt) contains 76,944 (64,824) observations, 24 observations for each of the 3,206 (2,701)
holdings.
For the period before inclusion, I measure accounting comparability as if the holding was
already part of the portfolio. That is, I create pseudo portfolios consisting of the actual portfolios
of mutual funds and the firms that they subsequently add. In this vein, I can observe how
comparable, in accounting terms, firms are with the portfolio choices of mutual funds, at every
single point in time.
Samples are not representative of the earlier samples, but should favor the incidence of
influence activities. Panel D of Table 2 shows that compacctikt (compcfikt) has a mean of -0.392
(-0.411) and a median of -0.214 (-0.332), clearly exceeding the respective values in the other
samples. Besides, the minimum holding period of 16 quarters does not generalize to the typical
holding. In the underlying samples, the holding period in a mutual fund, nonindexer portfolio
amounts on average to 3 quarters, with a median of 2 quarters (untabulated).52 However, a
longer investment horizon appears to make the (in)direct communication of preferences more
likely, strengthening the influence channel [McCahery et al., 2016].
Figure 2 illustrates changes in accounting comparability around inclusion in portfolios. Fig-
ure 2a (2b) depicts the quarterly mean of compacctikt (compcfikt) in each of the 24 quarters.
I redefine quarters relative to the quarter of inclusion and set the quarter of inclusion equal
to zero. In the quarters leading up to inclusion, comparability increases noticeably for either
proxy, complementing the findings of Section 4.3. Accounting comparability is not persistently
high, but rises steadily before inclusion and hence hints at a timing component in portfolio
selection. The firm fits into the mutual fund portfolio at the point in time when it is added.
The magnitude of the increase suggests that the simultaneous selection of other, more similar
peers contributes to the level of comparability at inclusion. In the quarters following inclusion,
comparability increases moderately for the return-based proxy and does not markedly change
52Mean and median are lower bounds. They refer to the underlying samples which I use in Section 4.2 and in
which I require a portfolio weight of at least 0.5%.
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for the cash flow-based proxy. Consequently, the influence channel does not seem to dominate
at first glance. To account for alternative factors impacting comparability, I estimate the model:
comp?ikt =β1pre1ikt + β2post1ikt + β3post2ikt + β4post3ikt + β5post4ikt
+ β6ln(peers)kt + βCONTit + βCONTkt + βFEIO + βFEi + βFEt + εikt
where comp?ikt is either compacctikt or compcfikt. The variables of interest are indicator vari-
ables for subperiods relative to the second year before portfolio inclusion, which serves as ref-
erence period. pre1ikt is equal to one starting in the year, i.e., the four quarters, preceding
inclusion. post1ikt (post2ikt) [post3ikt] {post4ikt} is equal to one starting in the first (second)
[third] {fourth} year subsequent to inclusion. All indicator variables are equal to one until the
end of the sample period, i.e., they measure incremental changes in the respective subperiods. I
control for the number of peers in the portfolio, ln(peers)kt, as well as firm characteristics and
portfolio means of firm characteristics, CONTit and CONTkt, as explained in Section 4.1. I
include fixed effects for investment objectives of mutual funds, firms and quarters, FEIO, FEi
and FEt. I cluster standard errors by portfolio and quarter-year.53
Table 7 displays the results. In the quarters before and around inclusion, comparability
increases, reinforcing the impression from the graphical representation. The coefficient of pre1ikt
amounts to 0.021 (0.011) and the coefficient of post1ikt amounts to 0.013 (0.011) for compacctikt
(compcfikt). The coefficients are statistically significant and translate into small, but noticeable
changes in comparability. For instance, the estimate of pre1ikt implies an increase of 5% (2%) of
compacctikt (compcfikt), evaluated at its mean for the preceding four quarters. In the following
quarters, comparability does not change further or even reverts to earlier levels, again confirming
the graphical representation. The coefficients of post2ikt and post3ikt are not different from
zero for both comparability proxies. The coefficient of post4ikt is not different from zero for
compacctikt and indicates a statistically significant decrease for compcfikt; it amounts to -0.008.
Accordingly, the findings are consistent with accounting comparability being one factor that
mutual funds consider in selecting portfolio firms. Section 4.3 demonstrates that the probability
of inclusion into portfolios is increasing in comparability. This section emphasizes that the level
of comparability is particularly high at the time of inclusion. On the other hand, the findings
are not consistent with accounting comparability being a factor that mutual funds target after
initial investment, even for a subset of holdings for which influence activities are more likely. As
53Alternatively, I cluster standard errors by (i) portfolio and quarter relative to inclusion; (ii) firm and quarter-
year; and (iii) firm and quarter relative to inclusion. Results are similar.
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it is still a very limited subset, I do not intend to generalize any results. For this subset, though,
selection appears to be relatively more prevalent.
5 Conclusion
In this study, I investigate whether mutual funds’ portfolio choices reflect a preference for ac-
counting comparability. I argue that investors with diversified portfolios need standardized
financial statement information to identify investment opportunities and conduct ongoing eval-
uations of their holdings. I examine portfolios of mutual funds, investors directly engaging in
data analysis and stock selection. I measure accounting comparability following De Franco et al.
[2011] and extend the concept in two respects. In addition to stock returns, I resort to operating
cash flow to proxy for economic events. In determining the relevant set of peers, I adopt an
investor perspective and assess comparability with portfolio peers. Two portfolio firms are com-
parable in their accounting if they produce similar financial statements for the same economic
events. I thus derive accounting comparability for holdings and first study variation in its level.
I can show that comparability is higher in mutual fund portfolios than in analyst portfolios,
which I construct from analysts’ coverage decisions. Moreover, comparability is higher in port-
folios of actively managed mutual funds whose portfolio composition suggests that they carefully
single out individual stocks. While these findings support the notion that mutual funds benefit
from accounting comparability, they do not inform about a potential impact on their investment
behavior. In the second step, I hence analyze comparability around the inclusion of firms into
portfolios. I can show that the probability of inclusion is moderately increasing in accounting
comparability. The relation is stronger for firms with more liquid stocks and less volatile returns,
in line with a preference for similar accounting information when firms’ information environment
allows for automated data processing. Furthermore, comparability is increasing until and around
inclusion, but does not change much afterwards, consistent with investment selection conditional
on comparability and inconsistent with the subsequent influence of accounting practices.
Altogether, the study provides evidence in line with mutual funds relying on comparable ac-
counting information for the selection of portfolio firms. The findings underline that accounting
comparability is not a primary concern. Yet, it does affect mutual funds’ investment decisions.
As the use of automated data processing techniques is becoming more common, the relevance
of similar financial statements might increase as well. As BlackRock’s CEO Larry Fink puts it:
"A year from now, [...] they [people]’ll just have different skill sets. It’ll be more data analysis,
there will be more model producers. We are not saying active is dead. We think active can be
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more alive, just using different insights".54







compacctikt Mean of the ten highest firm-pair comparability values for firm i in port-
folio k, based on the mapping of returns into earnings; multiplied by
100.
compcfikt Mean of the ten highest firm-pair comparability values for firm i in port-
folio k, based on the mapping of operating cash flows into accruals;
multiplied by 100.
inclusionikt Indicator variable equal to one if firm i is newly included in portfolio k
in quarter t.
pre1ikt Indicator variable equal to one starting in the year, i.e., the four quarters,
preceding inclusion of firm i in portfolio k.
post1ikt (post2ikt)
[post3ikt] {post4ikt}
Indicator variable equal to one starting in the first (second) [third]
{fourth} year subsequent to inclusion of firm i in portfolio k.
Firm-level variables
ln(mv)it Natural logarithm of the market value of equity.
btmit Ratio of book to market value of equity.
roait Income before extraordinary items over lagged total assets; multiplied
by 100.
ear_volatilityit Standard deviation of quarterly earnings scaled by lagged total assets
over the 16 previous quarters; multiplied by 100. I require a minimum
of 14 quarters.
ret_volatilityit Standard deviation of monthly returns over the previous 48 months;
multiplied by 100. I require a minimum of 36 months.
acc_volatilityit Standard deviation of quarterly accruals scaled by lagged total assets
over the 16 previous quarters; multiplied by 100. I require a minimum of
14 quarters. Accruals are the difference between income before extraor-
dinary items and operating cash flow.
cfo_volatilityit Standard deviation of quarterly operating cash flow scaled by lagged
total assets over the previous 16 quarters; multiplied by 100. I require a
minimum of 14 quarters.
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous page
Variable Description
ear_predictabilityit Adjusted R2 from a regression of quarterly earnings on lagged quarterly
earnings over 16 quarters. I require a minimum of 14 quarters. Earnings
are scaled by lagged market value of equity.
volumeit Quarterly mean of daily turnover; multiplied by 100. I require a mini-
mum of 32 observations. Turnover is daily volume over the number of
shares outstanding.
spreadit Quarterly mean of daily bid-ask spreads; multiplied by 100. I require
a minimum of 32 observations. The bid-ask spread is the difference
between the ask and bid price over the midpoint.
SPREADit Indicator variable equal to one if the mean of monthly bid-ask spreads
over the previous 48 months is above the median in quarter t. I require
a minimum of 36 months.
RETit Indicator variable equal to one if ret_volatilityit is above the median in
quarter t.
retq1it Buy-and-hold return from quarter (t− 1) to quarter t.
rety1it Buy-and-hold return from quarter (t− 4) to quarter (t− 1).
ret_sdit Quarterly standard deviation of daily returns. I require a minimum of
32 observations.
Portfolio-level variables
activekt The share of firms in portfolio k that is not in the S&P 500.
indexerkt Indicator variable equal to one if portfolio k is classified as indexing
investor in quarter t.
ln(tna)kt Natural logarithm of total net assets in portfolio k.
peerskt
[ln(peers)kt]
[Natural logarithm of the] number of portfolio peers.
mfkt Indicator variable equal to one (zero) if portfolio k is a mutual fund
(analyst) portfolio.
Notes: i, k and t denote firm, portfolio and quarter-year, respectively.
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A.2 Matching Approach
A.2.1 Mutual Funds vs. Analysts
The idea is to contrast comparability in mutual fund and analyst portfolios. To be able to
focus on the variation across portfolios, I use portfolios for the same firm. To control for other
portfolio characteristics, I match on predictor variables.
The figure shows the matching approach for a single firm. The firm is in three mutual fund
portfolios (of type A, B and C) and three analyst portfolios (of type A, B and D). After matching,
I retain only holdings, i.e., firm-portfolio combinations, for which the portfolio type appears
among both mutual funds and analysts. That is, I retain holdings with portfolios of type A and








I characterize the type with the following predictors for compacctikt (compcfikt): number of
peers and portfolio means of size, book-to-market and bid-ask spreads (size, accrual and cash
flow volatility). The table shows balance before and after matching. Note that CEM allows to
specify the tolerable range of the predictors ex ante so that balance checking is not necessary.
compacctikt compcfikt
Mean before Mean after Mean before Mean after
Variable fund analyst fund analyst Variable fund analyst fund analyst
peerskt 50.338 14.240 19.180 15.800 peerskt 46.337 14.016 19.375 15.976
mean_ln(mv)kt 9.286 8.222 8.704 8.785 mean_ln(mv)kt 9.268 8.212 8.696 8.733
mean_btmkt 0.439 0.533 0.475 0.483 mean_cfo_volatilitykt 2.169 2.128 2.043 1.885
mean_spreadkt 0.138 0.163 0.145 0.139 mean_acc_volatilitykt 1.976 1.871 1.912 1.760
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A.2.2 Mutual Fund Types
The idea is to contrast comparability in nonindexer and indexer portfolios. To be able to focus
on the variation across portfolios, I use portfolios for the same firm. To control for other portfolio
characteristics, I match on predictor variables.
The figure shows the matching approach for a single firm. The firm is in three nonindexer
portfolios (of type A, B and C) and three indexer portfolios (of type A, B and D). After matching,
I retain only holdings, i.e., firm-portfolio combinations, for which the portfolio type appears
among both nonindexers and indexers. That is, I retain holdings with portfolios of type A and








I characterize the type with the following predictors for compacctikt (compcfikt): number of
peers and portfolio means of size, book-to-market and bid-ask spreads (size, accrual and cash
flow volatility). The table shows balance before and after matching. Note that CEM allows to
specify the tolerable range of the predictors ex ante so that balance checking is not necessary.
compacctikt compcfikt
Mean before Mean after Mean before Mean after
Variable non indexer non indexer Variable non indexer non indexer
peerskt 50.382 50.960 46.885 45.995 peerskt 46.156 47.178 42.575 41.895
mean_ln(mv)kt 9.117 9.616 10.345 10.390 mean_ln(mv)kt 9.094 9.594 10.287 10.351
mean_btmkt 0.442 0.444 0.419 0.414 mean_cfo_volatilitykt 2.237 2.060 1.918 1.910
mean_spreadkt 0.151 0.116 0.116 0.120 mean_acc_volatilitykt 2.039 1.883 1.747 1.741
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A.2.3 Portfolio Selection
The idea is to compare newly included firms with potential candidates for inclusion. To be able
to focus on the variation across firms, I create holdings for the same portfolio. To control for
differences in firm characteristics, I match on predictor variables.
The figure shows the matching approach for a single portfolio. The newly included firm is of
type A. Among firms that are neither newly included nor existing members of the portfolio,
there are firms of type A, B, C and D. I retain only pairs of holdings, i.e., pairs of firm-portfolio
combinations, for which I can match a firm that is of the same type as the newly included firm.
That is, I keep both holdings with firms of type A and drop potential holdings with firms of









I characterize the type with the following predictors for compacctikt (compcfikt): size, book-
to-market, bid-ask spread, earnings and return volatility (size, book-to-market, bid-ask spread,
accrual and cash flow volatility). The table shows the mean of the predictors after matching.
compacctikt compcfikt
Mean after Mean after
Variable inclusion Variable inclusion
ln(mv)it 8.437 8.392 ln(mv)it 8.437 8.392
btmit 0.430 0.433 btmit 0.430 0.433
spreadit 0.113 0.121 spreadit 0.113 0.121
ear_volatilityit 1.203 1.192 acc_volatilityit 1.203 1.192
ret_volatilityit 10.249 10.189 cfo_volatilityit 10.249 10.189
88
References
Agarwal, V., Mullally, K. A., Tang, Y. and Yang, B. [2015], ‘Mandatory portfolio disclosure,
stock liquidity, and mutual fund performance’, The Journal of Finance 70(6), 2733–2776.
Aggarwal, R., Klapper, L. and Wysocki, P. D. [2005], ‘Portfolio preferences of foreign institu-
tional investors’, Journal of Banking & Finance 29(12), 2919–2946.
Amihud, Y. and Mendelson, H. [1986], ‘Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread’, Journal of Finan-
cial Economics 17(2), 223–249.
Amihud, Y. and Mendelson, H. [1989], ‘The effects of beta, bid-ask spread, residual risk, and
size on stock returns’, The Journal of Finance 44(2), 479–486.
Bhojraj, S. and Lee, C. M. C. [2002], ‘Who is my peer? A valuation-based approach to the
selection of comparable firms’, Journal of Accounting Research 40(2), 407–439.
Bhojraj, S., Lee, C. M. C. and Oler, D. K. [2003], ‘What’s my line? A comparison of industry
classification schemes for capital market research’, Journal of Accounting Research 41(5), 745–
774.
Boone, A. L. and White, J. T. [2015], ‘The effect of institutional ownership on firm transparency
and information production’, Journal of Financial Economics 117(3), 508–533.
Bowen, R. M., Rajgopal, S. and Venkatachalam, M. [2014], ‘Is Warren Buffett’s commentary
on accounting, governance, and investing practices reflected in the investment decisions and
subsequent influence of Berkshire Hathaway?’, The Accounting Review 89(5), 1609–1644.
Bradshaw, M. T., Bushee, B. J. and Miller, G. S. [2004], ‘Accounting choice, home bias, and
U.S. investment in non-U.S. firms’, Journal of Accounting Research 42(5), 795–841.
Bradshaw, M. T., Miller, G. S. and Serafeim, G. [2009], ‘Accounting method heterogeneity
and analysts’ forecasts’, Working Paper. Available at https://www.researchgate.net/profile/-
Mark_Bradshaw2.
Brochet, F., Jagolinzer, A. D. and Riedl, E. J. [2013], ‘Mandatory IFRS adoption and financial
statement comparability’, Contemporary Accounting Research 30(4), 1373–1400.
Bushee, B. J. and Noe, C. F. [2000], ‘Corporate disclosure practices, institutional investors, and
stock return volatility’, Journal of Accounting Research 38(Supplement: Studies on Account-
ing Information and the Economics of the Firm), 171–202.
Cascino, S. and Gassen, J. [2015], ‘What drives the comparability effect of mandatory IFRS
adoption?’, Review of Accounting Studies 20(1), 242–282.
Chen, H.-L., Jegadeesh, N. and Wermers, R. [2000], ‘The value of active mutual fund manage-
ment: An examination of the stockholdings and trades of fund managers’, Journal of Financial
and Quantitative Analysis 35(3), 343–368.
89
Covrig, V. M., DeFond, M. L. and Hung, M. [2007], ‘Home bias, foreign mutual fund holdings,
and the voluntary adoption of International Accounting Standards’, Journal of Accounting
Research 45(1), 41–70.
Cremers, K. J. M. and Petajisto, A. [2009], ‘How active is your fund manager? A new measure
that predicts performance’, The Review of Financial Studies 22(9), 3329–3365.
Daniel, K., Grinblatt, M., Titman, S. and Wermers, R. [1997], ‘Measuring mutual fund perfor-
mance with characteristic-based benchmarks’, The Journal of Finance 52(3), 1035–1058.
De Franco, G., Kothari, S. P. and Verdi, R. S. [2011], ‘The benefits of financial statement
comparability’, Journal of Accounting Research 49(4), 895–931.
DeFond, M., Hu, X., Hung, M. and Li, S. [2011], ‘The impact of mandatory IFRS adoption
on foreign mutual fund ownership: The role of comparability’, Journal of Accounting and
Economics 51(3), 240–258.
D’Souza, J. M., Ramesh, K. and Shen, M. [2010], ‘The interdependence between institu-
tional ownership and information dissemination by data aggregators’, The Accounting Review
85(1), 159–193.
Dye, R. A. and Sunder, S. [2001], ‘Why not allow FASB and IASB standards to compete in the
U.S.?’, Accounting Horizons 15(3), 257–271.
Falkenstein, E. G. [1996], ‘Preferences for stock characteristics as revealed by mutual fund port-
folio holdings’, The Journal of Finance 51(1), 111–135.
Fama, E. F. [1972], ‘Components of investment performance’, The Journal of Finance
27(3), 551–567.
Fang, V. W., Maffett, M. and Zhang, B. [2015], ‘Foreign institutional ownership and the global
convergence of financial reporting practices’, Journal of Accounting Research 53(3), 593–631.
FASB [2010], ‘Statement of financial accounting concepts no. 8’, Conceptual Framework for
Financial Reporting.
Fich, E. M., Harford, J. and Tran, A. L. [2015], ‘Motivated monitors: The importance of insti-
tutional investors’ portfolio weights’, Journal of Financial Economics 118(1), 21–48.
Florou, A. and Pope, P. F. [2012], ‘Mandatory IFRS adoption and institutional investment
decisions’, The Accounting Review 87(6), 1993–2025.
Gassen, J., Skaife, H. A. and Veenman, D. [2016], ‘Illiquidity and the measurement of stock
price synchronicity’, Working Paper. Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?-
abstract_id=2405465.
Gow, I. D., Ormazabal, G. and Taylor, D. J. [2010], ‘Correcting for cross-sectional and time-series
dependence in accounting research’, The Accounting Review 85(2), 483–512.
90
Gu, Z. and Chen, T. [2004], ‘Analysts’ treatment of nonrecurring items in street earnings’,
Journal of Accounting and Economics 38(1), 129–170.
Hoberg, G. and Phillips, G. [2016], ‘Text-based network industries and endogenous product
differentiation’, Journal of Political Economy 124(5), 1423–1465.
Horton, J., Serafeim, G. and Serafeim, I. [2013], ‘Does mandatory IFRS adoption improve the
information environment?’, Contemporary Accounting Research 30(1), 388–423.
Iacus, S. M., King, G. and Porro, G. [2012], ‘Causal inference without balance checking: Coars-
ened exact matching’, Political Analysis 20(1), 1–24.
ICI [2017], ‘Investment company fact book ’, Investment Company Institute (ICI).
Jung, M. J. [2013], ‘Investor overlap and diffusion of disclosure practices’, Review of Accounting
Studies 18(1), 167–206.
Kacpercyzk, M., Nieuwerburgh, S. V. and Veldkamp, L. [2014], ‘Time-varying fund manager
skill’, The Journal of Finance 69(4), 1455–1484.
Ke, B. and Petroni, K. [2004], ‘How informed are actively trading institutional investors? Evi-
dence from their trading behavior before a break in a string of consecutive earnings increases’,
Journal of Accounting Research 42(5), 895–927.
Kim, S., Kraft, P. and Ryan, S. G. [2013], ‘Financial statement comparability and credit risk’,
Review of Accounting Studies 18(3), 783–823.
Leuz, C. and Wysocki, P. D. [2016], ‘The economics of disclosure and financial reporting
regulation: Evidence and suggestions for future research’, Journal of Accounting Research
54(2), 525–622.
Lines, A. [2016], ‘Do institutional incentives distort asset prices?’, Working Paper. Available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2873739.
Ma, L., Tang, Y. and Gómez, J.-P. [2016], ‘Portfolio manager compensation and mutual fund per-
formance’, Working Paper. Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_-
id=2024027.
McCahery, J. A., Sautner, Z. and Starks, L. T. [2016], ‘Behind the scenes: The corporate
governance preferences of institutional investors’, The Journal of Finance 71(6), 2905–2932.
Neel, M. [2017], ‘Accounting comparability and economic outcomes of mandatory IFRS adop-
tion’, Contemporary Accounting Research 34(1), 658–690.
Petersen, M. A. [2009], ‘Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing
approaches’, The Review of Financial Studies 22(1), 435–480.
Ramnath, S. [2002], ‘Investor and analyst reactions to earnings announcements of related firms:
An empirical analysis’, Journal of Accounting Research 40(5), 1351–1376.
91
Shive, S. and Yun, H. [2013], ‘Are mutual funds sitting ducks?’, Journal of Financial Economics
107(1), 220–237.
Wermers, R. [2000], ‘Mutual fund performance: An empirical decomposition into stock-picking
talent, style, transactions costs, and expenses’, The Journal of Finance 55(4), 1655–1695.
Wermers, R. [2003], ‘Are mutual fund shareholders compensated for active management "bets"?’,
Working Paper. Available at https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Russ_Wermers.
Young, S. and Zeng, Y. [2015], ‘Accounting comparability and the accuracy of peer-based valu-
ation models’, The Accounting Review 90(6), 2571–2601.
Yu, G. and Wahid, A. S. [2014], ‘Accounting standards and international portfolio holdings’,
The Accounting Review 89(5), 1895–1930.
92
Figures
















2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 2015q1
quarter















2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 2015q1
quarter
mean for mutual funds mean for analysts
Notes: The figure displays the quarterly mean of accounting comparability for mutual fund (blue line) and analyst portfolios (red line). i, k and t denote firm, portfolio and quarter-year,
respectively. compacctikt (compcfikt) is the mean of the ten highest firm-pair comparability values for firm i in portfolio k, based on the mapping of returns into earnings (cash flows into
accruals). The sample for Figure 1a (Figure 1b) comprises 1,387,908 (1,330,219) observations, 1,136,150 (1,119,375) for mutual fund and 251,758 (210,844) for analyst portfolios.
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Notes: The figure displays the quarterly mean of accounting comparability around the inclusion in mutual fund portfolios. i, k and t denote firm, portfolio and quarter-year, respectively. Before
taking the mean, I limit mutual funds to nonindexers. I further restrict observations to holdings that are not part of portfolio k for eight quarters, are then newly included and remain in
portfolio k for at least four years. For each holding, the sample contains 24 observations, two years before and four years following inclusion. Quarter 0 is the quarter of inclusion. compacctikt
(compcfikt) is the mean of the ten highest firm-pair comparability values for firm i in portfolio k, based on the mapping of returns into earnings (cash flows into accruals). The sample for
Figure 2a (Figure 2b) comprises 3,206 (2,701) holdings.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Sample
Panel A: Firms
Variable N Mean SD Min 25th Med 75th Max
ln(mv)it 92,370 7.173 1.614 2.583 5.951 6.991 8.171 13.290
btmit 92,370 0.563 0.392 −0.498 0.300 0.485 0.731 2.887
roait 92,370 0.812 2.817 −22.728 0.210 0.930 2.016 9.166
ear_volatilityit 92,370 1.798 2.473 0.024 0.457 0.970 2.126 31.253
ret_volatilityit 92,370 12.109 5.845 2.462 7.940 10.873 14.905 47.235
acc_volatilityit 83,095 2.770 2.094 0.180 1.342 2.236 3.589 28.194
cfo_volatilityit 83,095 2.464 1.801 0.166 1.264 2.016 3.171 22.258
ear_predictabilityit 92,370 0.066 0.175 −0.071 −0.061 −0.013 0.129 0.744
volumeit 92,370 0.853 0.716 0.007 0.383 0.666 1.101 12.521
spreadit 92,370 0.304 0.477 −0.041 0.070 0.140 0.322 10.319
Panel B: Mutual Funds
Variable N Mean SD Min 25th Med 75th Max
activekt 117,696 0.893 0.161 0.220 0.889 0.941 0.978 1.000
indexerkt 117,696 0.148
ln(tna)kt 117,696 5.345 2.052 −2.303 3.991 5.352 6.746 12.909
ln(peers)kt 117,696 3.676 0.452 2.303 3.401 3.738 4.007 4.949
peerskt 117,696 43.329 17.568 10.000 30.000 42.000 55.000 141.000
Notes: The table displays summary statistics for the universe of firms and mutual funds from which I
construct the samples for the analyses. Panel A depicts summary statistics for firms and Panel B for
mutual funds. i, k and t denote firm, portfolio and quarter-year, respectively. I limit firm-quarters to
quarters in which the firm appears in at least one mutual fund portfolio. ln(mv)it is the natural logarithm
of the market value of equity. btmit is the ratio of book to market value of equity. roait is income
before extraordinary items over lagged total assets. ear_volatilityit is the standard deviation of quarterly
earnings scaled by lagged total assets over 16 quarters. ret_volatilityit is the standard deviation of monthly
returns over 48 months. acc_volatilityit is the standard deviation of quarterly accruals scaled by lagged
total assets over 16 quarters. cfo_volatilityit is the standard deviation of quarterly operating cash flow
scaled by lagged total assets over 16 quarters. ear_predictabilityit is the adjusted R2 from a regression
of quarterly earnings on lagged quarterly earnings over 16 quarters. volumeit is the quarterly mean of
daily turnover. spreadit is the quarterly mean of daily bid-ask spreads. I multiply roait, ear_volatilityit,
ret_volatilityit, acc_volatilityit, cfo_volatilityit, volumeit and spreadit by 100. activekt is the share of
firms in portfolio k that is not in the S&P 500. indexerkt is an indicator variable equal to one if portfolio
k is classified as indexing investor in quarter t. ln(tna)kt is the natural logarithm of total net assets in
portfolio k. peerskt [ln(peers)kt] is [the natural logarithm of] the number of portfolio peers. There are
3,162 (4,219) unique firms (mutual funds) in Panel A (B).
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Accounting Comparability
Panel A: Mutual Funds vs. Analysts
Variable N Mean SD Min 25th Med 75th Max
compacctikt 1,387,908 −0.680 1.172 −25.618 −0.665 −0.305 −0.170 −0.028
mutual funds 1,136,150 −0.557 1.034 −24.719 −0.506 −0.256 −0.154 −0.028
analysts 251,758 −1.234 1.539 −25.618 −1.414 −0.730 −0.404 −0.048
compcfikt 1,330,219 −0.659 0.641 −18.495 −0.799 −0.476 −0.294 −0.008
mutual funds 1,119,375 −0.592 0.563 −15.092 −0.705 −0.438 −0.284 −0.008
analysts 210,844 −1.015 0.874 −18.495 −1.307 −0.827 −0.484 −0.013
Correlation between compacctikt and compcfikt
Pearson 490,062 0.417∗∗∗
Spearman 490,062 0.414∗∗∗
Panel B: Mutual Fund Types
Variable N Mean SD Min 25th Med 75th Max
compacctikt 956,225 −0.514 0.965 −21.911 −0.472 −0.246 −0.150 −0.025
nonindexers 788,229 −0.515 0.960 −21.735 −0.477 −0.248 −0.151 −0.025
indexers 167,996 −0.510 0.987 −21.911 −0.450 −0.237 −0.142 −0.030
compcfikt 963,288 −0.580 0.535 −19.693 −0.694 −0.435 −0.282 −0.012
nonindexers 795,790 −0.587 0.537 −13.375 −0.705 −0.439 −0.283 −0.015
indexers 167,498 −0.546 0.524 −19.693 −0.643 −0.417 −0.277 −0.012




Panel C: Portfolio Selection
Variable N Mean SD Min 25th Med 75th Max
compacctikt 632,046 −0.531 0.875 −19.845 −0.514 −0.261 −0.157 −0.029
inclusion 316,023 −0.507 0.822 −19.845 −0.495 −0.254 −0.155 −0.029
316,023 −0.556 0.925 −19.379 −0.533 −0.268 −0.160 −0.031
compcfikt 578,942 −0.547 0.539 −15.304 −0.628 −0.393 −0.263 −0.008
inclusion 289,471 −0.533 0.499 −14.418 −0.618 −0.389 −0.261 −0.008
289,471 −0.561 0.576 −15.304 −0.640 −0.398 −0.264 −0.012
Panel D: Selection vs. Influence
Variable N Mean SD Min 25th Med 75th Max
compacctikt 76,944 −0.392 0.597 −11.912 −0.396 −0.214 −0.135 −0.028
compcfikt 64,824 −0.411 0.297 −4.802 −0.493 −0.332 −0.226 −0.029
Notes: The table displays summary statistics of accounting comparability for the different samples of the
analyses. Panel A refers to the sample in Table 4; Panel B to the sample in Table 5; Panel C to the sample
in Table 6; and Panel D to the sample in Table 7. i, k and t denote firm, portfolio and quarter-year,
respectively. compacctikt (compcfikt) is the mean of the ten highest firm-pair comparability values for
firm i in portfolio k, based on the mapping of returns into earnings (cash flows into accruals). Panel A and
Panel B depict the correlations between compacctikt and compcfikt for the observations that appear in
both samples. The overlap is small since the underlying samples are random draws. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) compacctikt 1.000 −0.232∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
(2) activekt −0.063∗∗∗ 1.000 −0.170∗∗∗−0.222∗∗∗−0.357∗∗∗
(3) indexerkt 0.002∗ −0.410∗∗∗ 1.000 −0.001 0.011∗∗∗
(4) ln(tna)kt 0.029∗∗∗−0.200∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 1.000 0.164∗∗∗
(5) ln(peers)kt 0.094∗∗∗−0.140∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 1.000
Panel B: compcfikt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) compcfikt 1.000 −0.216∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ 0.469∗∗∗
(2) activekt −0.097∗∗∗ 1.000 −0.172∗∗∗−0.220∗∗∗−0.324∗∗∗
(3) indexerkt 0.029∗∗∗−0.411∗∗∗ 1.000 0.000 0.011∗∗∗
(4) ln(tna)kt 0.076∗∗∗−0.199∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 1.000 0.165∗∗∗
(5) ln(peers)kt 0.354∗∗∗−0.114∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 1.000
Notes: The table displays Pearson (Spearman) correlations for accounting comparability and mutual fund
characteristics in the lower (upper) triangle. Panel A depicts correlations for accounting comparability based
on the mapping of returns into earnings, compacctikt. Panel B depicts correlations for accounting compa-
rability based on the mapping of cash flows into accruals, compcfikt. i, k and t denote firm, portfolio and
quarter-year, respectively. compacctikt (compcfikt) is the mean of the ten highest firm-pair comparability
values for firm i in portfolio k. activekt is the share of firms in portfolio k that is not in the S&P 500.
indexerkt is an indicator variable equal to one if portfolio k is classified as indexing investor in quarter t.
ln(tna)kt is the natural logarithm of total net assets in portfolio k. ln(peers)kt is the natural logarithm of
the number of portfolio peers. The number of observations is 956,225 (963,288) in Panel A (B). ∗, ∗∗ and
∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
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Table 4: Mutual Funds vs. Analysts
compacctikt compcfikt
Sample random matched random matched
mfkt 0.163
∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.013 0.067∗∗∗





∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.024
(0.023) (0.061) (0.008) (0.028)
btmit 0.313
∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.070
(0.053) (0.115) (0.013) (0.048)
roait 0.014
∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.004) (0.012) (0.002) (0.005)
?1_volatilityit −0.237∗∗∗ −0.269∗∗∗ −0.116∗∗∗ −0.213∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.035) (0.010) (0.016)
?2_volatilityit −0.089∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.005) (0.013) (0.008) (0.028)
ear_predictabilityit 0.021 0.115 −0.082∗∗∗ −0.083∗
(0.023) (0.148) (0.015) (0.044)
volumeit 0.004 −0.003 −0.014∗ −0.004
(0.014) (0.050) (0.007) (0.021)
spreadit −0.171∗∗∗ −0.491∗∗∗ 0.021 0.017
(0.063) (0.179) (0.028) (0.034)
Portfolio means of firm characteristics in portfolio k yes no yes no
Firm and quarter-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
adj. R2 0.625 0.764 0.698 0.772
adj. R2 within 0.335 0.349 0.371 0.120
N 1,387,908 10,925 1,330,219 12,693
Holdings 475,658 7,436 449,431 8,282
Firms 2,807 1,219 2,613 1,174
Mutual funds 4,218 940 4,190 1,083
Analysts 2,189 1,084 1,909 1,000
Notes: The table displays estimates for the association between accounting comparability and membership in mutual fund
portfolios, relative to analyst portfolios. i, k and t denote firm, portfolio and quarter-year, respectively. compacctikt
(compcfikt) is the mean of the ten highest firm-pair comparability values for firm i in portfolio k, based on the mapping
of returns into earnings (cash flows into accruals). In column 1 and 3, I draw a random sample of at most 10 holdings
per portfolio and quarter, while ensuring that each firm appears in at least one mutual fund and one analyst portfolio
(random). In column 2 and 4, I match holdings of the same firm in the same quarter from mutual fund to analyst portfolios
(matched). I apply the coarsened exact matching (CEM) algorithm and match on portfolio means of size, book-to-market
and spread (size, accrual and cash flow volatility) in column 2 (4). I further require that the difference in the number of
portfolio peers is at most 10. mfkt is an indicator variable equal to one (zero) if portfolio k is a mutual fund (analyst)
portfolio. ln(peers)kt is the natural logarithm of the number of portfolio peers. ln(mv)it is the natural logarithm of the
market value of equity. btmit is the ratio of book to market value of equity. roait is income before extraordinary items over
lagged total assets. ?1_volatilityit is ear_volatilityit (acc_volatilityit) in column 1 and 2 (column 3 and 4), the standard
deviation of quarterly earnings (accruals) scaled by lagged total assets over 16 quarters. ?2_volatilityit is ret_volatilityit
(cfo_volatilityit) in column 1 and 2 (column 3 and 4), the standard deviation of monthly returns (quarterly operating cash
flow scaled by lagged total assets) over 48 months (16 quarters). ear_predictabilityit is the adjusted R2 from a regression
of quarterly earnings on lagged quarterly earnings over 16 quarters. volumeit is the quarterly mean of daily turnover.
spreadit is the quarterly mean of daily bid-ask spreads. Standard errors are clustered by portfolio k and quarter t. ∗, ∗∗
and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
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Table 5: Mutual Fund Types
compacctikt compcfikt
Sample random matched random matched
activekt 0.055
∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ −0.008 0.032∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011)
ln(tna)kt −0.002∗∗ 0.000 −0.001 0.001




Firm characteristics of firm i yes yes yes yes
Portfolio means of firm characteristics in portfolio k yes no yes no
Investment objective fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Firm and quarter-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
adj. R2 0.602 0.622 0.684 0.663
adj. R2 within 0.303 0.264 0.313 0.146
N 956,225 542,950 963,288 502,510
Holdings 382,144 154,223 374,608 153,357
Firms 2,485 2,268 2,410 2,173
Mutual funds 3,981 3,405 3,972 3,435
Notes: The table displays estimates for the association between accounting comparability and mutual fund types. i, k and
t denote firm, portfolio and quarter-year, respectively. compacctikt (compcfikt) is the mean of the ten highest firm-pair
comparability values for firm i in portfolio k, based on the mapping of returns into earnings (cash flows into accruals).
In column 1 and 3, I draw a random sample of at most 10 holdings per portfolio and quarter, while ensuring that each
firm appears in at least one nonindexer and one indexer portfolio (random). In column 2 and 4, I match holdings of the
same firm in the same quarter from nonindexer to indexer portfolios (matched). I apply the coarsened exact matching
(CEM) algorithm and match on portfolio means of size, book-to-market and spread (size, accrual and cash flow volatility)
in column 2 (4). I further require that the difference in the number of portfolio peers is at most 10. activekt is the share
of firms in portfolio k that is not in the S&P 500. ln(tna)kt is the natural logarithm of total net assets in portfolio k.
ln(peers)kt is the natural logarithm of the number of portfolio peers. Firm characteristics comprise the natural logarithm of
the market value of equity, ln(mv)it; the ratio of book to market value of equity, btmit; income before extraordinary items
over lagged total assets, roait; the standard deviation of quarterly earnings (accruals) scaled by lagged total assets over 16
quarters in column 1 and 2 (column 3 and 4), ear_volatilityit (acc_volatilityit); the standard deviation of monthly returns
(quarterly operating cash flow scaled by lagged total assets) over 48 months (16 quarters) in column 1 and 2 (column 3 and
4), ret_volatilityit (cfo_volatilityit); the adjusted R2 from a regression of quarterly earnings on lagged quarterly earnings
over 16 quarters, ear_predictabilityit; the quarterly mean of daily turnover, volumeit; and the quarterly mean of daily
bid-ask spreads, spreadit. Standard errors are clustered by portfolio k and quarter t. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at
the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
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Table 6: Portfolio Selection
inclusionikt
Comparability proxy compacctikt compcfikt
Indicator variable SPREAD RET SPREAD RET
comp?ikt 0.020
∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010)
indicatorit 0.003 −0.049∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
comp?ikt × indicatorit −0.019∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.048∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
ln(peers)kt −0.003 −0.005∗∗ −0.006∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ln(mv)it 0.031
∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
btmit 0.056
∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.022∗ 0.023∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
retq1it 0.152
∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
rety1it 0.100
∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ret_sdit 0.739∗ 0.736∗ 1.097∗∗ 1.396∗∗∗ 1.381∗∗∗ 1.373∗∗∗
(0.416) (0.417) (0.418) (0.507) (0.509) (0.504)
volumeit 0.067
∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
spreadit −0.031 −0.034∗ −0.041∗∗ −0.066∗∗ −0.067∗∗ −0.065∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Investment objective fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm and quarter-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
adj. R2 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.054 0.054 0.055




Mutual funds 2,904 2,906
Notes: The table displays estimates for the determinants of portfolio selection. i, k and t denote firm, portfolio
and quarter-year, respectively. I limit mutual funds to nonindexers. I restrict observations to (i) holdings that
are not part of portfolio k in the preceding eight quarters and are newly included in quarter t; and (ii) potential
holdings that I match based on firm characteristics: size, book-to-market, spread, earnings and return volatility
(size, book-to-market, spread, accrual and cash flow volatility) in columns 1–3 (4–6). I apply the coarsened exact
matching (CEM) algorithm and match exactly one potential holding to each new holding in the quarter of inclusion.
The dependent variable is inclusionikt, an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is newly included portfolio k in
quarter t. comp?ikt is compacctikt (compcfikt), the mean of the ten highest firm-pair comparability values for firm
i in portfolio k, based on the mapping of returns into earnings (cash flows into accruals). SPREADit is an indicator
variable equal to one if the four-year mean of monthly bid-ask spreads is above the median in quarter t. RETit
is an indicator variable equal to one if the four-year standard deviation of monthly returns is above the median in
quarter t. ln(peers)kt is the natural logarithm of the number of portfolio peers. ln(mv)it is the natural logarithm
of the market value of equity. btmit is the ratio of book to market value of equity. retq1it is the return from quarter
(t− 1) to quarter t. rety1it is the return from quarter (t− 4) to quarter (t− 1). ret_sdit is the quarterly standard
deviation of daily returns. volumeit is the quarterly mean of daily turnover. spreadit is the quarterly mean of daily
bid-ask spreads. Standard errors are clustered by firm i and quarter t. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the
0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
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Number of peers in portfolio k yes yes
Firm characteristics of firm i yes yes
Portfolio means of firm characteristics in portfolio k yes yes
Investment objective fixed effects yes yes
Firm and quarter-year fixed effects yes yes
adj. R2 0.628 0.678




Mutual Funds 551 534
Notes: The table displays estimates for the change in comparability upon inclusion into mutual
fund portfolios. i, k and t denote firm, portfolio and quarter-year, respectively. I limit mutual
funds to nonindexers. I restrict observations to holdings that are not part of portfolio k for
eight quarters, are then newly included and remain in portfolio k for at least four years. For
each holding, the sample contains 24 observations, two years before and four years following
inclusion. compacctikt (compcfikt) is the mean of the ten highest firm-pair comparability values
for firm i in portfolio k, based on the mapping of returns into earnings (cash flows into accruals).
I define pre1ikt and post?ikt relative to the quarter of inclusion into portfolio k. pre1ikt is
an indicator variable equal to one starting in the year preceding inclusion. post1ikt (post2ikt)
[post3ikt] {post4ikt} is an indicator variable equal to one in the first (second) [third] {fourth}
starting in the year subsequent to inclusion. Number of peers is the natural logarithm of the
number of portfolio peers, ln(peers)kt. Firm characteristics comprise the natural logarithm
of the market value of equity, ln(mv)it; the ratio of book to market value of equity, btmit;
income before extraordinary items over lagged total assets, roait; the standard deviation of
quarterly earnings (accruals) scaled by lagged total assets over 16 quarters in column 1 (column
2), ear_volatilityit (acc_volatilityit); the standard deviation of monthly returns (quarterly
operating cash flow scaled by lagged total assets) over 48 months (16 quarters) in column 1
(column 2), ret_volatilityit (cfo_volatilityit); the adjusted R2 from a regression of quarterly
earnings on lagged quarterly earnings over 16 quarters, ear_predictabilityit; the quarterly mean
of daily turnover, volumeit; and the quarterly mean of daily bid-ask spreads, spreadit. Standard
errors are clustered by portfolio k and quarter t. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 0.1,
0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
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Abstract
This research note examines the determinants of temporary migration within multinational
corporations. We examine a comprehensive dataset on international assignments within a
large accounting firm. Our analysis yields two findings that are new to the literature. First,
we document that country-level factors established in prior studies on long-term migration
(e.g., economic ties or cultural proximity between home and host country) are also associated
with migration decisions in our setting. Second, we provide some evidence that regulatory
variation across countries at the occupational level (e.g., differences in accounting standards)
reduces the extent of temporary migration within multinational corporations.
∗The study is based on proprietary data provided by a large accounting firm. We thank our contacts in this firm for
supporting this project by making their data available to us. We also thank the members of the Research Training Group




Temporary migration of skilled labor is a highly relevant phenomenon around the world and
particularly pronounced in the accounting industry. The four largest accounting firms have
an aggregate workforce of more than 500,000 employees located in more than 150 countries.
Of these, roughly 11,000 to 16,000 (2.2% to 3.2%) participate in formal international mobility
programs [Beaverstock, 2017]. These statistics support the notion that temporary mobility55
within multinational corporations is a widespread phenomenon in the accounting industry and,
more generally, in industries that offer skilled services. Yet, we know very little about the
determinants of this phenomenon. This research note addresses this gap by presenting large-
scale empirical evidence based on a proprietary dataset on international assignments within a
large accounting firm.
The firm operates in three lines of services (LoS) or occupations as is common in the ac-
counting industry. The first LoS (auditing) combines typical auditing and assurance-oriented
activities. The second LoS (taxation) comprises tax filing preparation and tax-related consult-
ing activities. The third LoS (consulting) includes general consulting services, which are usually
related to the accounting activities of client firms.
Our empirical analysis consists of two parts. In the first part, we use a sample of 50,060
possible country-pair observations across the three LoS. We consider a pair possible if both the
host and the home country operate in the respective LoS. Our outcome variable is an indicator
equal to one if there is at least one individual from the respective home country working in the
respective host country. The analysis shows that the likelihood of temporary migration is higher
if host and home country have strong economic ties, share a similar culture or are geographically
close to each other. These findings support the view that country-level determinants established
in prior literature on long-term migration across firms [e.g., Beine, Docquier and Özden, 2011;
Mayda, 2010] also matter for temporary migration within multinational corporations.
In the second part of the empirical analysis, we examine whether regulatory differences
across countries affect migration decisions in certain occupations. This analysis is based on the
following arguments: Employees in auditing need to have detailed knowledge of the relevant
financial accounting and auditing rules that their clients are subject to. Prior work documents
that these rules vary significantly across countries [e.g., Bae, Tan and Welker, 2008]. This
cross-country variation can have two opposing effects on temporary migration. On the one
55In line with prior literature on temporary movements of labor [Beaverstock, 2017], we use the terms ‘migration’
and ‘mobility’ interchangeably throughout this note.
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hand, regulatory differences between host and home country may impose a cost of migration
if the employee has to be trained in the host country’s regulatory environment. On the other
hand, temporary migration may be enhanced to the extent that the regulatory expertise of
the individual is demanded by the host country (e.g., to provide services to a subsidiary of a
home country’s parent operating in the host country). Similar arguments hold for employees in
taxation. In contrast, consulting skills are more universal and, thus, less likely to be affected by
regulatory differences across countries.
We test for these potential associations at the occupational level using the share of mobile
employees as the outcome variable (i.e., we focus on the extent instead of the existence of
temporary migration). The analysis is restricted to the subset of 1,291 country pairs for which
we observe positive mobility. We document that the number of auditors and tax experts on
international assignments is higher for host countries with accounting and tax regimes that
resemble the regulatory environment in the home country. These results suggest that regulatory
differences at the occupational level generate migration costs that are higher than potential
benefits sparked by demand for expertise in foreign rules. We also find that migration decisions
by consultants are positively associated with the similarity of tax rules between home and host
country. This finding is harder to reconcile with our arguments above, illustrating that our
empirical evidence on occupation-level migration determinants is not conclusive.
Extant literature on temporary migration within multinational corporations focuses on de-
scriptive statistics and qualitative aspects of this important phenomenon [e.g., Beaverstock, 1991,
1996; Millar and Salt, 2008; Peixoto, 2001; Tzeng, 1995; Beaverstock, 2017, for a short overview].
We contribute to this literature by providing two new findings. First, we use insights from prior
migration literature to show that established country-level factors (e.g., economic ties or cul-
tural proximity between home and host country) are also associated with migration decisions in
our setting. Second, we find that regulatory variation across countries at the occupational level
hampers temporary migration within firms. While the results on occupation-level determinants
are inconclusive, we provide one of the first pieces of evidence that regulatory variation across
countries has the potential to impose barriers to labor market migration and competition [see
also Bloomfield, Brüggemann, Christensen and Leuz, 2017].
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2 Migration Data
Our study is based on a proprietary dataset on international assignments within a large ac-
counting firm.56 Individuals in this dataset are employees of the firm in the home country and
remain employees of the firm when working on an international assignment in the host coun-
try. The employees change their workplace only temporarily; the average (median) length of an
assignment is 1.9 (2.0) years. At the end of their stay abroad, they return to their home office.
The raw dataset includes information on the LoS (auditing, taxation or consulting), the
home country and the host country for all individuals that were on an international assignment
during the period 2005 to 2008. Since this period is too short to exploit variation across time, we
use this dataset for cross-sectional analyses only. The key variable is a mobility measure. This
measure is a ratio with the number of mobile employees in the host country (i.e., those on an
international assignment) in the numerator and the total number of employees in the respective
home country in the denominator. We compute the mobility measure by LoS for each possible
pair of host and home country. We consider a pair possible if both the host and the home
country operate in the respective LoS. Since the firm offers consulting services in 116 countries,
this procedure yields 13,340 possible country-pair observations (= 116× 115) for this LoS. The
firm operates in the other two LoS in 136 countries leading to 18,360 possible country pairs for
both auditing and taxation.57 Hence, our final dataset comprises 50,060 possible country-pair
observations across three LoS. For comparison, the studies by Beaverstock [1991, 1996] focus on
the U.K. as home or host country and do not distinguish between different LoS.
Our dataset is subject to two caveats: First, there is a mismatch between the numerator
and the denominator of our mobility measure. While the numerator is based on yearly averages
of international assignments over the period 2005 to 2008, the denominator uses data on the
total number of employees as of 2016 because data for earlier periods are not available to us.
This mismatch could affect our results to the extent that the number of employees across home
countries has changed systematically over the last decade. Second, our dataset contains little
usable information on individual assignments (e.g., demographic data, wage data). We therefore
focus our empirical analysis on country-level determinants of temporary migration within the
accounting firm.
56We are not allowed to disclose the firm’s name or any other information that may reveal its identity (e.g., total
number of employees or total number of mobile employees).
57The firm offers auditing services in three countries without offering taxation services, and vice versa. The final
dataset therefore comprises 139 countries in total.
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3 Migration Determinants
3.1 Existence of Temporary Migration
The labor migration literature indicates that prospects of higher future wages or, in general,
higher living standards provide incentives to migrate to host countries. It further argues that
economic ties and cultural as well as geographic proximity between home and potential host
countries strengthen these incentives by reducing migration costs. Existing business relations
and common forms of understanding decrease information asymmetries prior to migration and
facilitate the familiarization with a new environment after arrival in the host country. Short
distances imply lower direct costs of moving and are usually positively correlated with the extent
of economic and personal exchange [e.g., Sjaastad, 1962]. We investigate whether the mobility
patterns in our dataset are associated with these country-level determinants. Ex ante, it is
not obvious that such associations exist. First, we focus on temporary migration, which might
weaken the role of cultural factors because employees return to their home country in the near
future [e.g., Dustmann and Görlach, 2016]. Second, we focus on within-firm migration, which
might lessen the importance of economic factors in the host country because employment is
guaranteed and firm-specific characteristics such as career development programs or temporary
vacancies play into the migration decision [e.g., Edström and Galbraith, 1977].
We begin the empirical analysis by assessing the likelihood of observing temporary migration
between possible pairs of host and home countries. The dependent variable is an indicator,
mobileijk, which is equal to one if our mobility measure is larger than zero, i.e., if there is at
least one individual from LoS k in home country i that works in host country j during the period
2005 to 2008. The indicator is set to zero if the mobility measure equals zero. We estimate the
following regression model:
mobileijk =β1gdp_highij + β2taxhaven_hostij + β3crosslistingij + β4tradeflowij
+ β5comlangij + β6colonyij + β7distance_highij + βmFEi + βnFEj + εijk
The set of independent variables is inspired by prior literature that examines long-term migration
decisions outside current employments [e.g., Beine et al., 2011; Mayda, 2010]. These variables
are defined as follows (see Appendix A.1 for further details): gdp_highij is an indicator equal
to one if the per capita GDP of host country j is larger than the per capita GDP of home
country i, and equal to zero otherwise. We use this variable as a proxy for income differences
between home and host country. The variable is based on GDP data from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators. taxhaven_hostij is an indicator equal to one if host country j
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is among the five tax havens that are closest in geographic distance to home country i, and equal
to zero otherwise. We use this variable to capture high demand for tax consulting. We compute
the variable using the list of tax havens provided by Dyreng and Lindsey [2009]. Our sample
of 139 countries comprises 22 tax havens according to this list. crosslistingij is an indicator
equal to one if firms from home country i are cross-listed in host country j, and zero otherwise.
This variable is a proxy for capital market interdependencies between home and host country.
We compute it using data on cross-listed firms from Sarkissian and Schill [2004, 2009, 2016].58
tradeflowij is an indicator equal to one if exports from home country i to host country j are
above the median for home country i, and zero otherwise. It is based on trade flow data from
CEPII [Fouquin and Hugot, 2016]. We use this variable to quantify the importance of the host
country as a recipient of domestic products from the perspective of the home country. The
remaining independent variables characterize cultural and geographic proximity between home
and host country based on data from CEPII [Mayer and Zignago, 2011]. comlangij and colonyij
are indicators equal to one if both countries share the same language and a colonial history,
respectively. distance_highij is an indicator equal to one if the distance between the home and
host country is larger than the sample median, and equal to zero otherwise.
We estimate the model as a cross-sectional OLS regression with separate fixed effects for home
and host countries, FEi and FEj . These fixed effects ensure that the coefficient estimates on the
independent variables are less susceptible to the influence of individual countries with extreme
home or host characteristics (e.g., high economic development, strict immigration policies).
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and two-way clustering by home and host
country. To explore potential differences in migration determinants across LoS, we estimate the
regression separately for auditing, taxation and consulting.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for all variables. The statistics for the dependent variable
mobileijk show that there is no temporary migration between most country pairs. Moreover,
migration patterns differ substantially across LoS:mobileijk is equal to one for 4.5% of all country
pairs in auditing, 2.3% in taxation and 3.4% in consulting. The statistics for the independent
variables illustrate that cross-listings are rare (2.0% of all country pairs) and that 13.3% and
1.5% of all country pairs share the same language and a colonial history, respectively.
Table 2 shows correlations between all variables. The correlation estimates between the
dependent variable and the independent variables are statistically significant throughout and
often economically meaningful. For instance, mobileijk has a Pearson correlation coefficient of
58Sergei Sarkissian makes the data available on his website at: http://sergei-sarkissian.com/data.html.
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0.402 with crosslistingij and of 0.174 with colonyij . The correlations among the independent
variables are also high. As an example, tradeflowij has a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.205
with gdp_highij , of 0.131 with crosslistingij and of -0.161 with distance_highij .
Table 3 displays the regression results. In contrast to the univariate correlations, not all
independent variables are significantly associated with the dependent variable. For example,
the coefficient on gdp_highij is not statistically significant in any specification. This finding
suggests that income differences between home and host country play little role in the decision
to temporarily migrate within the accounting firm once other determinants are controlled for.
In contrast, the coefficient estimate on crosslistingij is statistically significant and large in
magnitude (between 0.318 and 0.354) for all LoS. While this result indicates a strong influence
of capital market interdependencies on migration decisions in our setting, we cannot rule out that
the cross-listing proxy captures part of the explanatory power of other independent variables that
are highly correlated with it (see Table 2). The coefficient estimate on tradeflowij is (weakly)
statistically significant for all LoS but low in magnitude (between 0.004 and 0.007), in line with
a modestly positive association between the likelihood of migration and trade ties. Similarly,
the coefficient estimate on taxhaven_hostij is weakly statistically significant for auditing and
taxation, providing mild evidence that geographically close tax havens create demand for services
in these LoS. Finally, the regression results suggest that employees in the accounting firm are
more likely to migrate to host countries that, relative to their home country, have the same
language, share the same colonial history and are geographically close. Specifically, the coefficient
estimates on comlangij , colonyij and distance_highij are statistically significant in almost all
specifications with absolute magnitudes ranging from 0.009 (distance_highij for taxation) to
0.144 (colonyij for auditing). Untabulated statistics show that the documented associations
between dependent and independent variables do not vary systematically across LoS with a few
exceptions (e.g., the coefficient estimate on taxhaven_hostij is significantly larger for auditing
and taxation relative to consulting).
The bottom of Table 3 depicts the three home and host countries with the largest fixed effects
coefficients. The United States (US) and the United Kingdom (GB) are among the most popular
home and host countries in all LoS. Australia (AU) and Canada (CA) are popular host countries.
These statistics suggest that mobility is particularly common between large, English-speaking
countries.
Taken together, the results of the first part of the empirical analysis support the notion
that country-level determinants established in prior migration literature [e.g., Beine et al., 2011;
Mayda, 2010] also matter in our specific context of temporary migration within firms.
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3.2 Extent of Temporary Migration
In the second part of the empirical analysis, we investigate whether migration decisions in our
setting also depend on LoS-specific factors. This analysis is based on the following argument:
Auditors and tax experts regularly have to turn to accounting, auditing and tax rules to carry
out their duties. These rules can be international standards, such as the IFRS, or national
law with differing degrees of harmonization, such as most tax regulation. Similarity in these
rules across borders facilitates the transition into a new work environment abroad and, thus,
lowers the cost for employees to migrate [e.g., Bloomfield et al., 2017]. Consultants, on the
other hand, apply procedures that are not subject to national regulations and, thus, should have
little impact on migration decisions within this LoS. We test these expectations by examining
whether migration decisions depend on similarity in accounting and tax regimes as LoS-specific
factors. We benchmark auditing and taxation against consulting, which should respond less to
these LoS-specific factors. In addition, we benchmark associations with similarity in accounting
and tax regimes against assocations with a well established migration determinant, income
differences. Monetary incentives, such as higher compensation, are usually regarded as first-order
determinants [e.g., Borjas, 1987; Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Roy, 1951] and could also matter in
our setting. Within-firm mobility normally implies additional compensation for relocation and
potential adjustments for higher living expenses. Anecdotal evidence from the accounting firm
confirms that employees in our sample can indeed only be better off financially by migrating
abroad.
In contrast to the first part of the analysis, we examine the extent instead of the existence
of temporary migration and resort to finer measures informing about relative numbers of mobile
employees. Figure 1 illustrates that relative numbers vary across LoS. It displays, for each
country, flows to the host countries to which mobile employees are sent (in the color of the
country) as well as flows from home countries from which it receives mobile employees (in the
colors of the respective home countries). Flows are expressed relative to the overall number of
mobile employees and countries correspond to the sample countries for the analysis below. The
figure demonstrates, for instance, that South Africa sends relatively more employees in auditing;
that India is a relatively more important home country in consulting; and that assignments
between countries often associated with favorable tax regimes (e.g., Netherlands, Luxembourg
and Switzerland) play a larger role in taxation.
In the analysis, we use our mobility measure in continuous form (mobile_shareijk) as de-
pendent variable (see Section 2). We restrict the analysis to the subset of country pairs for which
we observe positive mobility, i.e., where mobileijk is equal to one. As Figure 2a illustrates, raw
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values are positively skewed because each LoS has a few outliers that mostly belong to host coun-
tries with few employees. To reduce the influence of these outliers, we use the mobility measure
in logarithmic form (ln(mobile_share)ijk) in the regression analysis. Figure 2b shows that the
distribution of this logged measure roughly follows the normal distribution. We estimate the
following regression model:
ln(mobile_share)ijk =β1acc_simij + β2tax_simij + β3gdp_highij
[+βlCONTROLSij ] + βmFEi + βnFEj + εijk
The independent variables are defined as follows (see Appendix A.1 for further details): acc_simij
is our proxy for similarity in accounting regimes. We follow Bae, Tan and Welker [2008] and
count differences in accounting rules for country pairs. Bae et al. [2008] provide information on
whether accounting rules agree with IAS for 49 countries based on a survey study summarized in
Street [2002]. We add around 30 countries that adopted IFRS until 2007 and compute similarity
scores in line with Cascino and Gassen [2015].59 acc_simij is computed as the number of differ-
ences in accounting rules for the respective country pair divided by the maximum difference in
the sample. We multiply this score by -1 so that the resulting proxy is increasing in accounting
similarity. tax_simij is our proxy for similarity in tax regimes. This proxy is based on data
from the tax attractiveness index described in Schanz, Dinkel, Fritz, Grosselfinger and Keller
[2017] and Keller and Schanz [2013] and applied in previous studies [e.g., Beuselinck, Deloof and
Vanstraelen, 2015; Schanz, Dinkel and Keller, 2017]. The index aggregates information about
the existence and design of various tax rules in 100 countries.60 We focus on ten items that
allow simple comparisons across countries using values for the year 2007.61 tax_simij is the
number of differences in tax rules for each country pair divided by the maximum difference in the
sample. We multiply the score by -1 so that the resulting proxy is increasing in tax similarity.
gdp_highij captures income differences between home and host country (see Section 3.1) and,
thus, reflects the potential for wage increases. CONTROLSij includes the remaining migra-
tion determinants used in the previous Section: taxhaven_hostij , crosslistingij , tradeflowij ,
59We use the term ‘IFRS’ to refer to both the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the
International Accounting Standards (IAS). We have details on IFRS adoption years from the jurisdiction
profiles provided by the IFRS Foundation, available at: http://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/use-of-ifrs-
standards-by-jurisdiction/.
60The data are publicly available through the website http://www.taxindex.de.
61Specifically, we focus on the following ten items: anti-avoidance rules, CFC rules, EU member state, group taxa-
tion regime, holding tax climate, loss carryback, loss carryforward, R&D tax incentives, thin capitalization rules
and transfer pricing rules. All of these items are either coded 0/1 or 0/0.5/1 and hence allow straightforward
comparisons in country pairs.
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comlangij , colonyij and distance_highij .62
As in Section 3.1, we estimate the model separately for each LoS and as cross-sectional OLS
regressions with separate fixed effects for home and host countries, FEi and FEj . Standard
errors are again adjusted for heteroskedasticity and two-way clustering by home and host country.
The summary statistics in Table 1 show that, on average, between 0.708% (taxation) and
1.295% (auditing) of all employees in the home country are on an international assignment. The
proxy for accounting similarity, acc_simij , has a mean (median) of -0.295 (-0.250). These values
are higher than those reported in related literature [e.g., Cascino and Gassen, 2015] due to the
large number of IFRS adopters in our sample. The proxy for tax similarity, tax_simij , has a
mean (median) of -0.504 (-0.500) indicating that about half of the tax rules are the same in the
average country pair.
The correlations in Table 2 for ln(mobile_share)ijk, acc_simij and tax_simij are based on
the sample used in the subsequent regressions (1,291 observations). The correlations between
ln(mobile_share)ijk and the country-level migration determinants are largely similar to those
reported in Section 3.1. For instance, the mobility measure has a Pearson correlation coefficient
of 0.182 with crosslistingij and of 0.172 with colonyij . The proxies for accounting and tax
similarity are higher in country pairs with stronger economic ties and shorter distances. For
example, acc_simij (tax_simij) has a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.062 (0.068) with
crosslistingij and of -0.133 (-0.068) for distance_highij .63
Table 4 shows the regression results for the second part of our empirical analysis. The results
are consistent with LoS-specific factors playing a role for migration in our setting. Higher ac-
counting similarity is positively associated with the extent of migration in auditing and taxation,
suggesting that the proxy also captures characteristics of tax regimes. For auditing, the coeffi-
cient estimate on acc_simij is statistically significant, even after controlling for the country-level
migration determinants used in the first part. The association is economically meaningful as
the coefficient estimate of 0.800 corresponds to a 28% increase in the mobility measure for a
one-standard-deviation increase in accounting similarity. For taxation, the coefficient estimate
on acc_simij is weakly statistically significant once the control variables enter and smaller in
magnitude (0.401). Economically, it translates into a 14% increase in the mobility measure for
62Data on some independent variables are not available for all countries. We limit the sample in this analysis to
country pairs with non-missing information on accounting and tax similarity scores. For all other variables, we
set missing values to zero.
63However, correlations for accounting similarity and the proxies for economic ties are weaker. acc_simij has a
Pearson correlation coefficient of -0.079 with tradeflowij and statistically insignificant Spearman correlation
coefficients with both crosslistingij and tradeflowij .
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a one-standard-deviation increase in accounting similarity.64 Higher similarity in tax rules is
positively associated with the extent of migration in taxation and consulting. For taxation, the
association is not robust to the inclusion of the control variables; the coefficient estimate on
tax_simij becomes insignificant. For consulting, it becomes even stronger with the inclusion
of the control variables. This finding is somewhat contrary to our expectation that consultants
should respond less to LoS-specific factors. Finally, income differences do not seem to be asso-
ciated with the extent of migration in all three LoS. For auditing and taxation, the coefficient
estimates are not different from zero throughout. For consulting, the coefficient estimate is
weakly significant, but only without further control variables. In the middle part of Table 4, we
compare the coefficient estimates on the key independent variables across LoS. The coefficient
estimates on acc_simij are larger and statistically different for auditors relative to the other
two LoS. Supporting the rather weak findings above, the coefficient estimates on tax_simij are
not statistically different for tax experts relative to auditors and consultants. In a similar vein,
the coefficient estimates on gdp_highij are not statistically different for consultants relative to
auditors and tax experts.
Coefficient estimates for the other migration determinants are weaker, but largely consistent
with the results in the first part of the analysis. Common cultural links with the host coun-
try (captured by comlangij and colonyij) are significantly associated with the share of mobile
employees in all LoS. However, we do not have an explanation for the significantly negative
coefficient estimate on taxhaven_hostij in consulting.
The bottom of Table 4 shows the three home and host countries with the largest fixed effects
coefficients. The most popular home countries tend to have relatively few employees, such as
Macedonia (MK) or Zimbabwe (ZW). The most popular host countries are primarily English-
speaking countries with large offices, such as the United States (US), the United Kingdom (GB)
and Australia (AU).
In summary, our empirical findings are in line with LoS-specific factors shaping migration
decisions. Specifically, the number of auditors and tax experts on international assignments
is higher for host countries with accounting (and tax) regimes that resemble the regulatory
environment in the home country. Yet, our empirical findings are not clear. Despite greater
flexibility, consultants appear to respond to similarity in tax regimes and this to a higher degree
than to income differences.
64The standard deviation of acc_simij for the auditing (taxation) subsample amounts to 0.308 (0.327).
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4 Conclusion
This research note examines the determinants of temporary migration within multinational
corporations. Based on a comprehensive and proprietary dataset provided by a large accounting
firm, we document that country-level as well as occupation-level determinants are associated
with the likelihood and extent of temporary migration. While the associations with country-
level determinants (e.g., proxies for economic ties or geographic proximity between home and
host country) are in line with prior literature on long-term migration across firms, we are, to our
knowledge, the first to document that these determinants also matter for migration decisions
within firms. In addition, we find some evidence that occupation-related regulatory variation
across countries (e.g., differences in accounting standards) reduces the extent of temporary
migration within firms.
Our analysis is explorative in nature and some of the evidence is not conclusive. Nonetheless,
we believe that the analysis yields interesting insights on what drives temporary migration within
multinational corporations. Thus far, these insights have been elusive to researchers due to a
lack of appropriate data. Further research in this area is warranted, in particular with regard to
how regulatory differences across countries affect the international market for skilled labor. We





mobileijk Indicator variable equal to one if at least one individual from LoS k in
home country i works in host country j in the years 2005–2008.
Line of service (LoS) is auditing, taxation or consulting. The migration
data pertains to mobility within a large accounting firm.
mobile_shareijk
[ln(mobile_share)ijk]
[The natural logarithm of] the ratio of the annual number of employees
from LoS k in home country i working in host country j to the number
of employees from LoS k in home country i, as average over the years
2005–2008. We multiply mobile_shareijk by 100 for representation in
tables and figures.
acc_simij Accounting similarity following Bae et al. [2008].
tax_simij Tax similarity based on data from the tax attractiveness index [Schanz,
Dinkel, Fritz, Grosselfinger and Keller, 2017; Keller and Schanz, 2013].
gdp_highij Indicator variable equal to one if the per capita GDP of host country
j is larger than the per capita GDP of home country i. GDP data are
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. We employ the
average over the years 2005–2008 and set missing values to zero.
taxhaven_hostij Indicator variable equal to one if host country j is among the five closest
tax havens for home country i. We identify tax havens following Dyreng
and Lindsey [2009].
crosslistingij Indicator variable equal to one if firms from home country i are cross-
listed in host country j. We use cross-listings from the dataset described
in Sarkissian and Schill [2004, 2009, 2016]. For country pairs that are
not part of the dataset, we set cross-listings to zero.
tradeflowij Indicator variable equal to one if exports from home country i to host
country j are above the median for home country i. Data are from CEPII
[Fouquin and Hugot, 2016]. For country pairs that are not part of the
dataset, we set exports to zero.
comlangij Indicator variable equal to one if home country i and host country j
share the same language.
colonyij Indicator variable equal to one if home country i and host country j have
a common colonial history.
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous page
Variable Description
distance_highij Indicator variable equal to one if the distance between home country i
and host country j is larger than the sample median. Data on language,
colonial links and distance are from CEPII [Mayer and Zignago, 2011].
We set missing values to zero.
Notes: i, j and k denote home country, host country and line of service (LoS), respectively.
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Notes: The figure displays shares of mobile employees in country pairs, separately for the three lines of services (LoS): auditing in Figure 1a, taxation in Figure 1b and consulting in
Figure 1c. For each country, it depicts flows to the host countries to which mobile employees are sent (in the color of the country) and flows from the home countries from which it
receives mobile employees (in the colors of the respective home countries). Flows are expressed relative to the overall number of mobile employees in each LoS. Country pairs are limited
to the observations used in Section 3.2. We further drop country pairs whose share is below a threshold.
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Notes: The figure displays the distribution of the mobility share for all lines of services
(LoS) k, i.e., auditing, taxation and consulting. Figure 2a shows the distribution of
mobile_shareijk, i.e., the ratio of the annual number of employees from LoS k in
home country i working in host country j to the number of employees from LoS k in
home country i, as average over the years 2005–2008. We multiply mobile_shareijk
by 100 for the graphical representation. Figure 2b shows the distribution of the natural
logarithm ofmobile_shareijk and the normal density with the same mean and standard
deviation. The number of observations is equal to 1,291.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics





mobile_shareijk 1,291 1.103 3.842 0.002 0.269 91.000
auditing 598 1.295 4.503 0.003 0.250 91.000
taxation 339 0.708 2.052 0.002 0.272 34.357
consulting 354 1.156 3.924 0.002 0.295 52.778
ln(mobile_share)ijk 1,291 −5.896 1.680−10.841 −5.919 −0.094
acc_simij 1,291 −0.295 0.312 −1.000 −0.250 0.000








Notes: The table displays summary statistics. i, j and k denote home country, host country and line of
service (LoS), respectively. LoS is auditing, taxation or consulting. mobileijk is an indicator variable equal to
one if at least one individual from LoS k in home country i works in host country j in the years 2005–2008.
mobile_shareijk [ln(mobile_share)ijk] is [the natural logarithm of] the ratio of the annual number of employees
from LoS k in home country i working in host country j to the number of employees from LoS k in home country
i, as average over the years 2005–2008. We multiply mobile_shareijk by 100 for representation in the table.
acc_simij is accounting similarity following Bae et al. [2008]. tax_simij is tax similarity based on data from
the tax attractiveness index. gdp_highij is an indicator variable equal to one if the per capita GDP of host
country j is larger than the per capita GDP of home country i. taxhaven_hostij is an indicator variable equal
to one if host country j is among the five closest tax havens for home country i. crosslistingij is an indicator
variable equal to one if firms from home country i are cross-listed in host country j. tradeflowij is an indicator
variable equal to one if exports from home country i to host country j are above the median for home country i.
comlangij is an indicator variable equal to one if home country i and host country j share the same language.
colonyij is an indicator variable equal to one if home country i and host country j have a common colonial
history. distance_highij is an indicator variable equal to one if the distance between home country i and host
country j is larger than the sample median.
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Table 2: Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
(1) mobileijk 1.000 0.048∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗
(2) ln(mobile_share)ijk 1.000 0.032 0.025 0.295∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ −0.048∗
(3) acc_simij 0.038 1.000 0.229∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗ −0.030 0.042 0.005 0.009 0.041 −0.178∗∗∗
(4) tax_simij 0.033 0.210∗∗∗ 1.000 −0.050∗ −0.078∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ −0.010 −0.001 −0.064∗∗
(5) gdp_highij 0.048∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗ −0.043 1.000 0.058∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ −0.003 0.002 0.002
(6) taxhaven_hostij 0.040∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗ −0.050∗ −0.071∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 1.000 0.037∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗ −0.170∗∗∗
(7) crosslistingij 0.402∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.068∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 1.000 0.131∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗
(8) tradeflowij 0.164∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ −0.079∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 1.000 0.091∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗
(9) comlangij 0.085∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.045 −0.006 −0.003 0.101∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 1.000 0.158∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗
(10) colonyij 0.174∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.048∗ −0.006 0.002 −0.009∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 1.000 −0.032∗∗∗
(11) distance_highij −0.038∗∗∗ −0.041 −0.133∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗ 0.002 −0.170∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗ −0.161∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ 1.000
Notes: The table displays Pearson correlations in the lower and Spearman correlations in the upper triangle. i, j and k denote home country, host country and
line of service (LoS), respectively. LoS is auditing, taxation or consulting. mobileijk is an indicator variable equal to one if at least one individual from LoS k in
home country i works in host country j in the years 2005–2008. ln(mobile_share)ijk is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the annual number of employees from
LoS k in home country i working in host country j to the number of employees from LoS k in home country i, as average over the years 2005–2008. acc_simij is
accounting similarity following Bae et al. [2008]. tax_simij is tax similarity based on data from the tax attractiveness index. gdp_highij is an indicator variable
equal to one if the per capita GDP of host country j is larger than the per capita GDP of home country i. taxhaven_hostij is an indicator variable equal to
one if host country j is among the five closest tax havens for home country i. crosslistingij is an indicator variable equal to one if firms from home country i
are cross-listed in host country j. tradeflowij is an indicator variable equal to one if exports from home country i to host country j are above the median for
home country i. comlangij is an indicator variable equal to one if home country i and host country j share the same language. colonyij is an indicator variable
equal to one if home country i and host country j have a common colonial history. distance_highij is an indicator variable equal to one if the distance between
home country i and host country j is larger than the sample median. The number of observations is equal to 1,291 for all correlations with ln(mobile_share)ijk,
acc_simij and tax_simij ; and is equal to 50,600 else. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
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Table 3: Existence of Temporary Migration
mobileijk
auditing taxation consulting
gdp_highij 0.013 0.006 0.006
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006)














distance_highij −0.012∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Home and host country fixed effects yes yes yes
adj. R2 0.341 0.260 0.292
adj. R2 within 0.077 0.097 0.087
N 18,360 18,360 13,340
# home countries 136 136 116
# host countries 136 136 116
Largest fixed effects
Home country US, GB, DE US, GB, NL GB, US, DE
Host country US, GB, CA US, GB, AU US, GB, AU
Notes: The table displays the analysis of mobility determinants. i, j and k denote home country, host country
and line of service (LoS), respectively. LoS is auditing, taxation or consulting. The sample encompasses all
possible combinations of home and host countries, conditional on observing employees in LoS k. mobileijk is an
indicator variable equal to one if at least one individual from LoS k in home country i works in host country j in
the years 2005–2008. gdp_highij is an indicator variable equal to one if the per capita GDP of host country j is
larger than the per capita GDP of home country i. taxhaven_hostij is an indicator variable equal to one if host
country j is among the five closest tax havens for home country i. crosslistingij is an indicator variable equal
to one if firms from home country i are cross-listed in host country j. tradeflowij is an indicator variable equal
to one if exports from home country i to host country j are above the median for home country i. comlangij
is an indicator variable equal to one if home country i and host country j share the same language. colonyij
is an indicator variable equal to one if home country i and host country j have a common colonial history.
distance_highij is an indicator variable equal to one if the distance between home country i and host country
j is larger than the sample median. Standard errors are two-way clustered by home country i and host country
j and denoted below the coefficients in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01
level, respectively.
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Table 4: Extent of Temporary Migration
ln(mobile_share)ijk
auditing taxation consulting
acc_simij 0.757∗∗∗0.800∗∗∗ 0.299 0.401∗ −0.090 −0.199
(0.239) (0.246) (0.251) (0.231) (0.503) (0.510)
tax_simij 0.630 0.370 0.998∗∗∗0.495 0.953∗ 1.042∗∗
(0.465) (0.404) (0.328) (0.394) (0.536) (0.508)
gdp_highij 0.060 −0.004 0.217 0.147 0.181∗ 0.081
(0.168) (0.157) (0.156) (0.142) (0.097) (0.108)













distance_highij −0.254 −0.284 0.052
(0.160) (0.169) (0.150)
Home and host country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
acc_simij tax_simij gdp_highij
∆ coefficients 0.592∗∗ −0.151 0.060
(0.277) (0.406) (0.155)
adj. R2 0.614 0.659 0.602 0.643 0.652 0.670
adj. R2 within 0.019 0.144 0.036 0.157 0.022 0.092
N 598 339 354
# home countries 62 47 51
# host countries 44 35 37
Largest fixed effects (incl. controls)
Home country MK, ZW, HR SI, KE, NZ ZW, TH, LT
Host country US, GB, CN US, GB, CN GB, US, CN
Notes: The table displays the analysis of mobility determinants. i, j and k denote home country, host country
and line of service (LoS), respectively. LoS is auditing, taxation or consulting. The sample encompasses all
combinations of home and host countries for which we observe mobility in the years 2005–2008 with available
data for the similarity scores. ln(mobile_share)ijk is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the annual number
of employees from LoS k in home country i working in host country j to the number of employees from LoS k
in home country i, as average over the years 2005–2008. acc_simij is accounting similarity following Bae et al.
[2008]. tax_simij is tax similarity based on data from the tax attractiveness index. gdp_highij is an indicator
variable equal to one if the per capita GDP of host country j is larger than the per capita GDP of home country
i. taxhaven_hostij is an indicator variable equal to one if host country j is among the five closest tax havens for
home country i. crosslistingij is an indicator variable equal to one if firms from home country i are cross-listed
in host country j. tradeflowij is an indicator variable equal to one if exports from home country i to host
country j are above the median for home country i. comlangij is an indicator variable equal to one if home
country i and host country j share the same language. colonyij is an indicator variable equal to one if home
country i and host country j have a common colonial history. distance_highij is an indicator variable equal to
one if the distance between home country i and host country j is larger than the sample median. Standard errors
are two-way clustered by home country i and host country j and denoted below the coefficients in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level, respectively.
124
